Czechia / Supreme Court / 23 Cdo 1840/2021

DILIA, theatrical, literary, audiovisual agency against the defendant Uloz.to cloud a.s.
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
Supreme Court
Type
Decision
Decision date
08/06/2022
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:CZ:NS:2022:23.CDO.1840.2021.3
  • Czechia / Supreme Court / 23 Cdo 1840/2021

    Key facts of the case:

    Dilia represents authors and other copyright holders. Dilia argued that the defendant’s website which operates as a data storage service is almost exclusively used for the unauthorised sharing of copyrighted material by users of the service (the website). In this case, Dilia sued Uloz.to for infringing Dilia’s right to intellectual property by providing platform to illegally share six movies to which Dilia has intellectual property rights. Dilia also asked the Court to rule that the platform is obliged to prevent (by means of an easily searchable tool, a search engine which it itself provides) any access to such works for downloading and for streaming.

    Key legal questions raised by the Court:

    The Court was called to interpret the provisions of the Act no. 480/2004 Coll. on Information Services, in particular the extent of the responsibility of the service provider for storing the content of information provided by the user (Sections 5 and 6).

    The Act states that the provider of storing service of information provided by a user shall be liable for the content of the information stored at the request of the user only:

    (a) if, having regard to the subject matter of his or her activity and the circumstances and nature of the case, he or she could have known that the content of the information stored or the conduct of the user was unlawful; or

    (b) if he has become aware of the unlawful nature of the content of the stored information or of the unlawful conduct of the user and has not immediately taken all steps which may be required of him or her to remove or render inaccessible such information.

    The service providers shall not be obliged to

    (a) supervise the content of the information transmitted or stored by them,

    (b) actively search for facts and circumstances indicating the unlawful content of the information.

    Outcome of the case:

     

    The Supreme Court emphasised that it is necessary to take into account the specific nature of the service provided by the defendant, including the key technological parameters of the service and the business model used, when assessing the copyright implications. 

    The Supreme Court noted that the provider of an information service (the defendant) consisting of services beyond the mere storage of the data file (provided by the user) contributes to making that work available to the public by operating its service is liable for the content. However, the obligation to restrict searches and downloads can only be imposed in the future on specific works where copyright infringement is proven. The server can hardly control the content of all files uploaded by users in a blanket manner. 

    The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court’s reasoning that the defendant Uloz.to is different from "pirate" platforms like The Pirate Bay, as it deletes files after being notified and thus, it does not bear direct responsibility for copyright infringements by some users. 

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    53. It further follows from the above interpretation that in assessing the existence of an obligation on the part of the provider of a service which is used by users to infringe or threaten the rights of authors, it is necessary to take into account, according to the particular circumstances, a reasonable balance between the interests of copyright holders and related rights in the protection of their intellectual property rights (guaranteed by Articles 11 and 34(1) of the [Czech] Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, respectively, or Article 1 of Additional Protocol No. 209/1992 Coll.) on the one hand, and the right to free choice of profession and training for it, as well as the right to engage in business and other economic activity (guaranteed by Article 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, respectively, Art. 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), on the other hand, and at the same time the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information (guaranteed by Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, or Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, or Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, promulgated under No. 209/1992 Coll, or Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, promulgated under No 120/1976 Coll.). 

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    53. Ze shora uvedeného výkladu rovněž plyne, že při posouzení existence závazku poskytovatele služby, jež je využívána uživateli k porušování nebo ohrožování práv autorů ve smyslu § 40 odst. 1 písm. f) aut. zák., je třeba podle konkrétních okolností zohlednit přiměřenou rovnováhu mezi zájmy nositelů autorských práv a práv s nimi souvisejících na ochraně jejich práv duševního vlastnictví (zaručenými čl. 11 a čl. 34 odst. 1 Listiny základních práv a svobod, resp. čl. 17 odst. 2 Listiny základních práv Evropské unie, popř. též čl. 1 Dodatkového protokolu č. 1 k Úmluvě o ochraně lidských práv a základních svobod, vyhlášeného pod č. 209/1992 Sb.) na straně jedné a právem na svobodnou volbu povolání a přípravu k němu, jakož i právo podnikat a provozovat jinou hospodářskou činnost (zaručeným čl. 26 Listiny základních práv a svobod, resp. čl. 16 Listiny základních práv Evropské unie) na straně druhé, a zároveň je třeba šetřit základní právo na svobodu projevu a na informace (zaručené čl. 17 Listiny základních práv a svobod, resp. čl. 11 Listiny základních práv Evropské unie, popř. též čl. 10 Úmluvy o ochraně lidských práv a základních svobod, vyhlášené pod č. 209/1992 Sb., popř. čl. 19 Mezinárodního paktu o občanských a politických právech, vyhlášeného pod č. 120/1976 Sb.).