Slovenia / Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia / Decision I Up 146/2024 / ECLI:SI:VSRS:2024:I.UP.146.2024

A family (two adult plaintiffs and an infant) v Ministry of the Interior
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Type
Decision
Decision date
28/06/2024
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:SI:VSRS:2024:I.UP.146.2024
  • Slovenia / Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia / Decision I Up 146/2024 / ECLI:SI:VSRS:2024:I.UP.146.2024

    Key facts of the case:

    The case involves a family (two adult plaintiffs and an infant) applying for international protection in Slovenia. Their application was rejected on the ground that the Croatia was the country responsible for processing their claims under Dublin III Regulation. They challenged this decision before the Administrative Court (Upravno sodišče) claiming, amongst others, poor hygiene and the presence of cockroaches in the Croatian reception centre where they were accommodated for a few days before leaving for Slovenia. They further stated that a family with an infant represents a vulnerable group that may face further stress if returned to Croatia. The Administrative Court sided with the plaintiffs. It found that that the hygienic conditions in the Croatian asylum centre, where the claimants were accommodated and to which they were to be returned, had not ensured the best interests of the child and posed a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the sense of Article 4 of the EU Charter. The Administrative Court further held that the defendant should obtain an individual assurance that, in the event of their return, the plaintiffs will be accommodated in conditions corresponding to those in Slovenia in terms of hygiene and infant care. According to the court, under the established circumstances, the standard practice of the Croatian authorities of giving general assurance, which does not indicate how the best interest of the child is ensured, is insufficient. Thus, the Administrative Court remitted the case to asylum authorities. 

    The asylum authorities appealed this decision before the Supreme Court. They argued that the principle of mutual trust, which applies between Member States, should be upheld in this case, and that no exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from this principle have been demonstrated in the case at hand. They explained that the claimants were accommodated in the asylum centre in Croatia for only three days, were provided with their own room and regular meals, and that the first and second claimants received everything needed for the care of the child in due time. The fact that the room in which they were accommodated was dirty, and that the first and second plaintiffs had to clean it themselves, does not, in any way, amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. It is also irrelevant that the items necessary for the care of the child were not provided automatically but had to be requested. The authorities insisted that the presence of cockroaches in the room was a temporary issue. Given the short duration of the plaintiffs’ stay in the centre, their ability to leave the room, and the fact that all their requests were accommodated, it cannot be concluded that the presence of cockroaches is a systemic issue in the asylum centre or one that the authorities are unwilling to address. Slovenian authorities also alleged that there was no evidence of systemic deficiencies in Croatian asylum system. 

    Key legal question raised by the Court:

    The Supreme Court considered the principle of mutual trust among EU Member States in the context of asylum procedures, specifically the procedure under the Dublin III Regulation. This principle presumes that all Member States, in their action, comply with EU law, including the EU Charter. In this context, the court considered obligations of Member States when transferring asylum seekers to other EU countries and the standards of care required during such transfers. In practical terms, it observed whether Croatia’s asylum reception conditions fell short of the requirements set out in Article 4 of the EU Charter, prohibiting inhuman or degrading treatment, and Article 24/2 guaranteeing that the best interest of the child is primary consideration.  

    Outcome of the case: 

    The Supreme Court held that deficiencies in the procedures concerning the submission of applications for international protection and/or in the accommodation of applicants (living conditions, food, healthcare, etc.) in the Member State responsible prevented the transfer of an applicant to that state. Amongst others, Member States may not transfer the applicant to the Member State responsible, where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU Charter, which corresponds to Article 3 of the ECHR. According to the Supreme Court, the lower court had placed excessive emphasis on the hygiene conditions in the Croatian reception centre (particularly the presence of cockroaches), which led it to conclude that Croatia did not meet the necessary standards for transferring asylum seekers under the Dublin III Regulation. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the principle of mutual trust between EU Member States presumes that all Member States respect fundamental rights and EU law, and that isolated or temporary issues do not automatically qualify as systemic deficiencies. Therefore, the lower court had applied an overly strict standard for blocking the transfer (e.g. that standards in Croatia correspond to the Slovenian standards). As per the Supreme Court, the Reception Conditions Directive lays down minimum standards for the reception and care of applicants. While its aim is to ensure the comparability of the systems or rights that applicants have, differences in standards are permissible, at least expected, if not inevitable, and do not represent a reason for not transferring the applicant. 

    Also, according to the Supreme Court, by placing particular emphasis solely on the fact that there were cockroaches present in the room where the claimants were accommodated, and concluding that this deficiency, due to the age of the infant, reached a particularly high threshold of severity, the lower court failed to provide for a comprehensive evaluation of the situation. It, for example, did not determine the duration or extent of the problem, nor the actions of the claimants (e.g., whether they alerted anyone to the problem) or the competent officials responsible for addressing these deficiencies, if the claimants had reported the issue. In addition, regarding the principle of the best interest of the child, as enshrined in the Article 24(2) of the EU Charter, the Supreme Court clarified that the mere fact that the considered situation involved an infant did not, in itself, negate the principle of mutual trust between EU Member States. According to the Supreme Court, the Administrative Court based its criticism that the defendant had overlooked the (personal) circumstances and potential vulnerability of the third claimant solely on the age of the minor claimant and the previously mentioned inadequate assessment of the significance of the poor hygiene conditions during the claimants’ accommodation in the Republic of Croatia. Given the other undisputed findings (i.e., that the adult claimants received all necessary care for the infant while in Croatia and that none of them has any health issues), it is unclear which needs could not be met in Croatia, or why there is a risk that these needs would be denied. According to the Supreme Court, the lower court’s conclusions were, at the very least, premature. 

    The Supreme Court thus found that the Administrative Court wrongly applied substantive law and remitted the case to the lower court.  

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    6. The Supreme Court clarifies at the outset that the principle of mutual trust applies between EU Member States, which requires each state, but in exceptional circumstances, to assume that all other Member States respect EU law and the fundamental rights recognised therein. Therefore, within the framework of the common European asylum system, and particularly under the Dublin III Regulation, which is based on this principle and aims to streamline the handling of international protection applications in the interest of applicants and participating states, it must be assumed that the treatment of applicants for such protection in every Member State complies with the requirements of the EU Charter, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951, and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This assumption, however, is rebuttable. (2) 

    7. Since the said presumption is rebuttable, the competent authority is obliged to assess the existence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in another Member State. In this context, it must be taken into account (as correctly stated by the court of first instance) that the transfer of an applicant to this Member State shall not be carried out in any circumstances where there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would be exposed to such a risk during or after the transfer, and not only when the real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 4 of the EU Charter is the result of systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for applicants for international protection in that Member State. (3) 

    8. The Supreme Court clarified on several occasions that the obstacle to transferring an applicant to the Member State responsible is the finding that there are deficiencies in the procedures concerning the submission of applications for international protection and/or in the accommodation of applicants (living conditions, food, healthcare, etc.) in that state. However, for the existence of systemic deficiencies to be established, it is not sufficient that there is any breach of the rules laid down in directives governing the minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers and procedures for the recognition or withdrawal of refugee status. Rather, the deficiencies must be systemic. Such deficiencies exist when there is no assurance that, given the circumstances, the Member State responsible will seriously consider the application and will not expose the applicant to living conditions amounting to degrading or inhuman treatment. Namely, Member States are bound to respect the fundamental rights of applicants for international protection, so they may not transfer the applicant to the Member State responsible, where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU Charter, corresponding to Article 3 of the ECHR. (4) Including according to the CJEU’s position, the relevant question is whether there is a serious risk that the applicant will be exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment due to the transfer to the Member State responsible under Dublin III Regulation, either during the transfer or during or after the asylum procedure itself. (5) This position is also followed by the case law of the Supreme Court. (6)  

    11. In the assessment based on the mentioned views, all elements presented by the applicant must be considered in order to determine whether there is a risk of treatment contrary to Article 4 of the Charter. In this context, the judicial authorities of the Member State responsible for determining the Member State responsible must, on the basis of objective, reliable, accurate, and adequately updated elements, and considering the standard of protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by Union law, examine the reality of the alleged deficiencies. (9) 

    14. According to the Supreme Court’s assessments, the lower court's assessment was inadequate as it was not based on a thorough evidentiary assessment according to all the criteria developed by case law concerning circumstances that impede the transfer of an applicant to the Member State responsible. The mere fact that the third plaintiff is an infant does not, in itself, constitute a special circumstance from which it could be inferred that the family's transfer would contravene Article 4 of the Charter. The presence of cockroaches in the room where the plaintiffs were accommodated in the Republic of Croatia was not in dispute between the parties, but what was disputed was whether this constituted a breach of the minimum accommodation standards that Member States are required to provide. The court of first instance failed to establish the duration or extent of the problem or the steps taken by the plaintiffs (e.g., whether they alerted anyone to the problem) and the responsible authorities to rectify these deficiencies, if indeed the plaintiffs alerted them to the issue. The lower court deemed the defendant's assertion that the problem was temporary to be unsubstantiated and dismissed the assurances given by the Croatian authorities regarding appropriate reception of applicants as general statements regularly invoked by the respondent in such proceedings. In doing so, it overlooked the fact that Article 31 of Dublin III Regulation specifically mandates the exchange of essential information, including regarding healthcare needs, before the transfer is executed in order to meet the special needs of individuals being transferred. 

    16. The fact that the plaintiff is an infant cannot affect a different point of view. The contested judgment is also based on the allegation that the respondent failed to protect the best interests of the child. This is disputed by the appellant, who argues that they were not required to make such an assessment, as imposed by the contested judgment in paragraphs 32 and 34 of its reasoning. (12) In the view of the Supreme Court, the defendant justifiably objects to the allegations in the contested judgment that they erroneously applied the provisions of the International Protection Act (IPA), and to the related position of the court of first instance on the deficiently established factual situation.  

    18. According to the second paragraph of Article 24 of the EU Charter, in all actions taken by public authorities concerning children, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. Similarly, Article 15 of the IPA stipulates that the best interests of the child must be the primary concern in the treatment of minors (first paragraph) and that when assessing the best interests of the child, the factors to be considered include, for example, the possibility of family reunification, the well-being and social development of the child, particularly taking into account the environment from which the minor originates, the question of security and protection, particularly where there is a risk that the child is a victim of human trafficking, and the opinion of the child in accordance with their age and maturity (second paragraph). Additionally, Article 6(1) of Dublin III Regulation states that in the implementation of procedures under this Regulation, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration for Member States.  

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    6. Vrhovno sodišče uvodoma pojasnjuje, da med državami članicami EU velja načelo vzajemnega zaupanja, ki od vsake od teh držav zahteva, naj, razen v izrednih okoliščinah, šteje, da vse druge države članice spoštujejo pravo EU in temeljne pravice, priznane s tem pravom. Zato je treba v okviru skupnega evropskega azilnega sistema in zlasti Uredbe Dublin III, ki temelji na navedenem načelu in ki želi z racionalizacijo prošenj za mednarodno zaščito pospešiti njihovo obravnavanje v interesu prosilcev in udeleženih držav, domnevati, da je obravnavanje prosilcev za tako zaščito v vsaki državi članici v skladu z zahtevami Listine EU, Konvencije o statusu beguncev, podpisane v Ženevi 28. julija 1951, in Evropske konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic (v nadaljevanju EKČP). Ta domneva pa je izpodbojna. (2) 

    7. Ker je navedena domneva izpodbojna, je pristojni organ dolžan presoditi obstoj dejanske nevarnosti nečloveškega ali ponižujočega ravnanja v drugi državi članici. Pri tem je treba upoštevati (kot pravilno navaja sodišče prve stopnje), da se predaja prosilca v to državo članico ne izvede v vseh okoliščinah, v katerih obstajajo utemeljeni razlogi za prepričanje, da bo prosilec med predajo ali po njej izpostavljen taki nevarnosti, in ne le takrat, ko je dejanska nevarnost nečloveškega ali ponižujočega ravnanja v smislu 4. člena Listine EU posledica sistemske pomanjkljivosti v azilnem postopku in pogojev za sprejem prosilcev za mednarodno zaščito v državi članici. (3) 

    8. Vrhovno sodišče je že večkrat pojasnilo, da je ovira za predajo prosilca odgovorni državi članici ugotovitev, da v tej državi obstajajo pomanjkljivosti v izvajanju postopkov glede vloženih prošenj za mednarodno zaščito ali/in pri namestitvi prosilcev (bivanjski pogoji, prehrana, zdravstvena oskrba itd.). Pri tem pa za ugotovitev sistemskih pomanjkljivosti ne zadošča vsakršna kršitev pravil direktiv, ki urejajo minimalne standarde za sprejem prosilcev za azil in postopkov za priznanje ali odvzem statusa begunca, ampak morajo biti pomanjkljivosti sistemske. Take so, ko ni zagotovil, da bo glede na razmere odgovorna država članica resno obravnavala vloženo prošnjo in da prosilca ne bo izpostavila življenjskim razmeram, ki pomenijo ponižujoče oziroma nečloveško ravnanje. Države članice so namreč zavezane k spoštovanju temeljnih pravic prosilcev za mednarodno zaščito, zato prosilca ne smejo predati odgovorni državi članici, če ni mogoče, da ne bi vedele, da sistematične pomanjkljivosti sistema azilnega postopka in pogojev za sprejem prosilcev za azil v tej državi članici pomenijo utemeljene razloge za prepričanje, da bi bil prosilec izpostavljen resnični nevarnosti, da se bo z njim nečloveško ali ponižujoče ravnalo v smislu 4. člena Listine EU, ki ustreza 3. členu EKČP. (4) Tudi po stališču SEU gre za vprašanje, ali obstoji resna nevarnost, da bo prosilec izpostavljen nečloveškemu ali ponižujočemu ravnanju zaradi predaje odgovorni državi članici v smislu Uredbe Dublin III ob predaji, med azilnim postopkom ali po njem. (5) Tem stališčem sledi tudi sodna praksa Vrhovnega sodišča. (6) 

    11. Pri presoji na podlagi navedenih stališč je treba upoštevati vse elemente, ki jih predloži prosilec, da bi se ugotovil obstoj nevarnosti, da bo obravnavan v nasprotju s 4. členom Listine, pri čemer morajo sodni organi države članice, ki je pristojna za določitev odgovorne države članice, na osnovi objektivnih, zanesljivih, točnih in ustrezno posodobljenih elementov in ob upoštevanju standarda varstva temeljnih pravic, ki so zagotovljene s pravom Unije, preučiti resničnost uveljavljanih pomanjkljivosti. (9) 

    14. Po presoji Vrhovnega sodišča pa je omenjeno presojo sodišče prve stopnje opravilo pomanjkljivo, saj je ni oprlo na potrebno celovito dokazno oceno po vseh kriterijih, ki jih je sodna praksa razvila v zvezi z okoliščinami, ki ovirajo predajo prosilca odgovorni državi članici. Okoliščina, da je tretja tožnica dojenčica, sama po sebi ni posebna okoliščina, na podlagi katere bi bilo mogoče sklepati, da bi bila že zato predaja družine v nasprotju s 4. členom Listine. Prisotnost ščurkov v sobi, v kateri so bili tožniki nastanjeni v Republiki Hrvaški, med strankama sicer ni sporna, sporno je, ali gre za kršitev minimalnih standardov nastanitve, ki jih morajo zagotavljati države članice EU. Sodišče prve stopnje samo ni ugotavljalo ne trajanja ne obsega težave ne ukrepov tožnikov (npr. ali so na težavo koga opozorili) in pristojnih uradnih oseb za odpravo teh pomanjkljivosti, če so tožniki na težavo opozorili. Ugotovitev toženke, da je šlo za prehoden problem, je sodišče prve stopnje štelo za neizkazano, zagotovila pristojnega organa Republike Hrvaške, da bodo omogočili ustrezen sprejem prosilcev, pa zavrnilo kot splošne izjave, na katere se tožena stranka redno sklicuje v tovrstnih postopkih. Pri tem pa je prezrlo, da 31. člen Uredbe Dublin III prav z namenom zagotavljanja posebnih potreb oseb (vključno z zdravstveno oskrbo), ki se predajajo, določa obveznost izmenjave bistvenih informacij pred izvedbo predaje. 

    16. Na drugačno stališče ne more vplivati niti dejstvo, da je prosilec dojenček oziroma dojenčica. Izpodbijana sodba namreč temelji tudi na očitku o toženkini opustitvi varstva največjih otrokovih koristi. To je sporno za pritožnico, ki se ne strinja, da bi morala ugotavljati, kar ji za ponovljeni postopek nalaga izpodbijana sodba v 32. in 34. točki obrazložitve. (12) S tem nasprotuje, po presoji Vrhovnega sodišča utemeljeno, očitku v izpodbijani sodbi o nepravilni uporabi določb ZMZ-1 in Listine EU ter s tem povezanim nadaljnjim stališčem sodišča prve stopnje o pomanjkljivo ugotovljenem dejanskem stanju. 

    18. V skladu z drugim odstavkom 24. člena Listine EU se morajo pri vseh ukrepih javnih organov, ki se nanašajo na otroke, upoštevati predvsem koristi otroka. Tako tudi ZMZ-1 v 15. členu določa, da je največja korist otroka primarna skrb pri obravnavi mladoletnikov (prvi odstavek) in da se pri ocenjevanju največje koristi upoštevajo primeroma našteti dejavniki, kot so možnost ponovne združitve z družino, dobro počutje in družbeni razvoj mladoletnika, zlasti ob upoštevanju okolja, iz katerega mladoletnik izhaja, vprašanje glede varnosti in zaščite, zlasti kadar obstaja tveganje, da je mladoletnik žrtev trgovine z ljudmi, in mnenje mladoletnika v skladu z njegovo starostjo in zrelostjo (drugi odstavek istega člena). Tudi prvi odstavek 6. člena Uredbe Dublin III določa, da je pri izvajanju postopkov iz te uredbe primarna skrb držav članic največja korist otroka.