CJEU Case C-585/16 / Judgment

Serin Alheto v Zamestnik-predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite
Policy area
Justice, freedom and security
Asylum and migration
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
Court (Grand Chamber)
Type
Decision
Decision date
25/07/2018
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2018:584
  • CJEU Case C-585/16 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case:

    Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common policy on asylum and subsidiary protection — Standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection — Directive 2011/95/EU — Article 12 — Exclusion from refugee status — Persons registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) — Existence of a ‘first country of asylum’, for a refugee from Palestine, in the UNRWA area of operations — Common procedures for granting international protection — Directive 2013/32/EU — Article 46 — Right to an effective remedy — Full and ex nunc examination — Scope of the powers of the court of first instance — Examination by the courts of international protection needs — Examination of grounds of inadmissibility.

    Outcome of the case:

    On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

    1. Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, read in conjunction with Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection must be interpreted as meaning that the processing of an application for international protection lodged by a person registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) requires an examination of the question whether that person receives effective protection or assistance from that agency, provided that that application has not been previously rejected on the basis of a ground of inadmissibility or on the basis of a ground for exclusion other than that laid down in the first sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95.
    2. The second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted and the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95 must be interpreted as: – precluding national legislation which does not lay down or which incorrectly transposes the ground for no longer applying the ground for exclusion from being a refugee contained therein; – having direct effect; and – being applicable even if the applicant for international protection has not expressly referred to them.
    3. Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that a court or tribunal of a Member State seised at first instance of an appeal against a decision relating to an application for international protection must examine both facts and points of law, such as the applicability of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95 to the applicant’s circumstances, which the body that took that decision took into account or could have taken into account, and those which arose after the adoption of that decision.
    4. Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as meaning that the requirement for a full and ex nunc examination of the facts and points of law may also concern the grounds of inadmissibility of the application for international protection referred to in Article 33(2) of that directive, where permitted under national law, and that, in the event that the court or tribunal hearing the appeal plans to examine a ground of inadmissibility which has not been examined by the determining authority, it must conduct a hearing of the applicant in order to allow that individual to express his or her point of view in person concerning the applicability of that ground to his or her particular circumstances.
    5. Point (b) of the first paragraph of Article 35 of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that a person registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) must, if he or she is a beneficiary of effective protection or assistance from that agency in a third country that is not the territory in which he or she habitually resides but which forms part of the area of operations of that agency, be considered as enjoying sufficient protection in that third country, within the meaning of that provision, when it: – agrees to readmit the person concerned after he or she has left its territory in order to apply for international protection in the European Union; and – recognises that protection or assistance from UNRWA and supports the principle of non-refoulement, thus enabling the person concerned to stay in its territory in safety under dignified living conditions for as long as necessary in view of the risks in the territory of habitual residence.
    6. Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as meaning that it does not establish common procedural standards in respect of the power to adopt a new decision concerning an application for international protection following the annulment, by the court hearing the appeal, of the initial decision taken on that application. However, the need to ensure that Article 46(3) of that directive has a practical effect and to ensure an effective remedy in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights requires that, in the event that the file is referred back to the quasi-judicial or administrative body referred to in Article 2(f) of that directive, a new decision must be adopted within a short period of time and must comply with the assessment contained in the judgment annulling the initial decision.
  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    63) Furthermore, having regard to the obligation to ensure an effective remedy, and in particular to the requirement for a full and ex nunc examination, set out in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, it is necessary to determine, inter alia in the light of Articles 18, 19 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), the scope of the jurisdiction laid down by the EU legislature. It is important, inter alia, to ascertain, in the context of such a full and ex nunc examination, whether the court may factor into its assessment matters, including grounds of inadmissibility, which could not be taken into account when the contested decision rejecting the application for international protection was adopted.

    ...

    66) ... 

    (4) Does it follow from the provisions of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, concerning the right to an effective remedy incorporating the requirement of a “full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law”, interpreted in conjunction with Article 33, Article 34 and the second paragraph of Article 35 of that directive, Article 21(1) of Directive 2011/95 and Articles 18, 19 and 47 of the [Charter], that, in an appeal before a court or tribunal against a decision refusing international protection adopted in accordance with Article 10(2) of Directive 2013/32, those provisions permit the court or tribunal of first instance:

    a) to decide for the first time on the admissibility of the application for international protection and on the refoulement of the stateless person to the country in which he or she was resident before making the application for international protection, after requiring the determining authority to produce the evidence necessary for that purpose and after giving the person in question the opportunity to present his or her views on the admissibility of the application; or

    b) to annul the decision for breach of an essential procedural requirement and to require the determining authority, following directions on the interpretation and application of the law, to re-examine the application for international protection, inter alia, by conducting the admissibility interview provided for in Article 34 of Directive 2013/32 and deciding whether it is possible to return the stateless person to the country in which he or she was resident before making the application for international protection;

    c) to assess the security status of the country in which the person had been resident, at the time of the hearing or, where there have been fundamental changes in the situation that must be taken into account in the person’s favour in the decision to be taken, at the time when judgment is given?

    ...

    6) Does it follow from Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, that the right to an effective remedy incorporating the requirement, “where applicable, [for] an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive 2011/95” compels the court or tribunal of first instance, in an appeal against a decision examining the substance of an application for international protection and refusing to grant such protection, to give a judgment:

    a) which has the force of res judicata in relation not only to the question of the lawfulness of the refusal but also to the applicant’s need for international protection pursuant to Directive 2011/95, including in cases where, under the national law of the Member State concerned, international protection may be granted only by decision of an administrative authority;

    b) on the necessity of granting international protection, by carrying out a proper examination of the application for international protection, irrespective of any breaches of procedural requirements committed by the determining authority when assessing the application?’

    ...

    102) By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a court or tribunal of a Member State seised at first instance of an appeal against a decision on an application for international protection may take into account matters of fact or of law, such as the applicability of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95 to the applicant’s circumstances, which were not examined by the body that took that decision.

    ...

    114) Furthermore, since that provision must be interpreted in a manner consistent with Article 47 of the Charter, the requirement for a full and ex nunc examination implies that the court or tribunal seised of the appeal must interview the applicant, unless it considers that it is in a position to carry out the examination solely on the basis of the information in the case file, including, where applicable, the report or transcript of the personal interview before that authority (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraphs 31 and 44). In the event that new evidence comes to light after the adoption of the decision under appeal, the court or tribunal is required, as follows from Article 47 of the Charter, to offer the applicant the opportunity to express his views when that evidence could affect him negatively.

    ...

    118) In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the third question is that Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a court or tribunal of a Member State seised at first instance of an appeal against a decision relating to an application for international protection must examine both facts and points of law, such as the applicability of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95 to the applicant’s circumstances, which the body that took that decision took into account or could have taken into account, and those which arose after the adoption of that decision.

    The fourth question

    119) By its fourth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Articles 18, 19 and 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the requirement for a full and ex nunc examination both of facts and of points of law also covers the grounds of inadmissibility of the application for international protection referred to in Article 33(2) of that directive and, if so, whether, in the event of an examination of such a ground of inadmissibility by the court or tribunal, even though that ground had not been examined by the determining authority, the file must be referred back to that authority for it to conduct the admissibility interview provided for in Article 34 of that directive.

    ...

    125) While an applicant’s right to be heard with regard to the admissibility of his or her application before any decision on the matter is taken is ensured, in the context of the procedure before the determining authority, by the personal interview provided for in Article 34 of Directive 2013/32, that right derives, during the appeal procedure referred to in Article 46 of that directive, from Article 47 of the Charter and is exercised, if necessary, by means of a hearing of the applicant (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 July 2017, Sacko, C‑348/16, EU:C:2017:591, paragraphs 37 to 44).

    ...

    129) As regards, finally, the point raised by the referring court, concerning whether the requirement for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law must be interpreted in the light of Articles 18 and 19 of the Charter, it suffices to observe that, while the fundamental rights guaranteed by those provisions which relate to the right to asylum and protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition must be observed when implementing such a requirement, they do not offer, in the context of the reply to the question now referred, specific additional guidance concerning the scope of that requirement.

    130) In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the fourth question is that Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the requirement for a full and ex nunc examination of the facts and points of law may also concern the grounds of inadmissibility of the application for international protection referred to in Article 33(2) of that directive, where permitted under national law, and that, in the event that the court or tribunal hearing the appeal plans to examine a ground of inadmissibility which has not been examined by the determining authority, it must conduct a hearing of the applicant in order to allow that individual to express his or her point of view in person concerning the applicability of that ground to his or her particular circumstances.

    ...

    144) By its sixth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the court or tribunal seised at first instance of an appeal against a decision concerning an application for international protection must, in the event that it annuls that decision, rule itself on that application for international protection by granting or rejecting it.

    ...

    148) Consequently, even though the purpose of Directive 2013/32 is not to establish a common standard in respect of the power to adopt a new decision on an application for international protection after the annulment of the initial decision, it nevertheless follows from its purpose of ensuring the fastest possible processing of applications of that nature, from the obligation to ensure that Article 46(3) is effective, and from the need, arising from Article 47 of the Charter, to ensure an effective remedy, that each Member State bound by that directive must order its national law in such a way that, following annulment of the initial decision and in the event of the file being referred back to the quasi-judicial or administrative body referred to in Article 2(f) of that directive, a new decision is adopted within a short period of time and complies with the assessment contained in the judgment annulling the initial decision.

    149) It follows that the answer to the sixth question is that Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that it does not establish common procedural standards in respect of the power to adopt a new decision concerning an application for international protection following the annulment, by the court hearing the appeal, of the initial decision taken on that application. However, the need to ensure that Article 46(3) of that directive has a practical effect and to ensure an effective remedy in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter requires that, in the event that the file is referred back to the quasi-judicial or administrative body referred to in Article 2(f) of that directive, a new decision must be adopted within a short period of time and must comply with the assessment contained in the judgment annulling the initial decision.

    ...

    150) Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

    ...

    3. Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that a court or tribunal of a Member State seised at first instance of an appeal against a decision relating to an application for international protection must examine both facts and points of law, such as the applicability of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2011/95 to the applicant’s circumstances, which the body that took that decision took into account or could have taken into account, and those which arose after the adoption of that decision.

    4. Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as meaning that the requirement for a full and ex nunc examination of the facts and points of law may also concern the grounds of inadmissibility of the application for international protection referred to in Article 33(2) of that directive, where permitted under national law, and that, in the event that the court or tribunal hearing the appeal plans to examine a ground of inadmissibility which has not been examined by the determining authority, it must conduct a hearing of the applicant in order to allow that individual to express his or her point of view in person concerning the applicability of that ground to his or her particular circumstances.

    ...

    6. Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as meaning that it does not establish common procedural standards in respect of the power to adopt a new decision concerning an application for international protection following the annulment, by the court hearing the appeal, of the initial decision taken on that application. However, the need to ensure that Article 46(3) of that directive has a practical effect and to ensure an effective remedy in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights requires that, in the event that the file is referred back to the quasi-judicial or administrative body referred to in Article 2(f) of that directive, a new decision must be adopted within a short period of time and must comply with the assessment contained in the judgment annulling the initial decision.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)