Belgium / Belgian Council of State, Section Legislation / 77.609/4 and 77.669/4

Advisory role requested on a legislative proposal by the Belgian Chamber of Representatives
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
Belgian Council of State, Section Legislation
Type
Opinion
Decision date
14/05/2025
  • Belgium / Belgian Council of State, Section Legislation / 77.609/4 and 77.669/4

    Key facts of the opinion:

    In April 2025, the President of the House of Representatives asked the Council of State’s legislative section to give its opinion on a draft law concerning the objective neutrality of federal public servants. The proposal, introduced by a member of parliament, seeks to ensure neutrality and impartiality within the federal public administration. A few weeks later, an amendment to this proposal was submitted.

    The draft law defines the duties of state officials in performing their functions. They must treat users of public services with kindness; strictly respect the principles of neutrality, equal treatment, and compliance with laws, regulations, and directives; and avoid any words, attitudes, or appearances that could undermine public confidence in their neutrality, competence, or dignity.

    In particular, public servants are prohibited from wearing visible signs of religious, philosophical, or political conviction while performing their duties.

    The amendment replaces Article 3 of the proposal, reproducing its content but specifying that only state agents exercising authority and in contact with the public must refrain from displaying visible convictional signs. It also empowers the King to establish the list of agents subject to this restriction.

    The Council of State was given thirty days to provide its advisory opinion on both the original proposal and its amendment.

    Key legal question raised by the court:

    The role of the Council of State is to give an opinion on the compatibility of this draft law, in particular with fundamental rights as protected by the Belgian Constitution, as well as by international treaties to which Belgium is a party — notably the European Convention on Human Rights and EU law, to which the Council of State expressly refers.

    In this case, the general prohibition imposed on public officials from displaying any visible sign of belief while performing their duties involves the right to freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and the prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief, as guaranteed by constitutional, European, and international law, as well as the obligation of neutrality of public. 

    Outcome of the opinion:

    The Belgian Council of State assessed whether a ban on public employees wearing visible signs of belief complied with fundamental rights. Referring to EU and ECHR case law, particularly the CJEU judgments  L.F. v SCRL (C-344/20), 13 October 2022 and OP v Commune d’Ans (C-148/22), 28 November 2023, it confirmed that such a restriction may be lawful if it pursues a legitimate aim—such as ensuring public neutrality—and is necessary and proportionate to that aim.

    The Council emphasised that the legislator must justify why the same ban applies to all staff, including those without public contact, and must demonstrate that it is proportionate in light of the specific context of each service. The neutrality of the public service is a legitimate objective, but not every general ban automatically meets the proportionality requirement. The CJEU allows different neutrality policies, from full prohibition to more flexible approaches limited to public-facing roles. Therefore, extending the ban to all employees requires clear, fact-based justification to avoid indirect discrimination. Regarding the argument that distinguishing between “front-office” and “back-office” staff would create organisational difficulties (since staff may move around or be reassigned internally), this justification is only relevant if it is factually established for all the staff concerned. Otherwise, practical or organizational reasons alone cannot be considered a sufficient or pertinent basis for extending the restriction to “back-office” employees.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    On the one hand, in its judgment delivered on 13 October 2022 in case C-344/20, the Court of Justice confirmed its case law concerning Directive 2000/78/EC regarding the prohibition on wearing signs of belief within private undertakings: …

    1. As regards the condition relating to the existence of a legitimate aim, an employer’s desire to display, in relations with both public and private clients, a policy of political, philosophical or religious neutrality may be regarded as legitimate. Indeed, an employer’s wish to present an image of neutrality to clients relates to the freedom to conduct a business, recognised in Article 16 of the Charter, and is, in principle, legitimate, particularly where, in pursuing that aim, the employer involves only those workers who are supposed to come into contact with the employer’s clients (judgment of 15 July 2021, WABE and MH Müller Handel, C-804/18 and C-341/19, EU:C:2021:594, paragraph 63).”

    The Court of Justice also emphasised that the objective of ‘exclusive neutrality’ pursued by the authority must be genuinely followed in a consistent and systematic manner, and that the prohibition on wearing any visible sign of belief, whether philosophical or religious, must be limited to what is strictly necessary. In this respect, the Court stated: …

    40. It will be for the referring court, in the light of all the relevant characteristics of the context in which that rule was adopted, to weigh the competing interests, taking into account, on the one hand, the fundamental rights and principles at issue — namely, in this case, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by Article 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has as its corollary the prohibition of any discrimination based on religion laid down in Article 21 thereof — and, on the other hand, the principle of neutrality, under which the public administration concerned seeks to guarantee, through that rule limited to the workplace, both to users of its services and to its staff members an administrative environment free from visible manifestations of belief, in particular philosophical or religious ones.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    D’une part, dans son arrêt intervenu le 13 octobre 2022 dans l’affaire C-344/20 17, la Cour de justice a confirmé sa jurisprudence relative à la directive 2000/78/CE à propos de l’interdiction de port de signes convictionnels au sein d’entreprises privées : (…)

    1. S’agissant de la condition relative à l’existence d’un objectif légitime, la volonté d’un employeur d’afficher, dans les relations avec les clients tant publics que privés, une politique de neutralité politique, philosophique ou religieuse peut être considérée comme légitime. En effet, le souhait d’un employeur d’afficher une image de neutralité à l’égard des clients se rapporte à la liberté d’entreprise, reconnue à l’article 16 de la Charte, et revêt, en principe, un caractère légitime, notamment lorsque seuls sont impliqués par l’employeur dans la poursuite de cet objectif les travailleurs qui sont supposés entrer en contact avec les clients de l’employeur (arrêt du 15 juillet 2021, WABE et MH Müller Handel, C-804/18 et C-341/19, EU:C:2021:594, point 63).”

    “Il faut encore, souligne la Cour de justice, que l’objectif de « neutralité exclusive » que s’est fixé l’autorité soit véritablement poursuivi de manière cohérente et systématique, et que l’interdiction de port de tout signe visible de convictions, notamment philosophiques et religieuses, se limite au strict nécessaire 20. À cet égard, la Cour précise : (…)

    40. Il appartiendra encore à la juridiction de renvoi de procéder, à la lumière de l’ensemble des éléments caractéristiques du contexte dans lequel cette règle a été adoptée, à une pondération des intérêts en présence en tenant compte, d’une part, des droits et des principes fondamentaux en cause, à savoir, en l’occurrence, le droit à la liberté de pensée, de conscience et de religion garanti à l’article 10 de la charte des droits fondamentaux, lequel a pour corollaire l’interdiction de toute discrimination fondée sur la religion consacrée à l’article 21 de celle-ci, et, d’autre part, du principe de neutralité en application duquel l’administration publique concernée vise à garantir, par ladite règle limitée au lieu de travail, aux usagers de ses services et aux membres de son personnel un environnement administratif dépourvu de manifestations visibles de convictions, notamment, philosophiques ou religieuses.