Croatia / High Criminal Court of the Republic of Croatia / I Kž-eun-2/2024-4
-
Croatia / High Criminal Court of the Republic of Croatia / I Kž-eun-2/2024-4
Key facts of the case:
The County Court in Zagreb rejected the execution of a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) issued by the Office of the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Appeals in Athens, Greece. The warrant sought the extradition of K.P. to face charges for several serious criminal offences, including forming a criminal organisation, explosions, possession of explosives, attacks, and illegal possession of weapons. The first-instance court determined that Greek authorities had not provided adequate guarantees regarding detention conditions in Korydallos prison, raising concerns about the risk of inhumane and degrading treatment for the requested person, referencing a European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) report on prison deficiencies. Greek authorities had provided only general assurances of compliance with minimum standards without specifics about the conditions the requested person, K.P., would face. In the area governed by Framework Decision 2002/584, execution of the European arrest warrant is the principle, and the refusal to execute such a warrant is intended as an exception that must be narrowly interpreted. However, the execution of the EAW must not lead to inhuman or degrading treatment of the requested person. According to Article 4 of the EU Charter and Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, such behaviour is prohibited. The State Attorney appealed, arguing that the court had wrongly assessed the facts and that Greek judicial authorities should have been asked for more specific information before making a decision.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
Should the Framework Decision 2002/584 concerning Article 4 of the EU Charter, which refers to the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, be interpreted in such a way that, when examining the conditions of deprivation of liberty in the Member State issuing the order, the executing judicial body cannot refuse to execute a European Arrest Warrant unless it has requested additional information from a judicial authority? Does the existence of a legal means by which the requested person can challenge the conditions of deprivation of liberty in itself prevent the existence of absolute risks of inhuman or degrading treatment?
Outcome of the case:
In light of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) interpretation, the purpose and meaning of judicial cooperation, the response received from the Greek Public Prosecutor's Office, and the fact that even the first-instance court, in its request, did not explain to the Greek Public Prosecutor's Office the reasons for which it requested additional information, nor did it even require any more detailed information regarding the personal space available to the prisoner in the prison room, the health conditions and the extent of freedom of movement of the prisoner, it can be concluded that the state attorney is right with the claim that additional information should have been requested once again before the decision on the European arrest warrant was made. For this reason, the appeal court found the lower court's rejection premature, the contested decision was annulled, and the case was referred to the first-instance court for a new decision. According to the High Criminal Court, the court of first instance should request additional information from the Greek Public Prosecutor's Office of the Athens Court of Appeal before the decision on the European Arrest Warrant. The first-instance court should inform the Public Prosecutor's Office of the information at its disposal, which forms the basis for concerns regarding actions contrary to Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention (report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, information on the execution of judgments of the European Court for human rights in the group of cases Nisiotis v. Greece). Furthermore, specific information should be requested on the institution in which the requested person will be placed in case of surrender (including accommodation during criminal proceedings and accommodation in case of a prison sentence) and on the conditions of accommodation in that or those institutions, such as personal space the prisoner has in the prison room, the health conditions and scope of freedom of movement of the prisoner in the mentioned institution under the standards of the CJEU (Dorobantu et al.) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (Muršić v. Croatia, Grand Chamber et al.). In addition, given that the Public Prosecutor's Office issued the European Arrest Warrant, the first-instance court should verify whether the requested person in Greece can challenge the decision to issue the European Arrest Warrant, and especially its proportionality, in terms of the existence of a legal remedy that fully meets the requirements of effective judicial protection (CJEU, judgment of 27 May 2019, joined cases OG and PI, C-508/18 and C-82/19. PPU, EU:C:2019:456, point 75, judgment of 12 December 2019, joined cases JR and YC, EU:C:2019:1077, points 65 and 66 PPU). Only after receiving these notifications will the first-instance court be able to substantively examine the existence of fears about violating the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment.
-
Paragraphs referring to EU Charter
6.1. According to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) interpretation, when Member States implement Union law, they may be required to presume that other Member States respect fundamental rights. Only in exceptional cases can they check the respect of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Union (CJEU, judgment of October 15, 2019, Dorobantu, C-128/18, EU:C:2019:857, paragraph 47). In the area regulated by Framework Decision 2002/584, transposed into the Law on Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters with the Member States of the European Union-EU, the execution of a European arrest warrant is the principle. Refusal to execute such a warrant is designed as an exception that must be narrowly interpreted (CJEU, Dorobantu, paragraph 48). However, the execution of the warrant must not lead to inhuman or degrading treatment of the requested person (CJEU, Dorobantu and CJEU judgment of April 5, 2016, Aranyosi and Caldararu, joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198). Such treatment is prohibited under Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 202, 7.6.2016, pp. 389-405, hereinafter the Charter) and Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘Official Gazette - International Treaties’ No. 18/97, 6/99 - consolidated text, 8/99 - correction, 14/02, 13/03, 9/05, 1/06, 2/10, and 13/17, hereinafter the Convention). These provisions aim to ensure that every prisoner is held in conditions that respect human dignity, that the methods of executing the measure do not subject the person to discomfort or a burden of intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in deprivation of liberty, and that the health and well-being of prisoners are adequately ensured concerning practical prison conditions (CJEU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru).
6.2. Therefore, to ensure respect for Article 4 of the Charter, in cases where there are objective, reliable, precise, and duly updated elements indicating deficiencies in the prison system, it is necessary to specifically and precisely examine whether there are severe and verified reasons to believe that the requested person will be exposed to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment upon surrender. For this purpose, it is necessary to urgently request from the issuing State all the required supplementary information regarding the conditions in which the person in question will be deprived of liberty in that Member State. However, if the information thus obtained shows that there is a risk for the requested person of inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, the execution of that European arrest warrant must be postponed but not abandoned (CJEU, judgment of July 25, 2018, ML, C-220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589, paragraph 65).
(...)
7.2. Indeed, under the principle of mutual trust, the judicial authority of the executing State should generally rely on the guarantees of the judicial authorities of the issuing State of the European arrest warrant. However, in this case, there are precise data on which it can be concluded that there are deficiencies in the Greek prison system, including in the Korydallos prison (compare, CJEU, Dorobantu, paragraph 68). Therefore, the obtained information does not provide the necessary guarantee envisaged by the prohibition of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention or Article 4 of the Charter. Additionally, the possibility of requesting a transfer referred to by the Greek prosecutor in the response does not eliminate the fear of treatment contrary to Article 4 of the Charter. This is because, according to the interpretation of the CJEU, the existence of a legal remedy by which the requested person can challenge the conditions of deprivation of liberty does not prevent the existence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment (CJEU, Dorobantu, paragraph 85).
-
Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)
6.1. Naime, prema tumačenju Suda Europske unije (dalje SEU), kad države članice provode pravo Unije, mogu na temelju tog prava, biti obvezne pretpostaviti da druge države članice poštuju temeljna prava, pa samo u iznimnim slučajevima mogu provjeravati poštivanje temeljnih prava koje jamči Unija (SEU, presuda od 15. listopada 2019. Dorobantu, C-128/18., EU:C:2019:857, točka 47.). U području uređenom Okvirnom odlukom 2002/584, prenesenom u ZPSKS-EU, izvršenje europskog uhidbenog naloga je načelo, a odbijanje izvršenja takvog naloga zamišljeno je kao iznimka koja se mora usko tumačiti (SEU, Dorobantu, točka 48.). Međutim, izvršenje naloga ne smije dovesti do nečovječnog ili ponižavajućeg postupanja prema traženoj osobi (SEU, Dorobantu i presuda SEU od 5. travnja 2016. Aranyosi i Caldararu, spojeni predmeti C-404/15 i C-659/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:198). Takvo postupanje zabranjeno je prema članku 4. Povelje Europske unije o temeljnim pravima (SL C 202, 7.6.2016., str. 389.–405., dalje Povelja) i članku 3. Konvencije za zaštitu ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda ("Narodne novine – Međunarodni ugovori" broj 18/97., 6/99. – pročišćeni tekst, 8/99. – ispravak, 14/02., 13/03., 9/05., 1/06., 2/10. i 13/17., dalje: Konvencija). Cilj tih odredbi je osigurati da se svaki zatvorenik drži u uvjetima koji jamče poštovanje ljudskog dostojanstva, da načini izvršenja mjere dotičnu osobu ne izlažu nelagodi ili teretu intenziteta koji prelazi neizbježnu razinu patnje svojstvene oduzimanju slobode te da u pogledu praktičnih zatvorskih uvjeta na odgovarajući način budu osigurani zdravlje i dobrobit zatvorenika (SEU, Aranyosi i Căldăraru)
6.2. Zato, kako bi se osiguralo poštovanje članka 4. Povelje, u predmetima u kojima postoje objektivni, vjerodostojni, precizni i odgovarajuće aktualizirani elementi koji svjedoče o postojanju nedostataka u zatvorskom sustavu treba konkretno i precizno ispitati postoje li i u okolnostima slučaja ozbiljni i utvrđeni razlozi za vjerovanje da će tražena osoba nakon predaje biti izložena stvarnoj opasnosti podvrgavanja nečovječnom i ponižavajućem postupanju. U tu svrhu treba od tijela države izdavateljice zahtijevati žurnu dostavu svih potrebnih dopunskih informacija o uvjetima u kojima se dotičnoj osobi namjerava oduzeti sloboda u toj državi članici. Međutim, ako se na temelju tako prikupljenih informacija utvrdi da za traženu osobu postoji opasnost nečovječnog ili ponižavajućeg postupanja, u smislu članka 4. Povelje, izvršenje toga europskog uhidbenog naloga mora biti odgođeno, ali ne smije biti napušteno (SEU, presuda od 25. srpnja 2018. ML, C-220/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:589 točka 65.)
(...)
7.2. Doista, u skladu s načelom uzajamnog povjerenja, pravosudno tijelo države izvršiteljice u pravilu se treba pouzdati u jamstva pravosudnih tijela države izdavateljice europskog uhidbenog naloga. No, u ovom predmetu postoje precizni podaci na temelju kojih se može zaključiti da postoje nedostaci u grčkom zatvorskom sustavu, pa i u zatvoru Korydallos (usporedi, SEU, Dorobantu, 68). Zbog toga očito pribavljene informacije ne predstavljaju potrebno jamstvo kakvo ima u vidu zabrana postupanja protivno članku 3. Konvencije odnosno članku 4. Povelje. Tome treba dodati da mogućnost traženja premještaja na koju se u odgovoru referira grčki tužitelj, ne otklanja postojanje bojazni od postupanja protivnog članku 4. Povelje. To zato jer prema tumačenju SEu-a postojanje pravnog sredstva, kojim tražena osoba može osporiti uvjete oduzimanja slobode samo za sebe ne prevenira postojanje stvarne opasnosti od nečovječnog ili ponižavajućeg postupanja (SEU, Dorobantu, točka 85).