CJEU Case C-718/21 / Judgment

L.G. v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa
Policy area
Justice, freedom and security
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Type
Decision
Decision date
21/12/2023
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2023:1015
  • CJEU Case C-718/21 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case:

    Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 267 TFEU – Concept of ‘court or tribunal’ – Criteria – Izba Kontroli Nadzwyczajnej i Spraw Publicznych (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs) of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) – Reference for a preliminary ruling from a panel of judges without the status of an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law – Inadmissibility.

    Outcome of the case:

    On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules: The request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Izba Kontroli Nadzwyczajnej i Spraw Publicznych) (Supreme Court (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs), Poland), made by decision of 20 October 2021, is inadmissible.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    44 However, the Court has also stated, as regards a court formation consisting of a single judge, that the presumption referred to in paragraph 41 above may be rebutted where a final judicial decision handed down by a court or tribunal of a Member State or an international court or tribunal leads to the conclusion that the judge constituting the referring court is not an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law for the purposes of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) (judgment of 29 March 2022, Getin Noble Bank, C‑132/20, EU:C:2022:235, paragraph 72).

    ...

    46 In those circumstances, it is necessary, in the present case, to examine whether the findings and assessments made by the European Court of Human Rights in the judgment in Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland in the light of Article 6(1) ECHR, in conjunction with those made by the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court) in its judgment of 21 September 2021, are such as to lead the Court, which alone is responsible for interpreting EU law, to consider, in the light of its own case-law, that the panel of judges of the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs which made a reference to it for a preliminary ruling in the present case does not have the status of an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, for the purposes of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, and, consequently, that that panel of judges does not satisfy the requirements set out in paragraph 40 above in order to be classified as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.

    ...

    58 In the light of the Court’s own case-law on the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, the findings and assessments made by the European Court of Human Rights in the judgment in Dolińska-Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland and by the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court) in its judgment of 21 September 2021, as described in paragraphs 47 to 57 above, lead to the conclusion that, because of the manner in which its constituent judges were appointed, the panel of judges of the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs which made the present request for a preliminary ruling does not have the status of an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, for the purposes of those provisions of EU law, with the result that that panel of judges does not constitute a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.

    59 In that regard, it is necessary to bear in mind the inextricable links which, according to the wording of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, exist, for the purposes of the fundamental right to a fair trial, within the meaning of that provision, between the guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality as well as that of access to a tribunal previously established by law (judgment of 22 February 2022, Openbaar Ministerie (Tribunal established by law in the issuing Member State), C‑562/21 PPU and C‑563/21 PPU, EU:C:2022:100, paragraph 55).

    60 As regards, in particular, the judicial appointment procedure, the Court has held that, having regard to its fundamental implications for the proper functioning and the legitimacy of the judiciary in a democratic State governed by the rule of law, the procedure for the appointment of judges necessarily constitutes an inherent element of the concept of a ‘tribunal established by law’, within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, while noting that the independence of a tribunal within the meaning of that provision, may be measured, inter alia, by the way in which its members are appointed (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2022, Openbaar Ministerie (Tribunal established by law in the issuing Member State), C‑562/21 PPU and C‑563/21 PPU, EU:C:2022:100, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited).

    ...

    77 It follows from all the foregoing that, taken together, the consequence of all the factors, both systemic and circumstantial, referred to in paragraphs 47 to 57 above, on the one hand, and in paragraphs 62 to 76 above, on the other, which characterised the appointment, within the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs, of the three judges constituting the referring body in the present case, is that the Chamber does not have the status of an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law for the purposes of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter. The combination of all those factors is such as to give rise to reasonable doubts in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of the persons concerned and the panel in which they sit with regard to external factors, in particular the direct or indirect influence of the national legislature and executive and their neutrality with respect to the interests before them. Those factors are thus capable of leading to a lack of appearance of independence or impartiality on the part of those judges and that body likely to undermine the trust which justice in a democratic society governed by the rule of law must inspire in those individuals.