CJEU Case C‑369/23 / Judgment
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CJEU Case C‑369/23 / Judgment
Key facts of the case:
Reference for a preliminary ruling – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – Effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law – Second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Access to an independent and impartial tribunal – Liability of a Member State for damage caused to individuals by an infringement of EU law – Infringement by a national court adjudicating at last instance in relation to value added tax (VAT) – Jurisdiction of a court adjudicating at last instance while having the capacity of defendant in the dispute – Composition of the adjudicating panel
Outcome of the case:
On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules:
The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which a court hears at last instance, in the context of an appeal on a point of law, a case, in which that court has the status of defendant, relating to the liability of the State for an alleged infringement of EU law on account of a judgment delivered by that court, provided that that national legislation and the measures taken to deal with that case are such as to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the independence and impartiality of the court concerned.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter
25. By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a court hears at last instance, in the context of an appeal on a point of law, a case, relating to the liability of the State for an alleged infringement of EU law on account of a judgment delivered by that court, in which that court has the status of defendant.
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27. Second, it should be noted that the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which sets out, inter alia, the fundamental right to an independent and impartial tribunal, applies to the Member States, in accordance with Article 51(1) thereof, when they are implementing EU law. That is the situation in the present case, since the dispute in the main proceedings concerns the liability of the State for an alleged infringement of the VAT Directive.
28. In so far as the Charter sets out rights corresponding to rights guaranteed under the ECHR, Article 52(3) of the Charter is intended to ensure the necessary consistency between the rights contained in the Charter and the corresponding rights guaranteed under the ECHR, without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law. According to the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter corresponds to Article 6(1) ECHR. The Court must therefore ensure that its interpretation in the present case safeguards a level of protection which does not fall below the level of protection established in Article 6(1) ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others, C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
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39. In that regard, it should be noted that the fact that the Court of Justice of the European Union, as an institution, is the defendant in the proceedings does not preclude a case from being determined by the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 May 2000, Kögler v Court of Justice, C‑82/98 P, EU:C:2000:282, and of 4 May 2023, KY v Court of Justice of the European Union, C‑100/22 P, EU:C:2023:377). Similarly, the fundamental right to an independent and impartial tribunal, as set out in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, is not infringed where the Court of Justice is the court hearing an appeal brought by the European Union, represented by the institution of the Court of Justice of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2018, European Union v Kendrion, C‑150/17 P, EU:C:2018:1014, paragraph 36).
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49. It should also be recalled that the Court of Justice has held that the fundamental right to an independent and impartial tribunal, as laid down in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, is respected where the General Court, hearing a claim for damages seeking compensation for the alleged damage resulting from the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time, rules on that claim sitting in a different composition from that which heard the dispute giving rise to the procedure whose duration is criticised (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 November 2013, Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission, C‑40/12 P, EU:C:2013:768, paragraph 96, and of 13 December 2018, European Union v Kendrion, C‑150/17 P, EU:C:2018:1014, paragraphs 36 and 37 and the case-law cited).
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51. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which a court hears at last instance, in the context of an appeal on a point of law, a case, in which that court has the status of defendant, relating to the liability of the State for an alleged infringement of EU law on account of a judgment delivered by that court, provided that that national legislation and the measures taken to deal with that case are such as to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the independence and impartiality of the court concerned.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)