CJEU Joined Cases C-146/23 and C-374/23 / Judgment
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CJEU Joined Cases C-146/23 and C-374/23 / Judgment
Key facts of the case:
References for a preliminary ruling – Freezing or reduction of remuneration in the national public administration – Measures specifically aimed at judges – Article 2 TEU – Article 19(1), second subparagraph, TEU – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Obligations on Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection – Principle of judicial independence – Powers of the legislatures and executives of the Member States to set the detailed rules for determining judges’ remuneration – Possibility of derogating from those rules – Conditions
Outcome of the case:
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:
The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU, must be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence does not preclude:
– on the one hand, the legislature and the executive of a Member State from determining the remuneration of judges in so far as that determination does not involve the exercise of an arbitrary power but is based on detailed rules which:
– are provided for by law,
– are objective, foreseeable, stable and transparent,
– ensure that judges receive a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the functions they carry out, having regard to the economic, social and financial situation of the Member State concerned and the average salary in that Member State, and
– may be subject to effective judicial review in accordance with the procedural rules laid down by the law of that Member State;
– on the other hand, the legislature and the executive of a Member State from derogating from national legislation, which defines objectively the detailed rules for determining judges’ remuneration, by deciding to increase that remuneration by less than is provided for by that legislation or even to freeze or reduce the amount of that remuneration, in so far as such a derogating measure does not involve the exercise of an arbitrary power but:
– is provided for by law,
– sets detailed rules for remuneration that are objective, foreseeable and transparent,
– is justified by an objective of general interest pursued in the context of measures which, subject to duly justified exceptional circumstances, are not specifically aimed at judges but affect, more generally, the remuneration of other categories of officials or public servants,
– is necessary and strictly proportionate to the attainment of that objective, which presupposes that the derogating measure remains exceptional and temporary and does not undermine the commensurate nature of judges’ remuneration with the importance of the functions they carry out, and
– may be subject to effective judicial review in accordance with the procedural rules laid down by the law of the Member State concerned.
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Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)
20. In those circumstances the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku (District Court, Białystok) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Should Article 2 [TEU], which defines the values on which the European Union is based with regard to respect for the rule of law, and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) [TEU], in conjunction with Article 47 of the [Charter], which requires Member States to ensure effective legal protection, which is based on the right to a fair and public hearing, be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence precludes provisions of national legislation which, for the purpose of limiting government spending, waives a mechanism for setting judges’ pay on the basis of objective criteria that are independent of arbitrary interference by the executive and legislative authorities, resulting in sustained cuts to the pay of judges, thereby infringing the constitutional guarantees by which judges are granted remuneration consistent with the dignity of their office and the scope of their duties and the administration of justice is carried out by independent courts and independent judges?’
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29. In that context, that court states that it is required to ascertain whether a national system for the remuneration of judges which is directly dependent on the political will of the legislature and the executive is consistent with EU law and guarantees the values protected by Article 2 TEU as well as the principle of judicial independence enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.
30. In those circumstances the Vilniaus apygardos administracinis teismas (Regional Administrative Court, Vilnius) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘(1) Are the values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and justice, enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and the provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, to be interpreted as conferring on the legislature and the executive of the Member States the unrestricted and exclusive discretion to set, by means of national legislation, the remuneration of judges at a rate that depends solely on the will of the legislature and the executive?
(2) Are the provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, as well as those of Article 47 of the Charter, which covers, inter alia, the independence of the judiciary, to be interpreted as permitting the Member States to introduce, by means of national legislation, rules which set the remuneration of judges below the remuneration or fees set by the State in respect of members of other legal professions?’
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38. It is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court is hearing an action for damages brought against the Republic of Lithuania, in which it is claimed, in essence, that the discretion enjoyed by the legislature and the executive of that Member State in order to determine judges’ remuneration fails to observe the principle of judicial independence. In that context, the referring court wishes to ascertain, in order to be able to rule on that action, whether the detailed rules for determining that remuneration and the amount of that remuneration itself are consistent with that principle, which follows from Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and from Article 47 of the Charter.
39. Consequently, an answer to the questions referred in Case C‑374/23, which concern the interpretation of those provisions, appears necessary in order to enable the referring court to rule on the dispute in the main proceedings.
40. It follows that the request for a preliminary ruling in Case C‑374/23 is admissible.
41. As a preliminary point, in so far as, in Case C‑374/23, the second question concerns the interpretation of Article 47 of the Charter, it must be pointed out that the recognition of the right to an effective remedy, in a given case, presupposes that the person invoking that right is relying on rights or freedoms guaranteed by EU law or that that person is the subject of proceedings constituting an implementation of EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter (judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
42. However, it is not apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that SR and RB satisfy either of those conditions.
43. Consequently, in accordance with Article 51(1) of the Charter, Article 47 thereof is not, as such, applicable in Case C‑374/23. Nevertheless, since the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU requires all Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU law, within the meaning in particular of Article 47 of the Charter, that latter provision must be duly taken into consideration for the purposes of interpreting the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (judgments of 20 April 2021, Repubblika, C‑896/19, EU:C:2021:311, paragraphs 44 and 45, and of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraphs 36 and 37).