Article 24 - The rights of the child
Article 33 - Family and professional life
Key facts of the case:
The case focuses on the possible unconstitutionality of Article 48, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Workers' Statute (LET) and Article 177 of the General Social Security Law (LGSS), which regulate leave for childbirth and childcare. Specifically, the mother of a single-parent family (S.C.J.) claimed the right to extend the maternity leave of 16 weeks, equating it to the total leave of 32 weeks available in two-parent families, by adding the time allotted to the other parent.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The key legal issue raised by the Court was to determine whether the regulation of Article 48 LET and 177 LGSS, by not providing for a special regime for single-parent families, violates the principle of equality and non-discrimination (Art. 14 Spanish Constitution), the best interests of the child (Art. 39 Spanish Constitution and Art. 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU) and equal gender opportunities, considering that most single-parent families are headed by women.
Outcome of the case:
The Constitutional Court concluded that the challenged norms did not directly violate the Constitution. However, it recognised the need for a more specific regulation to protect single-parent families, stressing that any change is up to the legislature.
The judgment emphasises that no direct discrimination can be interpreted since the rules apply equally to all cases. According to the Court, the omission of a differentiated regulation does not constitute unconstitutionality. However, the possibility of legislative improvement is recognised.
La Sala promotora de la cuestión argumenta, en primer lugar, que las previsiones legales cuestionadas supondrían un trato discriminatorio hacia el menor perteneciente a una familia monoparental, ya que implican que recibirá un tiempo de cuidado inferior que el nacido en una familia biparental, a pesar de que tiene idénticas necesidades. Esto podría colisionar con el obligado respeto al interés superior del menor, al recibir un trato discriminatorio respecto de los nacidos en familias biparentales. Se vulnerarían, por tanto, los arts. 14, 39, apartados 1, 2 y 4, y 41 CE; el art. 10.1 (realmente, art. 10.2) CE, en relación con el art. 3.1 de la Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos del niño y el art. 24 de la Carta de los derechos fundamentales de la Unión Europea; y el art. 2.4 de la Ley Orgánica 1/1996, de 15 de enero, de protección jurídica del menor.
En este sentido, debemos recordar que el art. 4 de la Directiva (UE) 2019/1158, a la que ya hemos hecho referencia, impone a los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea, la obligación de reconocer a los padres —o, en su caso, a los segundos progenitores reconocidos por la legislación nacional— un permiso de paternidad de diez días laborables con ocasión del nacimiento del hijo “y a fin de facilitarle cuidados” [arts. 3.1 a) y 4.1]. La finalidad de la medida es pues coincidente con la del permiso parental, al que hace referencia el art. 33.2 de la Carta de derechos fundamentales de la Unión Europea, y que regula actualmente el art. 5 de la citada Directiva. El permiso parental se configura así como un derecho individual de cada trabajador —y, por tanto, no solo del padre o segundo progenitor— a disfrutar de un permiso de cuatro meses antes de que el hijo alcance una determinada edad “para cuidar de este” y esa finalidad de cuidado ha sido enfatizada por el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea en su jurisprudencia al respecto, en la que viene afirmando que “el permiso parental se concede a los progenitores para que puedan ocuparse de su hijo” (véase, en este sentido, las STJUE de 16 de mayo de 2024, CCC c. INSS, asunto C-673/22, § 29; y STJUE de 16 de junio de 2016, Estrella Rodríguez Sánchez c. Consum Sociedad Cooperativa Valenciana, asunto C-351/14, § 44).
La Sala promotora de la presente cuestión de inconstitucionalidad señala, en primer lugar, que los arts. 48.4 LET y 177 LGSS supondrían un trato discriminatorio de los menores nacidos en familias monoparentales, ya que recibirán un tiempo de cuidado por parte de sus progenitores, inferior que los nacidos en familias biparentales, a pesar de que tienen idénticas necesidades. Esta diferencia de trato no solo sería discriminatoria, a entender de la Sala, sino que no atendería al interés superior del menor, contraviniendo los arts. 14 y 39, apartados 1, 2 y 4 CE, que han de ser interpretados en relación con el art. 3.1 de la Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos del niño y el art. 24 de la Carta de los derechos fundamentales de la Unión Europea, en virtud de lo previsto en el art. 10.2 CE.
The Chamber promoting the issue argues, first of all, that the legal provisions in question would entail discriminatory treatment towards the minor belonging to a single-parent family, since they imply that he/she will receive less time of care than the one born in a two-parent family, despite the fact that he/she has identical needs. This could collide with the obligatory respect for the best interests of the minor, as he/she would receive discriminatory treatment with respect to those born in two-parent families. Therefore, articles 14, 39, sections 1, 2 and 4, and 41 of the Spanish Constitution (hereon EC); article 10.1 (actually, article 10.2) EC, in relation to article 3.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; and article 2.4 of Organic Law 1/1996, of January 15, 1996, on the legal protection of minors, would be violated.
In this regard, we should recall that art. 4 of Directive (EU) 2019/1158, to which we have already referred, imposes on the Member States of the European Union the obligation to grant fathers - or, where appropriate, second parents recognized by national legislation - paternity leave of ten working days on the occasion of the birth of the child “and in order to provide care for the child” [arts. 3.1 a) and 4.1]. The purpose of the measure thus coincides with that of parental leave, referred to in art. 33.2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and currently regulated by art. 5 of the aforementioned Directive. Parental leave is thus configured as an individual right of each worker - and, therefore, not only of the father or second parent - to enjoy a leave of four months before the child reaches a certain age “to take care of the child” and this purpose of care has been emphasized by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its case law on the matter, in which it has stated that “parental leave is granted to parents so that they can take care of their child” (see, in this sense, the CJEU of May 16, 2024, CCC v. INSS, case C-673/22/22, case C-673/22 and C-673/22/22, case C-673/22). INSS, Case C-673/22, § 29; and CJEU of 16 June 2016, Estrella Rodríguez Sánchez v. Consum Sociedad Cooperativa Valenciana, Case C-351/14, § 44).
The Chamber promoting the present question of unconstitutionality points out, first of all, that arts. 48.4 LET and 177 LGSS would entail discriminatory treatment of minors born in single-parent families, since they would receive less care time from their parents than those born in two-parent families, despite the fact that they have identical needs. This difference in treatment would not only be discriminatory, in the opinion of the Court, but would not be in the best interests of the child, in contravention of articles 14 and 39, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 EC, which must be interpreted in relation to article 3.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by virtue of the provisions of article 10.2 EC.