CJEU Case T-498/22 / Judgment

Aleksandra Melnichenko v Council of the European Union
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Type
Decision
Decision date
26/02/2025
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:T:2025:180
  • CJEU Case T-498/22 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case: 

    Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Restrictions on entry into the territory of the Member States – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and subject to restrictions on entry into the territory of the Member States – Inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Concept of ‘association’ – Article 2(1), in fine, of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Plea of illegality – Error of assessment – Fundamental rights – Proportionality.

    Outcome of the case: 

    On those grounds,

    THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber, Extended Composition)

    hereby:

    1. Dismisses the action; 
    2. Orders Ms Aleksandra Melnichenko to pay the costs;
    3. Orders EuroChem Group AG, Siberian Coal Energy Company AO (SUEK) and the Kingdom of Belgium to bear their own costs.
  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)


    107. It should be recalled that the right to respect for private and family life, home and communications, the right to property and the right of Union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States are enshrined in Articles 7, 17 and 45 of the Charter, respectively.

    108. As regards, in the first place, the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter, in the present case, the restrictive measures at issue constitute protective measures, which are not intended to deprive the persons concerned of their right to property and their right to respect for private and family life, home and communications. However, with the exception of the right to respect for communications for which a limitation has not been demonstrated, the measures in question undeniably entail a limitation of those fundamental rights in the present case (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 115 and the case-law cited).

    109. However, according to settled case-law, the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 17 of the Charter do not enjoy absolute protection in EU law, but must be viewed in relation to their function in society (see judgment of 12 March 2014, Al Assad v Council, T‑202/12, EU:T:2014:113, paragraph 113 and the case-law cited).

    110. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 52(1) of the Charter, first, ‘any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by [the Charter] must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and, second, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’

    ...


    120. As regards, in the second place, the applicant’s argument alleging infringement of her right to move freely within the territory of the Member States, enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter, it must be noted that in accordance with Article 52(2) thereof, the rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. As is apparent from the Explanations relating to the [Charter] (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the right guaranteed by Article 45(1) of the Charter is the same right as that guaranteed by Article 20(2)(a) TFEU. The scope of that right is described further in Article 21 TFEU.

    121. It should be noted that, according to Article 21(1) TFEU, the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect. That reservation, formulated in the second part of Article 21(1) TFEU, referring to the Treaties, in the plural, also includes the EU Treaty and the measures adopted to give it effect. It follows that limitations on the exercise of the right to freedom of movement and of residence of Union citizens enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter may, in the field of the CFSP, be imposed by acts which are adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU, such as the contested acts (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraphs 195 and 196, and of 4 December 2015, Sarafraz v Council, T‑273/13, not published, EU:T:2015:939, paragraphs 194 and 195).

    122. However, as recalled in paragraph 111 above, in order to comply with EU law, limitations on the exercise of the rights enshrined in the Charter must satisfy the conditions set out in Article 52(1) thereof, namely: be provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights, refer to an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union, and not be disproportionate. That also applies to the rights recognised by the Charter which are the subject of provisions in the Treaties (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 46, and Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Agenzia delle dogane e dei monopoli and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, C‑452/20, EU:C:2021:855, point 60). Therefore, the limitations on the exercise of the right enshrined in Article 45(1) of the Charter, imposed in the context of the implementation of the CFSP, must satisfy those conditions.

    ...


    131. It follows that the limitations referred to in paragraph 123 above comply with the conditions set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter.

    132. As regards the applicant’s argument that the application by analogy of the judgment of 19 October 2004, Zhu and Chen (C‑200/02, EU:C:2004:639, paragraph 46), confers on her, under Article 21 TFEU, the derived right to reside in a Member State, where that is necessary in order to ensure enjoyment of the right of residence of her young children, who are Union citizens, it should be noted that the considerations drawn from that judgment cannot be transposed to the present case, given that the applicant, as a Union citizen, has the autonomous right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Such a right is not absolute and it is apparent from the foregoing considerations that the limitation of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States is considered to be justified.

    133. Furthermore, in so far as the applicant refers to the derived right of her husband, a third-country national, to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, that argument must also be rejected as ineffective since it is not capable to demonstrate infringement of the applicant’s right to move freely within the territory of the Member States.

    134. As regards the applicant’s reference to the right of her minor children to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, it must be borne in mind that Article 24(2) of the Charter provides that, in all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration.

    135. In the present case, it should be noted, first, that the applicant stated, in her written pleadings and at the hearing, that she was not claiming infringement of her children’s autonomous right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Second, in so far as the applicant refers to the situation of her children in order to demonstrate the allegedly disproportionate nature of the limitation on her own right to move freely within the territory of the Member States, it should be noted that that argument is not substantiated. The applicant merely claims that the restrictive measures imposed on her would oblige her children to leave the territory of the Member States. Furthermore, when questioned on that point at the hearing, she merely stated in general terms that the members of her family are prevented from living together at their homes in the European Union and in Switzerland, and referred to the disruption to her children’s relationship with their grandparents living in Europe and to their education being put on hold. It should be noted that the restrictive measures at issue, first, do not cover the applicant’s children and, second, do not restrict the applicant’s right to enter and reside freely in the territory of the Member State of the European Union of which she is a national. Therefore, the applicant is wrong to claim that, as a result of those measures, her children are forced into leaving that territory. Moreover, it should be recalled that Article 1(6) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, authorises Member States to grant exemptions from the measures at issue, inter alia, where a person’s travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, and that provision is to be interpreted and applied, in the light of Article 24(2) of the Charter, taking into account the best interests of the child.