CJEU Case C-274/14 / Opinion

Proceedings brought by Banco de Santander SA
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Deciding body
Advocate General
Type
Opinion
Decision date
01/10/2019
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2019:802
  • CJEU Case C-274/14 / Opinion

    Key facts of the case:

    Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 267 TFEU — Definition of ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’ — Criteria — Independence of the national body concerned — Irremovability of the members — Inadmissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling.

    Outcome of the case:

    In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court hold that it has no jurisdiction to rule on the request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Central (Central Tax Tribunal, Spain).

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    4) EU law has not stood still since the judgment of 21 March 2000, Gabalfrisa and Others (C‑110/98 to C‑147/98, EU:C:2000:145) was decided. Article 2 TEU now provides that the Union is founded on the value of respect for the rule of law. Article 19(2) TEU provides that the judges and Advocates General of the Court of Justice ‘shall be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt’. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) provides for a guarantee of an effective remedy and a hearing before an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’.

    5) In line, perhaps, with these Treaty and Charter developments, the Court has subsequently developed an impressive line of case-law addressing the requirements of judicial independence. Much of this contemporary case-law has been summarised by the Court in its judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117).

    ...

    31) The fact that the Director-General of the Department of the State Tax Administration Agency is also a member of the eight person Special Chamber — even though it is his or her Agency that issued the decision which is under appeal — is also a very singular fact. It is, in my view, contrary to the maxim nemo judex in causa sua and, by definition, contrary to the fundamental principle laid down in Article 47(2) of the Charter requiring an independent and impartial tribunal.