CJEU Case C-487/19 / Judgment

Proceedings brought by W.Ż.
Policy area
Justice, freedom and security
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
Court (Grand Chamber)
Type
Decision
Decision date
06/10/2021
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2021:798

Харта на основните права на Европейския съюз

  • CJEU Case C-487/19 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case:

    Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy.

    Reference for a preliminary ruling – Rule of law – Effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – Principles of the irremovability of judges and judicial independence – Transfer without consent of a judge of an ordinary court – Action – Order of inadmissibility made by a judge of the Sąd Najwyższy (Izba Kontroli Nadzwyczajnej i Spraw Publicznych) (Supreme Court (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs), Poland) – Judge appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland on the basis of a resolution of the National Council of the Judiciary, despite a court decision ordering that the effects of that resolution be suspended pending a preliminary ruling of the Court – Judge not constituting an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law – Primacy of EU law – Possibility of finding such an order of inadmissibility to be null and void.

     

    Outcome of the case:

    On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

    The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the principle of the primacy of EU law must be interpreted as meaning that a national court seised of an application for recusal as an adjunct to an action by which a judge holding office in a court that may be called upon to interpret and apply EU law challenges a decision to transfer him without his consent, must – where such a consequence is essential in view of the procedural situation at issue in order to ensure the primacy of EU law – declare to be null and void an order by which a court, ruling at last instance and comprising a single judge, has dismissed that action, if it follows from all the conditions and circumstances in which the process of the appointment of that single judge took place that (i) that appointment took place in clear breach of fundamental rules which form an integral part of the establishment and functioning of the judicial system concerned, and (ii) the integrity of the outcome of that procedure is undermined, giving rise to reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the independence and impartiality of the judge concerned, with the result that that order may not be regarded as being made by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    1) This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 2, Article 6(1) and (3) and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

    ...

    38) By decision of 20 March 2019, the Sąd Najwyższy (Izba Cywilna) (Supreme Court (Civil Chamber)), sitting as a panel of three judges, held that the order at issue had been made in breach of Article 50(3)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, stressing that that provision precludes the delivery of a final judgment in a case while no ruling has been given on an application for recusal of a judge submitted by another judge. In that decision, that court, moreover, noted that that order infringed W.Ż’s rights of defence, for the purposes of Article 45(1) of the Constitution, Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’) and Article 47 of the Charter, since that order had been made by a court not in possession of the case file and without W.Ż’s having had an opportunity to be informed of the position of the public prosecutor.

    ...

    40) The referring court considers that the answer to the questions thus addressed to it will depend, inter alia, on whether a judge appointed in such circumstances constitutes an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Article 267 TFEU, the second subparagraph of Article 47 of the Charter, and Article 6(1) ECHR.

    ...

    42) First, the referring court states that the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs is inter alia called upon to rule in cases in fields covered by EU law such as those relating to the protection of competition and energy regulation. Second, the order at issue was issued in a case concerning the status of and the protection of the independence of a judge of a national court, itself called upon to rule in areas covered by EU law, which requires, at each stage of the main proceedings, compliance with the requirements set out in the second subparagraph of Article 47 of the Charter.

    ...

    51) It is in those circumstances that the Sąd Najwyższy (Izba Cywilna) (Supreme Court (Civil Chamber)), sitting in extended composition as a panel of seven judges, decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

    ‘Should Articles 2, 6(1) and (3) and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) [TEU], in conjunction with Article 47 [of the Charter] and Article 267 [TFEU], be interpreted as meaning that a court composed of a single person who has been appointed to the position of judge in flagrant breach of the laws of a Member State applicable to judicial appointments – which breach included, in particular, the appointment of that person to the position of judge despite a prior appeal to the competent national court [the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court)] against the resolution of a national body [the KRS], which included a motion for the appointment of that person to the position of judge, notwithstanding the fact that the effects of that resolution had been suspended in accordance with national law and that proceedings before the competent national court [the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court)] had not been concluded before the delivery of the appointment letter – is not an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law within the meaning of EU law?’

    ...

    102) As the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU provides, it is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring for individuals compliance with their right to effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law. The principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law, referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, and which is now reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter (judgment of 18 May 2021, Asociația Forumul Judecătorilor Din România and Others, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19EU:C:2021:393, paragraph 190 and the case-law cited). That provision must, therefore, be duly taken into consideration for the purposes of interpreting the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 April 2021, Repubblika, C‑896/19EU:C:2021:311, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).

    103) As regards the material scope of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, that provision refers to ‘the fields covered by Union law’, irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter (judgments of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland(Independence of the Supreme Court), C‑619/18EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited, and of 18 May 2021, Asociaţia Forumul Judecătorilor din România and Others, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19EU:C:2021:393, paragraph 192 and the case-law cited).

    ...

    107) To ensure that such a body is in a position to ensure the effective legal protection thus required under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, maintaining its independence is essential, as confirmed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which refers to access to an ‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental right to an effective remedy (judgments of 18 May 2021, Asociația Forumul Judecătorilor Din România and Others, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19, EU:C:2021:393, paragraph 194 and the case-law cited, and of 15 July 2021, Commission v Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges), C‑791/19, EU:C:2021:596, paragraph 57).

    ...

    113) In that regard, according to settled case-law, the requirement of judicial independence arising from the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU means that the disciplinary regime governing those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute must display the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of its being used as a system of political control of the content of judicial decisions. Rules which define, in particular, both conduct amounting to disciplinary offences and the penalties actually applicable, provide for the involvement of an independent body in accordance with a procedure which fully safeguards the rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, in particular the rights of the defence, and lay down the possibility of bringing legal proceedings challenging the disciplinary bodies’ decisions constitute a set of guarantees that are essential for safeguarding the independence of the judiciary (judgments of 18 May 2021, Asociația Forumul Judecătorilor Din România and Others, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19, EU:C:2021:393, paragraph 198 and the case-law cited, and of 15 July 2021, Commission v Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges), C‑791/19, EU:C:2021:596, paragraph 61).

    ...

    117) In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the requirement of judicial independence arising from second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, requires that the rules applicable to transfer without the consent of such judges present, like the rules governing disciplinary matters, in particular the necessary guarantees to prevent any risk of that independence being jeopardised by direct or indirect external interventions. It follows that the rules and principles recalled in paragraph 113 of the present judgment relating to the disciplinary regime applicable to judges must, mutatis mutandis, also apply so far as concerns such rules concerning transfers.

    118) It is thus important that, even where such transfer measures without consent are, as in the context of the case in the main proceedings, adopted by the president of the court to which the judge who is the subject of those measures belongs outside the disciplinary regime applicable to judges, those measures may only be ordered on legitimate grounds, in particular relating to distribution of available resources to ensure the proper administration of justice, and that such decisions may be legally challenged in accordance with a procedure which fully safeguards the rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, in particular the rights of the defence.

    ...

    120) Although it does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, hearing, as in the case, a request for a preliminary ruling, to confirm the extent to which those circumstances, or certain of them, have in fact been established, it remains, in any event, in order to ensure the possibility of an effective judicial remedy in respect of a decision to transfer a judge without consent, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, necessary for an independent and impartial tribunal established by law to be able, in accordance with a procedure that fully safeguards the rights enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter, to review the validity of that decision and that of the decision not to adjudicate of a body such as the KRS concerning the challenge brought against that transfer decision.

    ...

    122) As regards those concepts, it follows from the first sentence of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which reflects, in essence and as has already been noted in paragraph 102 of this judgment, the general principle of EU law of effective judicial protection, to which the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU also refers, that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.

    123) Moreover, in so far as the Charter sets out rights corresponding to rights guaranteed under the ECHR, Article 52(3) of the Charter is intended to ensure the necessary consistency between the rights contained in the Charter and the corresponding rights guaranteed under the ECHR, without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law. According to the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter corresponds to Article 6(1) ECHR. The Court must, therefore, ensure that the interpretation which it gives to the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter safeguards a level of protection which does not fall below the level of protection established in Article 6(1) ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (see, to that effect, judgments of 29 July 2019, Gambino and Hyka, C‑38/18, EU:C:2019:628, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited, and of 26 March 2020, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission, C‑542/18 RX-II and C‑543/18 RX-II, EU:C:2020:232, paragraph 72).