Article 17 - Right to property
Article 51 - Field of application
Key facts of the case:
The Applicant is a business enterprise that operated a mobile payment system to pay parking fees. Its clients were municipalities providing parking service. Act no. CC of 2011 on the national mobile payment system (A nemzeti mobil fizetési rendszerről szóló 2011. évi CC. törvény, hereinafter: the Mobile Payment System Act), that entered into force on 1 April 2013, made the operation of the mobile payment system in the whole country the monopoly of a single, State-controlled undertaking (Nemzeti Mobilfizetési Zrt.) the use of which was mandatory. Consequently, the applicant could no longer provide its service to its clients.
The European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Hungary and the European Court of Justice concluded in case C-171/17 that “by instituting and maintaining in force the national mobile payment system […] Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 15(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market and Article 56 TFEU”.4
The Applicant sued the Hungarian state for compensation for the financial gain that it was unable to realize due to the Mobile Payment System Act, and for the depreciation of the value of its property, including material assets and intellectual property. The Applicant based its claim on Directive 2006/123 (Services Directive), Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Article 17 of the Charter.
After the dismissal of its petition by the first instance court, the Applicant filed an appeal with the Metropolitan Regional Court of Appeal.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The Metropolitan Regional Court of Appeal had to decide whether the three criteria of the State’s responsibility set out in paragraph 74 of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered in the Brasserie case5 are satisfied, namely whether the applicable EU law confers a right on the Applicant that was breached by the national legislature, whether the breach is sufficiently serious, and whether there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by the Applicant.
Outcome of the case:
The Metropolitan Regional Court of Appeal (hereinafter: Court of Appeal) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and confirmed the judgment of the first instance court that declared the applicant’s petition unfounded.
The Court of Appeal noted that the provisions of the Services Directive had direct effect because Hungary had failed to implement the directive correctly as concluded by the CJEU in case C-171/17,6 and also because the direct effect of Article 15 of the directive had already been acknowledged in the previous case law of the CJEU.7
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal found that EU law did not confer a right on the Applicant that was breached by the national legislature. The Applicant claimed that it had the right under the Services Directive to be protected from the monopolization of the operation of a mobile payment system by the State. The Court of Appeal noted, however, that according to the judgment of the CJEU in case C-171/17 it was not the creation of a national monopoly of mobile payment services itself that constituted a breach of EU law, but the disproportionality of the legislative measure. The Mobile Payment System Act was found disproportionate because it granted the monopoly to a single, State-controlled undertaking (Nemzeti Mobilfizetési Zrt.), instead of using a less restrictive measure, for example a system of concessions based on a competitive process. So, under the Services Directive the Applicant had no justiciable right, meaning that the claim did not meet the first criterion of the Brasserie test.
The Court of Appeal also concluded that there was no direct causal link between the breach of EU law and the damage sustained by the applicant. The direct cause of the applicant’s damage was not the creation of a national monopoly of mobile payment services, but the fact that after the entry into force of the law it had no longer the right to provide this service. The Court of Appeal reasoned that even if the contested legislation had entered into force with a content that is compatible with EU law according to the judgment of the CJEU, the applicant would be in the same situation. It is impossible to prove that the applicant would have won the concession in a competitive process. Therefore, the third criterion of the Brasserie test was missing as well.
The Court of Appeal turned to the examination of the applicant’s claim based on the Charter and addressed the first criterion of the Brasserie test again (the existence of a right breached by the national legislature). It was acknowledged that the applicant’s material assets and intellectual property fell under Article 17 of the Charter. However, the Court of Appeal did not examine whether the aApplicant’s right to property was violated (and whether the first criterion of the Brasserie test was satisfied after all) because the lack of a direct causal link was already established.
The outcome of the case was the dismissal of the applicant’s claim for compensation.
[140] The arguments of the appeal concerning the violation of Article 17 of the Charter, already submitted in the first instance procedure, were relevant in the appellate procedure because the judgement delivered in case C-171/17 had established of the violation of the obligation stemming from Article 56 of TFEU.
[141] Based on the case law of the Supreme Court [Kúria] the applicability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights cannot be raised in a given case “because Article 51 (1) provides that the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. Article 6 (1) of TFEU – similarly to Article 51 (2) of the Charter – specifies that the provisions of the Charter do not expand the competences of the European Union as defined in the Treaties (see Dutka and Sajtos, C-614/12 and C-10/13, EU:C:2014:30, paragraph 13). According to the interpretation of the Court of Justice of the European Union if the facts of a given case are not governed by EU law the CJEU does not have the competence to adjudicate the case, nor can such competence be based solely on the invoked provisions of the Charter. [See Judgment of 19 November 2019, A.K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C-585/18., C-624/18. és C-625/18., EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 78; Judgment in case Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10., EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 22; in addition see Cholakova decision, C-14/13., EU:C:2013:374, paragraph 30; Nagy and Others decision, C-488/12/12. és C-526/12., EU:C:2013:703, paragraphs 17, and Dutke and Others decision, EU:C:2014:30, paragraph 15.] {Judgment of the Kúria no. Gfv.VII.30.135/2020/12., paragraph 53}.
[142] The Applicant argued that its goodwill, contacts (such as the municipalities providing parking services and the clients using this service), clients (the municipalities providing parking services, the telecommunication and banking service providers contributing the operation of the mobile payment service system), contracts, and technological solutions, professional knowledge and know-how fall under the protection of the right to property, and claimed that the Respondent’s [i.e., the State] interference with the enjoyment of these assets was unlawful in light of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The continuous provision of mobile payment services was rendered impossible, and consequently the Applicant lost its clients – primarily the municipalities. This argument would have been enough to examine whether the Applicant’s right to property enshrines in Article 17 of the Charter was violated or not.
[143] Even though the first instance court incorrectly found that the assets falling under the right to property were not specified sufficiently [by the Applicant], the examination of the merits on this legal basis was excluded because the Applicant failed to prove a direct link between its damage and the breach of law committed by the State.
[140] A fellebbezésben az Alapjogi Charta 17. cikkének sérelmére vonatkozó, az elsőfokú eljárásban is előadott érvek az elsőfokú ítélet felülbírálata során annyiban voltak relevánsak, hogy a C-171/17. számú ítélet az EUMSz 56. cikkéből eredő kötelezettség megsértését állapította meg.
[141] A Kúria követendő gyakorlatából következően az Alapjogi Charta alkalmazhatósága nem merülhet fel az adott ügyben, „mivel az 51. cikk (1) bekezdése azt írja elő, hogy a tagállamok csak annyiban címzettjei a Charta rendelkezéseinek, amennyiben az Unió jogát hajtják végre. Az EUMSz 6. cikk (1) bekezdése - a Charta 51. cikkének (2) bekezdéséhez hasonlóan - pontosítja, hogy ezen utóbbi rendelkezései semmilyen módon nem terjesztik ki az Európai Uniónak a Szerződésekben meghatározott hatásköreit (lásd Dutka és Sajtos végzés, C-614/12. és C-10/13., EU:C:2014:30, 13. pont). Az Európai Unió Bíróságának jogértelmezése szerint amennyiben valamely jogi tényállás nem tartozik az uniós jog alkalmazási körébe, az EUB annak elbírálására nem rendelkezik hatáskörrel, a Charta esetleg hivatkozott rendelkezései pedig önmagukban nem alapozhatják meg e hatáskört [lásd 2019. november 19-i A. K. és társai (a legfelsőbb bíróság fegyelmi tanácsának függetlensége) ítélet, C-585/18., C-624/18. és C-625/18., EU:C:2019:982, 78. pont, Åkerberg Fransson-ítélet, C-617/10., EU:C:2013:105, 22. pont; továbbá Cholakova-végzés, C-14/13., EU:C:2013:374, 30. pont; Nagy és társai végzés, C-488/12/12. és C-526/12., EU:C:2013:703, 17. pont, valamint Dutka és Sajtos végzés, EU:C:2014:30, 15. pont]” {a Kúria Gfv.VII.30.135/2020/12. számú ítélete [53] bekezdés}.
[142] A felperes helyesen hivatkozott arra, hogy a keresetben tulajdonjogi védelem alá eső javai körében a goodwill-jét, ismertségét (úgy a parkolási szolgáltatást nyújtó önkormányzatok, mint az ilyen szolgáltatásokat igénybe vevő személyek körében), ügyfélkörét (a parkolási szolgáltatást nyújtó önkormányzatok, a mobilparkolási szolgáltatások nyújtásában közreműködő telekommunikációs és banki szolgáltatók) és szerződésállományát, valamint a számítástechnikai megoldásait, szakmai ismereteit és know-how-ját jelölte meg, azt állítva, hogy az alperes e javak élvezetébe az Európai Unió Bíróságának ítéletéből következően jogellenesen beavatkozott. Ellehetetlenítette a mobilparkolási szolgáltatások további nyújtását, illetve a felperes ennek eredményeként elveszítette - elsősorban önkormányzati - ügyfélkörét. Ez az előadás elegendő lett volna annak vizsgálatához, hogy a felperesnek az Alapjogi Charta 17. cikke szerinti tulajdonjoga sérült-e vagy sem.
[143] A tulajdonjog körébe vonható vagyoni elemek határozott megjelölését az elsőfokú bíróság ugyan megalapozatlanul hiányolta, de az érdemi vizsgálatot ezen a jogalapon is az az ok zárta ki, hogy a felperes a megállapított tagállami jogsértéssel okozati összefüggésben álló kárt nem igazolt.
