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CJEU - C 566/14 P / Opinion

Jean-Charles Marchiani v European Parliament

Policy area:
Institutional affairs
Deciding Body type:
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding Body:
Advocate General
Decision date:

Key facts of the case:

Appeal — Member of the European Parliament — Parliamentary assistance allowances — Recovery of sums unduly paid — Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 — Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 — Limitation — Reasonable time — Review judgment in Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB (C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134) — Judgment in Nencini v Parliament (C‑447/13 P, EU:C:2014:2372)

  1. By his appeal, Mr Marchiani asks the Court to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 10 October 2014 in Marchiani v Parliament (T‑479/13, EU:T:2014:866, ‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the General Court dismissed his action for annulment of the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament of 4 July 2013 regarding the recovery of a sum of EUR 107 694.72 (‘the contested decision’) and of the related debit note of 5 July 2013 (‘the debit note’).
  2. In the fourth ground put forward in support of his appeal Mr Marchiani complains that the General Court committed several errors of law in respect of the limitation period for the entitlements to which the contested decision relates. The appellant has not drafted his appeal particularly clearly. However, in the fourth ground of appeal the fourth part may be identified as concerning more specifically an assessment of the reasonable period principle, which applies where no provision of EU law lays down the period within which an application or an action must be lodged.
  3. That question was carefully examined by the Court of Justice in the context of a review judgment (Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB (C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134). It was also analysed more recently and in a context similar to that of the present appeal in the judgment in Nencini v Parliament (C‑447/13 P, EU:C:2014:2372), although the approaches taken by the Court in those two judgments may appear to conflict with one another.
  4. That is why, in accordance with the wishes of the Court of Justice, the present Opinion will be limited to an analysis of that specific question.

Results (sanctions) and key consequences of the case:

  1. In the light of the above considerations, I consider that the fourth part of the fourth ground of appeal put forward by the appellant in support of his appeal is unfounded and that consequently it cannot lead to the judgment under appeal being set aside.