38. The requirement to interpret Article 15(b) of Directive 2004/83 in a manner consistent with Article 19(2) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment in Abed El Karem El Kott and Others, C‑364/11, EU:C:2012:826, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited), to the effect that no person may be returned to a State in which there is a serious risk that that person will be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, and having due regard for Article 3 of the ECHR, to which Article 15(b), in essence, corresponds (judgment in Elgafaji, EU:C:2009:94, paragraph 28), is not such as to call that interpretation into question.
39. It should be noted in that regard that, according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that, while non-nationals subject to a decision authorising their removal cannot, in principle, claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance and services provided by that State, a decision to remove a foreign national suffering from a serious physical or mental illness to a country where the facilities for the treatment of the illness are inferior to those available in that State may raise an issue under Article 3 ECHR in very exceptional cases, where the humanitarian grounds against removal are compelling (see, inter alia, European Court of Human Rights, judgment in N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565/05, § 42, ECHR 2008).
40. None the less, the fact that a third country national suffering from a serious illness may not, under Article 3 ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, in highly exceptional cases, be removed to a country in which appropriate treatment is not available does not mean that that person should be granted leave to reside in a Member State by way of subsidiary protection under Directive 2004/83.