As at the end of 2024, two thirds of the countries studied did not have a comprehensive civil society strategy or development strategy as a separate policy document. In Albania, Bulgaria and Croatia, earlier civil society strategies had expired but had not been replaced [111]
 Albania: 2019–2023 roadmap on government policy for an enabling environment for civil society development; Bulgaria: Council of Ministers (Министерски съвет), ‘Стратегия за подкрепа на развитието на гражданските организации в Република България за периода 2012–2015’ [‘Strategy for supporting the development of civil society organisations in the Republic of Bulgaria for the 2012–2015 period’], 5 September 2012; Croatia: Government of the Republic of Croatia, ‘National strategy for the creation of an enabling environment for civil society development from 2012 to 2016’, 12 July 2012.
. In France and the Netherlands, a civil society strategy had only been drafted in relation to civil society outside of the country as part of foreign policy [112]
 France: Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères), Strategic guidance paper 2023-2027 on civil society and civic engagement, June 2023; the Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken), ‘Policy framework strengthening civil society’, Government of the Netherlands website, 23 March 2022.
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A more comprehensive approach is found for example in Finland, Latvia and Slovakia. The existence of an enabling environment for civil society is a political criterion for accession to the European Union. To this end, Serbia has an explicit strategy for creating an enabling environment for the development of civil society for 2022–2030 [113]
 Government of the Republic of Serbia, ‘Strategija za stvaranje podsticajnog okruženja za razvoj civilnog društva u Republici Srbiji’ [‘Strategy for creating an enabling environment for the development of civil society in the Republic of Serbia for the period from 2022 to 2030’], Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No 23/2022, 2 February 2022.
. An adopted strategy is, however, only as effective as its implementation [114]
 Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue, ‘Избор чланова Савета – Министарствo за људска и мањинска права и друштвени дијалог’ [‘The election of Council Members – Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue’], Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue website; Civic Initiatives, ‘Otvoreno pismo Vladi Srbije organizacija civilnog društva: Vlast da prestane sa ugrožavanjem vladavine prava u sferi javnog informisanja’ [‘Open letter to the Government of Serbia from civil society organisations: The authorities must stop undermining the rule of law in the field of public information’], 25 March 2016; Center for Democracy Foundation, ‘Members of the Council for Creating a Supportive Environment for Civil Society Development freeze Their membership due to threats to CSOs’ work’, 27 January 2025.
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Finland’s CSO strategy 2023–2027 outlines how the government will develop civic space, and seeks to develop cooperation between the public administration and CSOs ‘to promote genuine dialogue and strengthen democracy’ [115]
 Ministry of Justice (oikeusministeriö/justitieministeriet), CSO Strategy 2023–2027: Government resolution on the development of civic space, Publications of the Ministry of Justice, Helsinki, 6 June 2024, p. 7.
. The strategy seeks to improve the preconditions for CSOs to raise their own funds, continue to develop government grant activities and practices, support access to EU funding in Finland, encourage civic and voluntary activities, and build the knowledge base for civil society policy and cooperation. It also addresses the development of civic space and the inclusion of CSOs at the regional level through the municipalities. The strategy is accompanied by an implementation plan, and implementation will be coordinated by a cross-administrative working group appointed by the Ministry of Justice [116]
 Ministry of Justice (oikeusministeriö/justitieministeriet), ‘The civil society organisations strategy outlines the development of the operating conditions of non-governmental organisations’, 6 June 2024.
. In addition to the CSO strategy, civil society is supported through two other complementary programmes.

In Latvia, the development plan for a cohesive and civically active society 2024–2027 includes measures to strengthen the development and sustainability of civil society, such as through ensuring continuous funding for participation and advocacy, improving the general participatory framework, strengthening the financial literacy and capacity of CSOs and supporting the development, capacity and participation of regional CSOs [117]
 Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, ‘Saliedētas un pilsoniski aktīvas sabiedrības attīstības plāns 2024.–2027. gadam’ [‘Development plan for a cohesive and civically active society 2024–2027’], Latvijas Vēstnesis, No 251, 17 December 2024.
. In Slovakia, the conception for the development of civil society 2022–2030 is complemented by an action plan for 2022–2016. The main priorities explicitly include creating an enabling environment for the development of civil society. Other goals include increasing the level of citizen participation, building and deepening cooperation between civil society and the public sector and ensuring systematic data collection on civil society [118]
 Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the Civil Society Development (Úrad splnomocnenca Vlády SR pre rozvoj občianskej spoločnosti), ‘Koncepcia rozvoja občianskej spoločnosti na Slovensku na roky 2022–2030’ [‘Strategy of Civil Society Development in Slovakia for 2022-2030’].
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While few Member States have a comprehensive civil society strategy as such, this does not mean that civic space-related issues are ignored in government strategies and policy documents entirely. Some policy documents are either more specific or of a related scope. For example, in Croatia, improving cooperation with civil society organisations and the media in protecting human rights and combatting discrimination is part of the 2023–2027 national plan for the promotion of human rights and combating discrimination [119]
 Government of the Republic of Croatia (Vlada Republike Hrvatske), ‘National Plan for the protection and promotion of human rights and combatting discrimination for the period to 2027’, 30 March 2023.
. In Czechia, the government adopted a general strategy for cooperation between the public administration and non-governmental, non-profit organisation for 2021–2030. This covers three strategic areas: improving the social climate for NGOs, supporting effective partnership and cooperation between the public administration and the non-profit sector, and ensuring adequate conditions for the functioning of NGOs [120]
 Czechia: Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, ‘Strategy for Cooperation between public administration and non-governmental non-profit organisations 2021–2030’, June 2021.
. In Sweden, the government’s strategy for national human rights work established advisory bodies to enhance collaboration between civil society and the government [121]
 Ministry of culture of Sweden (Kulturdepartamentet), ‘Regeringens strategi för det nationella arbetet med mänskliga rättigheter’ [‘Government’s strategy for national human rights work’], Skr. 2016/17:29, 13 October 2016.
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In Ireland, civic space and civil society organisations are framed as the community and voluntary sector, with a national strategy titled Sustainable, Inclusive and Empowered Communities: A five-year strategy to support the community and voluntary sector in Ireland 2019–2024 and the National Volunteering Strategy 2021–2025 [122]
 Government of Ireland: Department of Rural and Community Development and the Cross Sectoral Group on Local and Community Development, Sustainable, Inclusive and Empowered Communities: A five-year strategy to support the community and voluntary sector in Ireland 2019–2024, 28 August 2019; Government of Ireland: Department of Rural and Community Development, National Volunteering Strategy 2021–2025, 5 December 2020.
. Similarly, in Malta, the national volunteering strategy focuses on volunteers and their organisations and establishes an agreement between the government and the Malta Council for the Voluntary Sector on behalf of the voluntary sector in Malta [123]
 Malta Council for the Voluntary Sector and the Parliamentary Secretary for Youth, Sport and Voluntary Organisations, National Strategy on Volunteering – Moving towards 2025, 6 February 2020.
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In Estonia, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain, civic space and civil society are addressed in the context of an Open Government Partnership (OGP) action plan [124]
 OGP, ‘Members’, OGP website.
. The OGP is an international initiative aimed at promoting the principles of transparency, participation and accountability in government with the participation of 75 states as national members and thousands of CSOs worldwide [125]
 OGP, ‘How we work’, OGP website.
. In its Member States, OGP multi-stakeholder forums institutionalise government–civil society engagement by providing spaces for dialogue and the co-creation of OGP national action plans [126]
 OGP, ‘Multi-Stakeholder Forums’, OGP website.
. For example, Spain’s Open Government Forum (Foro de Gobierno Abierto) exemplifies this approach through a legally established, parity-based structure with clear rules, defined roles and regular working arrangements [127]
 Portal de la Transparencia, ‘Foro de Gobierno Abierto’, Portal de la Transparencia website.
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As another example of an OGP action plan, France includes 17 commitments grouped around three main thematic priorities: to improve and strengthen citizen participation and democratic innovation practices to give citizens a more prominent role in government decision making, improve inclusion and citizen engagement nationwide to address majority public policy challenges, and use digital technology to encourage more transparent and more participatory government action [128]
 Interministerial Directorate for Government Transformation (Direction interministérielle de la transformation publique), France’s 2024–2026 National Action Plan, December 2023.
. In Ireland, the fourth OGP national action plan consists of seven high-level commitments, including two related to civil society and the policymaking process [129] Information received from the national liaison officer for Ireland.
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With or without a comprehensive civil society strategy, many of the Member States and FRA observer countries that were studied have measures in place to enhance and protect an enabling environment for civil society to work on fundamental rights. These address one or more of the different aspects of an enabling civic space and the challenges that have been identified in Chapter 2.

Some measures affecting CSOs are embedded within broader programmes. For example, while not directly aimed at civic space or exclusively at civil society organisations, in Germany, a federal programme ‘Live democracy’ has been supporting civic engagement for a democratic society since 2015. It seeks to protect democracy, promote democratic education and prevent all forms of extremism, including through funding projects. In Finland, as part of the national democracy programme up to 2025, the ‘Vapaa! – Fri! [Free!]’ project studied and issued recommendations to address the administrative, legislative and other challenges facing civil society and voluntary activities in Finland [130]
 Ministry of Justice (oikeusministeriö/justitieministeriet), ‘Vapaa! - Fri! -hanke’ [‘Free! Project’], OM011:00/2021, 16 February 2021).
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In Estonia, the National Foundation of Civil Society is an independent centre for supporting and developing civil society, established and funded by the government. The network of county development centres includes consultants who deal specifically with civil society organisations, including by providing free-of-charge support in project writing, funding options and strategic development. The foundation also hosts a website that serves as a roadmap for CSOs, with quick answers to frequently asked questions on founding and running a CSO and guidance on navigating the complex world of funding opportunities [131]
 National Foundation of Civil Society (Kodanikuühiskonna Sihtkapital), ‘Roadmap for CSOs’ (‘Teejuht vabaühendustele’), National Foundation of Civil Society website.
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An interesting example of an amendment to the legal environment that is viewed as having a protective effect for civic space actors is the criminalisation of doxing (i.e. the provision, distribution or otherwise making available of personal data with the intention of intimidation or harassment) in the Netherlands [132]
 Government of the Netherlands (Rijksoverheid), ‘Wetboek van Strafrecht’ [‘Criminal Code’], Overheid website, 1 January 2025, Article 285d.
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Issues regarding the availability of resources and provision of funding have been addressed through various government funding programmes that provide funding or capacity-building support to CSOs. For example, in Portugal, the people 2030 programme includes financial support to CSOs working in the area of equality and non-discrimination, and the action plan for migration includes a measure to strengthen financial support for civil society associations operating in the sector [133]
 Pessoas 2030, ‘People 2030’, Pessoas 2030 website.
. In Finland, there are measures to help CSOs improve their ability to raise own funds [134]
 Ministry of Justice (oikeusministeriö/justitieministeriet), CSO Strategy 2023–2027: Government resolution on the development of civic space, Publications of the Ministry of Justice, Helsinki, 6 June 2024.
, and in Latvia, measures seek to improve the financial literacy of CSOs [135]
 Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, ‘Saliedētas un pilsoniski aktīvas sabiedrības attīstības plāns 2024.–2027. gadam’ [‘Development plan for a cohesive and civically active society 2024–2027’], Latvijas Vēstnesis, No 251, 17 December 2024.
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Another way in which the funding of civil society has been supported is through taxation policies that provide incentives for CSO funding by private or public actors. For example, in Albania, a 0 % VAT (value added tax) rate has been introduced for projects funded by foreign donors, although there are concerns that administrative burdens have limited the ability of CSOs to benefit from it [136]
 Ministry of Finance and Economy of Albania, Instruction No 27 of 13 September 2023, Official Gazette of the Republic of Albania, No 137; Commission staff working document – Albania 2024 report – Accompanying the document ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – 2024 communication on EU enlargement policy’, SWD(2024) 690 final of 30 October 2024.
. In Italy, taxpayers can donate a share of personal income tax to an eligible CSO of their choice [137]
 National Revenue Agency of Italy (Agenzia delle Entrate), ‘Elenco complessivo degli enti ammessi in una o più categorie di beneficiari’ [‘Overall list of organisations admitted in one or more beneficiary categories’], Agenzia delle Entrate website.
. Similarly, in Slovenia, 1 % of income tax may be allocated to publicly beneficial purposes, including NGOs, while in Poland, individuals can donate 1.5 % of their personal income tax to support civil society organisations [138]
 National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, ‘Zakon o nevladnih organizacijah’ [‘Act on non-governmental organisations’], Legal Information System of the Republic of Slovenia, 20 March 2018; Chancellory of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland (Kancelaria Sejmu), ‘Ustawa z dnia 26 lipca 1991 r. O podatku dochodowym od osób fizycznych’ [‘Act of 26 July 1991 regarding income tax from a natural person’], Article 45c.
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Support is also available to Member States through the newly established OGP civic space lab, which is designed to help governments strengthen civic space [139]
 OGP, ‘Civic Space Lab’, OGP website.
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In many national systems, a key role is played by NHRIs. These are independent, state-mandated bodies that are accredited based on their compliance with the UN Paris Principles that are mandated with promoting and protecting human rights and freedoms, including as these affect civic space and civic space actors. One way that they monitor civic space is through systematic reporting.

For example, in Croatia, the Ombudswoman[AS1], who also holds an NHRI mandate, reports regularly on the situation of civil society organisations, including issues related to the freedoms of expression, information and association, the financing framework, participation, cooperation with authorities and a safe civic space [140]
 Ombudswoman of the Republic of Croatia (Pučka pravobraniteljica Republike Hrvatske), Izvješće pučke pravobraniteljice – Analiza stanja ljudskih prava u Hrvatskoj 2021 [Report of the Ombudswoman – Analysis of the state of human rights and equality in Croatia 2021], March 2022.
. Similarly, in Spain, the national Ombudsman institution, which is also an NHRI, reports regularly on a safe and protected civic space, the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, expression and information, access to justice, participation and cooperation with authorities [141]
 Spain, National Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) (2024), 2023 National Report (Informe Anual 2023), Defensor del Pueblo.
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Ombudsman institutions are generally mandated to address individual complaints, which can also shed light on general trends. They may also monitor and address civic space issues in the course of reviewing complaints by individuals or on their own initiative, where this is in their [AS2]mandate [142]
 FRA, ‘National human rights structures’, National human rights structures navigator.
. While NHRIs and Ombudsman institutions are not CSOs, they are considered important civic space actors that also require an enabling environment.

Building on their monitoring role, NHRIs also develop concrete tools and methodologies to assess the enabling environment for civic space and human rights defenders. For example, the Danish NHRI has launched a tool that provides an indicator framework and methodology to systematically monitor progress on the enabling environment for human rights defenders, using human rights-based indicators. The tool is open for use by all stakeholders, such as government authorities, NGOs, academia and think tanks [143]
 Danish Institute for Human Rights, ‘Furthering the right to defend rights’, Danish Institute for Human Rights website.
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At European level, NHRIs cooperate through the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI), which brings together information from its members. Since 2020, ENNHRI has published an annual report on the State of the Rule of Law in Europe, which includes an analysis of the overall enabling environment for civil society and human rights defenders based on the country reports. In its 2025 report, ENNHRI calls upon national authorities in Europe to ‘firmly support the establishment and enabling space for independent and effective NHRIs’. ENNHRI also calls on states to address persisting challenges for the rule of law, including structural human rights issues, and to work together with civil society to ensure the effective implementation of European courts’ judgments. ENNHRI also calls upon EU enlargement countries to ‘safeguard civic space and human rights defenders, including through legal protections, access to funding and regional and national protection mechanisms’ [144]
 ENNHRI, State of the Rule of Law in the EU Enlargement Countries: Reports from national human rights institutions in 2025, September 2023; ENNHRI, ‘State of the rule of law in Europe 2025’, ENNHRI website.
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Civil society organisations are also involved in monitoring various aspects of civic space at the national, regional, European and international levels.

For example, the CIVICUS Monitor is a monitoring tool built by a civil society alliance that tracks the state of civic freedoms – specifically the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly and expression – in every country in the world. For two decades it has compiled data from civil society groups, researchers and media sources to rate each country’s civic space as ‘open’, ‘narrowed’, ‘obstructed’, ‘repressed’, or ‘closed’. The platform provides real-time updates and analysis on trends and violations [145]
 Civicus, ‘How it works’, Civicus website.
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In the Western Balkans, for the past 12 years, the Monitoring Matrix on enabling environment for civil society development has been published annually by the Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN). It is structured around three areas: basic legal guarantees and freedoms, the framework for CSO financial viability and sustainability, and the relationship between the government and CSOs. In addition to the annual regional reports, BCSDN also publishes country reports for Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia, and some of the other EU candidates, i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Türkiye [146]
 BCSDN, ‘Monitoring Matrix Reports’, BCSDN website.
, prepared by the BCSDN member organisations in each of the countries.

The situation in 21 EU Member States is examined through the prism of the rule of law in the annual Liberties Rule of Law Report published by the Civil Liberties Union for Europe. The country chapters in the report include a look at developments in civic space, including the online civic space [147]
 Civil Liberties Union for Europe, Liberties Rule of Law Report 2025, 17 March 2025.
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In 2025, the European Civic Forum together with Civic Space Watch published a Civic Space Report with country reports for 15 EU Member States and a Western Balkans chapter encompassing Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia, written by 21 member and partner organisations [148]
 European Civic Forum and Civic Space Watch, Civic Space Report 2025, June 2025.
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A recent civil society monitoring initiative that was funded by the EU (citizens, equality, rights and values programme) is the monitoring action for civic space (MACS). MACS is a joint initiative by the European Centre for Not-for-profit Law and the European Civic Forum that tracks developments affecting civic freedoms across the EU. It systematically gathers evidence on laws, policies and practices that impact the ability of civil society to operate, mobilise and advocate. The initiative provides analyses and alerts to support timely responses and strengthen protections for civic space. The first analytical reports by MACS are expected in spring 2026. The system already provides real-time alerts on developments in seven EU Member States (Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania) with plans to expand to more countries [149]
 ECNL, ‘MACS – Monitoring Action for Civic Space’, ECNL website.
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Other smaller civil society initiatives cover certain countries or certain aspects of civic space, such as the two EU-funded projects ‘Civic champions’, which monitors new and emerging threats to CSOs in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and Italy [150]
 European Centre of Studies and Initiatives (Centro Studi ed Iniziative Europeo), ‘CivicChampions – Empowering civil society organisations and activists championing human rights and democratic values in the EU’, European Centre of Studies and Initiatives website.
, and ‘B.RIGHT SPACES’ (better rights in better civic spaces), which aims to understand, develop and network civic spaces at the local level [151]
 European Network of Cities and Regions for the Social Economy, ‘B.RIGHT SPACES’, European Network of Cities and Regions for the Social Economy website.
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Many of these civil society actors also contribute to the country visits and country reports for the European Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report, which also looks at civic space in the context of the national system of checks and balances. The aim of these reports is to identify inconsistencies with rule of law standards at an early stage so governments can respond to them before they become more problematic. Through input from various civil society actors, the Rule of Law Report is also seen to serve ‘as a stimulus for deeper civil society and stakeholder engagement’ [152]
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – 2025 rule of law report – The rule of law situation in the European Union, COM(2025) 900 final of 8 July 2025, p. 7.
. The 2025 report notes that ‘most Member States continue to ensure an enabling and supportive framework for civil society’; however, the trend of increasing challenges for civil society has continued. Progress over past years is noted in the recommendations for Ireland, Poland and Sweden, while recommendations relating to civic space are made in the country reports of Germany, Greece, Hungary and Poland [153]
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – 2025 rule of law report – The rule of law situation in the European Union, COM(2025) 900 final of 8 July 2025.
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In addition to monitoring civic space, CSOs are active in finding ways to protect but also empower other CSOs. All civic space actors, including CSOs and less formal associations, need resources of all kinds to operate effectively, including the knowledge and capacity to engage meaningfully with public authorities. In a number of countries, this know-how is supported by a central organisation. For example, the National Resource Centre for Civil Society in Albania is run by two CSOs and a think tank and plays a crucial role in supporting civil society organisations by enhancing their capacity, promoting participation in decision making and monitoring the enabling environment. The centre provides training, technical assistance, mentorship and guidance to CSOs in navigating legal and financial challenges, such as registration and taxation. It also provides legal advice and resources to CSOs to help them address bureaucratic obstacles and political interference and respond strategically to pressures on civic space through legal action and coordinated advocacy [154]
 National Resource Centre for Civil Society in Albania.
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Other initiatives by CSOs include a civic participation toolkit published by the multinational CSO The Good Lobby, with information on the different forms of participation in public and political life available to citizens, associations and social movements. The toolkit aims to empower citizens and civil society actors to fight for the issues they believe in and includes practical examples of how to influence law- and policymaking [155]
 Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, #iomiattivo – Fai sentire la tua voce in 5 mosse [#iomiattivo – Make your voice heard in 5 moves], The Good Lobby, July 2023.
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As another example, the pan-European Civil Liberties Union for Europe has published several toolkits to strengthen the capacity of CSOs, including training on how to use the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to advance the protection of fundamental rights in the EU, training on cybersecurity awareness, and a messaging guide for civil society actors facing smear campaigns [156]
 Butler, I., ‘New: Messaging guide For progressive civil society facing smear campaigns’, Civil Liberties Union for Europe, 10 December 2021.
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Also, at the pan-European level, the European Civic Forum published two papers in 2024 on the protection of CSOs and HRDs in the EU [157]
 Goodwin, B., ‘European NGOs publish papers on a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and CSOs’, European Civic Forum, 8 October 2024.
. Based on their findings, a pilot project ‘Net4Defenders’ has been launched to adopt a proactive approach to protecting civic space in Europe. Selected CSOs at the national level in France, Italy, Poland, Slovenia and Spain are serving as ‘protection hubs’ that are piloting approaches to holistic protection and serving as focal points for coordinated support, including legal advice, psychological support and digital protection / cybersecurity measures [158]
 Willamo, K., ‘Net4Defenders – Project partners advance work on civic space and protection of human rights defenders’, European Civic Forum, 26 February 2025.
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At the national level, in Cyprus, for the past three years, the NGO Civil Society Advocates has been running a project to monitor the implementation of the law regulating the operation of CSOs. The project is aimed at identifying gaps and good practices, and fostering better cooperation between CSOs and government ministries, including through seminars, conferences and online consultations with CSOs [159]
 Cyprus Bar Association, The Associations and Foundations Acts of 1972 and 1997 (Oι περί Σωματείων και Ιδρυμάτων Νόμοι του 1972 και 1997).
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CSOs can contribute to strengthening democracy and democratic resilience through efforts to combat disinformation and other forms of FIMI. For example, in Lithuania, since 2018, the non-profit organisation Civic Resilience Initiative has focused on countering foreign influence in democratic processes by enhancing societal resilience through educational programmes. Democracy is also cultivated through the democracy festivals that are held in a number of countries in Northern Europe, including the EU Member States Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden. These festivals feature constructive political dialogue in an informal setting between government officials, politicians, civil society organisations, businesses, media, academia and the general public [160]
 Democracy Festivals Association.
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