CJEU Case C-467/19 PPU / Order

Criminal proceedings against QR
Policy area
Justice, freedom and security
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
Court (Second Chamber)
Type
Decision
Decision date
24/09/2019
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2019:776
  • CJEU Case C-467/19 PPU / Order

    Key facts of the case:

    Reference for a preliminary ruling — Urgent preliminary ruling procedure — Judicial cooperation in criminal matters — Directive (EU) 2016/343 — Article 7(4) — Strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings — Right to remain silent and right not to incriminate oneself — Agreement between the prosecutor and the offender — Approval of such an agreement by the court — Condition — Consent of the other accused persons — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Not applicable.

    Outcome of the case:

    On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules:

    Article 7(4) of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings must be interpreted as meaning that it does not govern the issue of whether or not the approval, by a court, of an agreement on the imposition of a negotiated sentence, such as the agreement at issue in the main proceedings, concluded between a person accused, on the basis of his alleged membership of a criminal group, and the prosecutor, may be rendered subject to the condition that the other persons accused, on the basis of their membership of that criminal group, must give their consent to the conclusion of that agreement.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    1) This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 7(4) of Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1), the interpretation of Articles 47 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and the interpretation of the principles of effectiveness and equal treatment.

    ...

    3) Article 20 of the Charter, headed ‘Equality before the law’, provides as follows:

    ‘Everyone is equal before the law.’

    4) Article 51 of the Charter, entitled ‘Field of application’, provides as follows:

    ‘1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.

    2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.’

    ...

    21) However, the referring court raises the issue of whether the requirement to obtain the consent of all the accused persons is consistent with Article 7(4) of Directive 2016/343, Article 47, first and second paragraphs, of the Charter and Article 52(1) thereof, and the principles of effectiveness and equal treatment.

    ...

    22) In those circumstances, the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Specialised Criminal Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

    ‘Is case-law such as that at issue, which concerns the national law regarding the approval by the court of an agreement on the imposition of a negotiated sentence concluded between the prosecution and the defence, which provides for the consent of the other persons charged as a condition for the approval of such an agreement, and that that consent is required only during the judicial stage of the proceedings, consistent with Article 7(4) of Directive 2016/343, with Article 47 and Article 52 of the Charter, and with the principles of effectiveness and equality?’

    ...

    30) By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 7(4) of Directive 2016/343, the first and second paragraphs of Article 47 of the Charter and Article 52(1) thereof, the principle of effectiveness and the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Article 20 of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding the approval, by a court, of an agreement on the imposition of a negotiated sentence, such as the agreement at issue in the main proceedings, concluded between a person accused on the basis of his membership of a criminal group and the prosecutor, from being subject to the condition that the other persons accused on the basis of their membership of that criminal group must give their consent to the conclusion of that agreement.

    ...

    37) As regards the provisions of the Charter mentioned by the referring court, it must be observed that the Charter is not applicable in the case in the main proceedings.

    38) According to Article 51(1) of the Charter, its provisions are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. Under Article 51(2), the Charter does not extend the field of application of EU law beyond the powers of the European Union and does not ‘establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties’. Accordingly, the Court is called upon to interpret, in the light of the Charter, the law of the European Union within the limits of the powers which are conferred on it (judgment of 10 July 2014, Julián Hernández and Others, C‑198/13, EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

    39) As is apparent from the explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter, which must be given due regard pursuant to Article 52(7) thereof, the concept of ‘implementation’ provided for in Article 51 thereof confirms the case-law of the Court as to the applicability of the fundamental rights of the European Union as general principles of the EU law developed before the Charter entered into force, according to which the requirement to respect fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union is binding on the Member States only when they are acting within the scope of EU law (judgment of 10 July 2014, Julián Hernández and Others, C‑198/13, EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

    40) In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the concept of ‘implementing Union law’, as referred to in Article 51 of the Charter, presupposes a degree of connection between the measure of EU law and the national measure at issue which goes beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other (judgment of 10 July 2014, Julián Hernández and Others, C‑198/13, EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).

    ...

    43) Consequently, a consent requirement, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to which the approval of an agreement on the imposition of a negotiated sentence is rendered subject, cannot be regarded as implementing Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.