Article 3 - Right to integrity of the person
Article 7 - Respect for private and family life
Article 52 - Scope and interpretation
Article 8 - Protection of personal data
Key facts of the case:
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data – Regulation (EU) 2016/679 – Article 5(1)(d) – Principle of accuracy – Article 16 – Right to rectification – Article 23 – Restrictions – Data relating to gender identity – Data incorrect from the time of inclusion in a public register – Means of proof – Administrative practice of requesting proof of gender reassignment surgery
Outcome of the case:
On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:
22. By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 16 of the GDPR must be interpreted as requiring a national authority responsible for keeping a public register to rectify the personal data relating to the gender identity of a natural person where those data are inaccurate, within the meaning of Article 5(1)(d) of that regulation.
23. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, under Article 16 of the GDPR, the data subject has the right to obtain from the controller without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject has the right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a supplementary statement.
24. That provision gives specific expression to the fundamental right enshrined in the second sentence of Article 8(2) of the Charter, according to which everyone has the right of access to data which have been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have them rectified.
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27. Lastly, for the purposes of interpreting Article 16 of the GDPR, it should also be noted that the objective pursued by that regulation, as is set out in Article 1 thereof and in recitals 1 and 10 thereof, consists, inter alia, in ensuring a high level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data, as enshrined in Article 8(1) of the Charter and Article 16(1) TFEU (judgment of 9 January 2025, Mousse, C‑394/23, EU:C:2025:2, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
37. In any event, a Member State cannot rely on the absence, in its national law, of a procedure for the legal recognition of transgender identity in order to limit the right to rectification. In that regard, it should be noted that, although EU law does not detract from the Member States’ competence in the area of the civil status of persons and the legal recognition of their gender identity, those States must, however, in exercising that competence, comply with EU law. Thus, national legislation which prevents a transgender person, in the absence of recognition of their gender identity, from fulfilling a requirement which must be met in order to be entitled to a right protected by EU law such as, in the present case, the right enshrined in Article 8(2) of the Charter and given specific expression in Article 16 of the GDPR, must be regarded as being, in principle, incompatible with EU law (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraphs 53 and 60 and the case-law cited).
39. By its second and third questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 16 of the GDPR must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may, by means of an administrative practice, make the exercise of the right to rectification of the personal data relating to the gender identity of a natural person, which are contained in a public register, conditional upon the production of evidence of, in particular, gender reassignment surgery.
45. Second, such an administrative practice undermines the essence of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter and, in particular, the essence of the right to the integrity of the person and the right to respect for private life, referred to in Articles 3 and 7 of the Charter respectively.
46. In that regard, it should be noted that, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, the rights guaranteed by the Charter have the same meaning and the same scope as the corresponding rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the latter constituting a minimum threshold of protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).
47. It is apparent from the settled case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that Article 8 ECHR, which corresponds to Article 7 of the Charter, protects a person’s gender identity, which is a constituent element and one of the most intimate aspects of their private life. Thus, that provision encompasses the right to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the right of transgender people to personal development and physical and moral integrity and to respect for and recognition of their gender identity. To that end, Article 8 imposes positive obligations on States, in addition to negative obligations to protect transgender persons against arbitrary interference by public authorities, which also entails the establishment of effective and accessible procedures guaranteeing effective respect for their right to gender identity. Furthermore, in view of the particular importance of that right, States have only limited discretion in this area (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraphs 64 and 65 and the case-law cited).