Czechia / Supreme Administrative Court / 5 Azs 89/2024-49 / ECLI:CZ:NSS:2024:5.Azs.89.2024.49

I. B. v Ministry of the Interior
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Type
Decision
Decision date
08/08/2024
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:CZ:NSS:2024:5.Azs.89.2024.49

12. The Supreme Administrative Court also addressed the issue of systemic deficiencies in the Polish asylum system. According to Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, ‘[w]here it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the determining Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish whether another Member State can be designated as responsible’.

13. Systemic flaws under the cited provision may therefore be an obstacle to the foreign national’s relocation. However, as regards the nature of those flaws, it must be noted that they must be of such an intensity as to risk a breach of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The latter provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. From the ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court of 11 September 2018, no. 1 Azs 96/2017-87, it follows that: ‘[a] declaration of systemic flaws in relation to a particular Member State of the European Union may be considered only where it is clear from the circumstances necessarily known to the deciding authority that a foreign national cannot be detained for the purpose of transfer to that Member State in accordance with the objectives of the Dublin III Regulation, because such a transfer would be contrary to the human rights standards shared by all Member States of the European Union’. 

14. There is mutual trust between Member States in the asylum procedure, so the applicant must make credible allegations of systemic flaws in the Polish asylum procedure, which he must support with relevant evidence. The principle of mutual trust has been expressed by the Supreme Administrative Court, e.g. in its Resolution of 7 June 2016, No 8 Azs 18/2016-52 : ‘The European asylum system is based on the presumption of mutual trust and on the assumption that the treatment of asylum seekers in each Member State complies with the requirements of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Geneva Convention, and the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This presumption is rebuttable, but this does not mean that any violation of a fundamental right by a Member State automatically precludes the transfer of an asylum seeker to that Member State. This is the case only if there is a serious concern that there are systematic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for applicants in the Member State concerned which entail a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment’. On the principle of mutual trust and the presumption of respect for human rights, cf. also the judgment of the CJEU of 21 December 2011, in Joined Cases N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-411/10, and M .E. and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, C-493/10. 

  • Czechia / Supreme Administrative Court / 5 Azs 89/2024-49 / ECLI:CZ:NSS:2024:5.Azs.89.2024.49

    Key facts of the case:

    The complainant is a citizen of the Russian Federation who lived in Ukraine for a long time before the war. He arrived in the EU in February 2022 and obtained a Polish visa. He subsequently applied for international protection in Czechia. The Ministry of the Interior rejected his application as inadmissible holding that Poland was the responsible state for examining the application under the Dublin III Regulation. The complainant complained before the Prague Municipal Court and, following the rejection of the action, a cassation complaint before the Supreme Administrative Court. In the cassation complaint the complainant argued that he had connections and friends in Czechia, whereas he knew no one in Poland. He further argued that the asylum system in Poland suffered from systemic flaws and expressed concern that Poland would return him to Russia without a proper examination of the case. 

    However, the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the appeal as inadmissible holding that the complainant had not demonstrated any systemic deficiencies in the Polish asylum system and that the administrative Ministry’s decision had not infringed Article 4 of the EU Charter.

    Key legal question raised by the Court:

    The main issue in the case was whether Poland or Czechia had jurisdiction over the complainant's application for international protection under the Dublin III Regulation. Czechia argued that Poland was responsible for examining the application, while the complainant argued that Czechia should decide on the application due to systemic flaws in the Polish asylum system and the complainant’s family ties in Czechia. 

    Outcome of the case: 

    The Supreme Administrative Court held that the appeal was inadmissible. The court firstly noted that the conditions for the submission of a cassation complaint had not been met. Secondly, the complainant was required to submit an application for international protection in Poland, as, in accordance with the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation, Poland was responsible for examining the complainant’s application. Furthermore, the Supreme Administrative Court addressed the complainant's arguments, particularly his assertion that the Polish asylum system lacks impartiality and objectivity in assessing his application. However, the Court concluded that the complainant had not substantiated this claim, and thus the rejection of his application did not violate Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 

    The complainant's application for international protection in Czechia was therefore deemed inadmissible and he was referred to the Polish asylum system. 

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    12. Nejvyšší správní soud se dále zabýval otázkou systémových nedostatků polského azylového systému. Podle čl. 3 odst. 2 nařízení Dublin III platí, že „[n]ení‑li možné přemístit žadatele do členského státu, který byl primárně určen jako příslušný, protože existují závažné důvody se domnívat, že dochází k systematickým nedostatkům, pokud jde o azylové řízení a o podmínky přijetí žadatelů v daném členském státě, které s sebou nesou riziko nelidského či ponižujícího zacházení ve smyslu článku 4 Listiny základních práv Evropské unie, členský stát, který vede řízení o určení příslušného členského státu, pokračuje v posuzování kritérií stanovených v kapitole III, aby zjistil, jestli nemůže být určen jako příslušný jiný členský stát“.

    13. Systémové nedostatky dle citovaného ustanovení tedy mohou být překážkou přemístění cizince. K povaze těchto nedostatků je však třeba uvést, že musí dosahovat takové intenzity, aby hrozilo riziko porušení čl. 4 Listiny základních práv Evropské unie. Ten stanoví, že „[n]ikdo nesmí být mučen nebo podroben nelidskému či ponižujícímu trestu anebo zacházení“. Jak přitom vyplývá z rozsudku Nejvyššího správního soudu ze dne 11. 9. 2018, č. j. 1 Azs 96/2017‑87: „Deklarace systémových nedostatků ve vztahu k určitému členskému státu Evropské unie může připadat v úvahu pouze tam, kde je z okolností nutně známých zjišťujícímu orgánu jednoznačné, že dotyčný cizinec nemůže být v souladu s cíli nařízení Dublin III zajištěn za účelem předání do tohoto členského státu, protože takové předání by bylo v rozporu s lidsko‑právními standardy sdílenými všemi členskými státy Evropské unie.“

    14.   V otázce azylového řízení mezi členskými státy platí vzájemná důvěra, žadatel tak musí uvést hodnověrná tvrzení o systémových nedostatcích v polském azylovém řízení, jež musí podepřít relevantními důkazy. K principu vzájemné důvěry se vyslovil Nejvyšší správní soud např. v usnesení ze dne 7. 6. 2016, č. j. 8 Azs 18/2016‑52: „Evropský azylový systém je totiž založen na domněnce vzájemné důvěry a na předpokladu, že zacházení s žadateli o azyl v každém členském státě splňuje požadavky Listiny základních práv EU, Ženevské Úmluvy i Úmluvy o lidských právech a základních svobodách. Tato domněnka je vyvratitelná, to však neznamená, že jakékoli porušení základního práva členským státem automaticky znemožňuje přemístění žadatele o azyl do tohoto členského státu. Je tomu tak pouze tehdy, je‑li třeba se vážně obávat, že dochází systematickým nedostatkům azylového řízení a podmínek příjmu žadatelů v příslušném členském státě, které s sebou nesou riziko nelidského či ponižujícího zacházení.“ K principu vzájemné důvěry a domněnce dodržování lidských práv srov. též rozsudek Soudního dvora EU ze dne 21. 12. 2011, ve spojených věcech N. S. proti Secretary of State for the Home Department, C–411/10, a M. E. a další proti Refugee Applications Commissioner a Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, C‑493/10.

  • Relevance of Charter

    12. The Supreme Administrative Court also addressed the issue of systemic deficiencies in the Polish asylum system. According to Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, ‘[w]here it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the determining Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish whether another Member State can be designated as responsible’.

    13. Systemic flaws under the cited provision may therefore be an obstacle to the foreign national’s relocation. However, as regards the nature of those flaws, it must be noted that they must be of such an intensity as to risk a breach of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The latter provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. From the ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court of 11 September 2018, no. 1 Azs 96/2017-87, it follows that: ‘[a] declaration of systemic flaws in relation to a particular Member State of the European Union may be considered only where it is clear from the circumstances necessarily known to the deciding authority that a foreign national cannot be detained for the purpose of transfer to that Member State in accordance with the objectives of the Dublin III Regulation, because such a transfer would be contrary to the human rights standards shared by all Member States of the European Union’. 

    14. There is mutual trust between Member States in the asylum procedure, so the applicant must make credible allegations of systemic flaws in the Polish asylum procedure, which he must support with relevant evidence. The principle of mutual trust has been expressed by the Supreme Administrative Court, e.g. in its Resolution of 7 June 2016, No 8 Azs 18/2016-52 : ‘The European asylum system is based on the presumption of mutual trust and on the assumption that the treatment of asylum seekers in each Member State complies with the requirements of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Geneva Convention, and the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This presumption is rebuttable, but this does not mean that any violation of a fundamental right by a Member State automatically precludes the transfer of an asylum seeker to that Member State. This is the case only if there is a serious concern that there are systematic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for applicants in the Member State concerned which entail a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment’. On the principle of mutual trust and the presumption of respect for human rights, cf. also the judgment of the CJEU of 21 December 2011, in Joined Cases N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-411/10, and M .E. and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, C-493/10.