Article 3 - Right to integrity of the person
Article 31 - Fair and just working conditions
Article 47 - Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
Key facts of the case:
On 22 September 2020, the Superior Council of the Magistracy, awarded A, a judge, the classification of "Sufficient" for the service provided in a district court, in the period from 2015 to 2019. Dissatisfied A. lodged a complaint with the Superior Council of the Magistracy, complaint that was dismissed on May 2021. Still dissatisfied, A filed a complaint with the Supreme Court of Justice, against the Superior Council of the Magistracy, requesting that the deliberation that dismissed their complaint be considered null and void or annulled, arguing that, among other claims, it violated articles 3 and 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, further noting that the classification awarded to them did not correspond to their functional performance, and that neither the inspector nor the contested deliberation took into account the workload and health problems affecting A. Finally, A also claimed that the decision violated the principle of judicial independence arising from Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). For its part, the Superior Council of the Magistracy contested, requesting that the action be dismissed, arguing that the decision of 2021 does not suffer from any of the alleged defects.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The Supreme Court of Justice was called to decide whether the decision of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy on the alleged violation of articles 3 and 31 of the Charter, and the violation of the principle of judicial independence arising from Article 47.
Outcome of the case:
In its reasoning, and with regard to A's claim on violations of articles 3 and 31 of the Charter, the Court considered that although these articles enshrine the right to physical and mental integrity and the right to healthy, safe and dignified working conditions, and that Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union has established that the Charter is legally binding and has the same legal value as the Treaties, Article 51 of the Charter states that the provisions of the Charter are addressed to Union institutions, bodies and agencies, in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, as well as the Member States, only when they apply Union law. Thus, compliance with the principle of subsidiarity means that EU Member States are bound by the fundamental rights guaranteed by their national constitutions, and the Charter does not give the Commission a general competence to intervene in matters of fundamental rights. The latter can only intervene when Union law is at stake, which is not the case. Furthermore, the court also concluded that the plaintiff's health limitations were not relativized. As for the claim of violation of the principle of judicial independence arising from Article 47 of the Charter, the Court considered that the exercise of judicial activity is not subject to compliance with the respective functional duties of judges and, as such, included in the scope of the inspection action on the performance of judges. Therefore, the Court decided to dismiss the appeal as completely unfounded.
«This Supreme Court has already had the opportunity to rule on the applicability of the Charter of Fundamentals Rights of the European Union, namely under the terms of 11.16.2017, Case T8LSB.L3.S1, and of 3.21.2013, Case nº 15/12.6YFLSB, delivered within the scope of disciplinary proceedings against a judge, stating that:
“(…)
Article 6 (1), of the Treaty on the European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, established that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is legally binding and has the same legal value as the Treaties. This means, inter alia, that EU legislation that violates the rights guaranteed by the Charter can be annulled by the European Court of Justice. However, article 51 of the Charter states that “the provisions of this Charter are addressed as bodies and agencies of the Union, they apply in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, as well as only the Member States, only Union law”.
The observance of the principle of subsidiary that the EU Member States are bound by the fundamental rights guaranteed by national constitutions. However, all EU legislative proposals must respect the Charter.
However, the Charter does not give the Commission a general competence to intervene in matters of fundamental rights. The latter can only intervene when Union law is at stake. Member States have their own systems of protection of fundamental rights through their constitutions and national courts and the Charter does not replace them (…)”
As these edges are stated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union:
- is only enforceable against Member States,
- apply Union law under the terms of article 51, paragraph 1 of the Charter.
However, as highlighted in the aforementioned judgment of 21.3.2013, the “Statute of Judicial Magistrates, as well as Decree-Law 58/2008, of 9 September and the Code of Criminal Procedure are not creations of primarily Union law” , however, this statement being applicable and transposable, mutatis mutandis, for the present case, is that, also for that reason, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not applicable, nor summonable for the situation in question."
"As for the violation of the principle of judicial independence invoked by the author, it will be said preliminarily and briefly that it does not follow from article 19, paragraph 1 of the Treaty on European Union, since it is not provided for therein, referring as far as the applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the aforementioned, and, on the other hand, that the plaintiff does not allege any facts that materialize the generic allegation, and in this purely theoretical aspect, that the defendant assessed the merit or demerit of the decisions rendered and / or has interfered in the sphere of appreciation of the decisions rendered."
«Este Supremo Tribunal já teve ocasião de se pronunciar sobre a aplicabilidade da Carta dos Fundamentais da União Europeia, designadamente nos termos de 16.11.2017, Procº nº 2910/14.9TTLSB.L2.S1, 26.11.2020, Procº nº 30060/15. T8LSB.L3.S1, e de 21.3.2013, Procº nº 15/12.6YFLSB, este proferido no âmbito de procedimento disciplinar contra magistrado, nele se afirmando que:
O art. 6.º, n.º 1, do TUE, alterado pelo Tratado de Lisboa, veio estabelecer que a (...)[Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais] é juridicamente vinculativa e tem o mesmo valor jurídico que os Tratados. Isto significa, nomeadamente, que a legislação da UE que viola os direitos garantidos pela Carta pode ser anulada pelo TJUE. Porém, o artigo 51.º da Carta declara que «as disposições da presente Carta têm por destinatários como, órgãos e organismos da União, aplicam-se na observância do princípio da subsidiariedade, bem como apenas os Estados-Membros, apenas o direito da União».
A observância do princípio das subsidiárias significativas que se encontram os Estados-Membros da UE se encontram pelos direitos fundamentais garantidos por constituições nacionais. Contudo, quando a Carta do Direito da União deve respeitar também os direitos fundamentais, o que significa que todas as propostas legislativas da UE devem respeitar a Carta.
Porém, a Carta não confere à Comissão uma competência geral de intervenção em matéria de direitos fundamentais. Esta só pode intervir quando o direito da União estiver em causa. Os Estados-Membros têm os seus próprios sistemas de proteção dos direitos fundamentais através das suas constituições e dos tribunais nacionais e a Carta não os substitui (…)”
Como se afirma esses arestos a Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia:
- só é oponível aos Estados Membros,
- apliquem direito da União nos termos do artigo 51º, nº 1, quando aquele diploma.
Ora, como se sublinhou no acórdão de 21.3.2013 citado, o “Estatuto dos Magistrados Judiciais bem como o Decreto-Lei nº 58/2008, de 9 de Setembro e o Código de Processo Penal não criado primariamente direito comunitário, não são aplicação do Direito da União” , pelo, sendo tal afirmação aplicável e transponível, mutatis mutandis, para o caso vertente, é de que, também por esse motivo, não é a Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais aplicável, nem convocável para a situação em apreço."»
"Quanto à violação do princípio da independência judicial invocado pela autora, dir-se-á preliminar e sinteticamente que o mesmo não decorre do artigo 19º, nº 1 do Tratado da União Europeia, pois que não se encontra aí previsto, remetendo-se quanto à aplicabilidade da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais para o anteriormente referido, e, por outro lado, que autora não alega quaisquer factos que concretizem a alegação genérica, e neste conspecto puramente teórica, de que a entidade demandada aferiu do mérito ou demérito das decisões proferidas e/ou se tenha imiscuído na esfera de apreciação das decisões proferdas."