Article 47 - Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial
Article 51 - Field of application
Key facts of the case:
Following divorce proceedings, A filled for a precautionary seizure order against B, claiming that B refused to return the money (from the sale of their family home), which he had allegedly misappropriated. The District Court upheld the request and ordered the seizure of B's assets to guarantee A's credit. Once the seizure was carried out, B filed an opposition. In a new judgement, the District Court decided to partially uphold B's claim and ordered the seizure to be lifted, replacing it with an inventory of assets. Against this new decision, A lodged an appeal and B, in response, lodged a cross-appeal. Both appeals were accepted, and the Court of Appeal decided to uphold A's appeal, reinstating the seizure order, and dismissing B's appeal in its entirety. In response, B lodged a review appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice, which was rejected, on the gounds that according to article 370 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, no appeal may be lodged with the Supreme Court of Justice against decisions handed down in precautionary proceedings, including those ordering the reversal of proceedings, and that it also didn’t meet the requirements established by article 629 (2) to be an appealable decision, more specifically, that there were double conformity – principle where a second confirmation of a judicial decision should not be subject to a third judicial review. B filed a complaint against this decision, claiming that the situation under review wasn’t a case that violated the rule of double conformity since there were divergences in the decisions made by the lower courts; and that by refusing the appeal, the Supreme Court had violated not only B.´s right to effective judicial protection in the form of the right to an appeal, but also EU law. Therefore, B. also asked the intervention of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) by way of a preliminary ruling, so that it would assess whether the interpretation given by the Court of the principle of double conformity, complied with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); whether this restriction of the right to an appeal respects the principle of proportionality immanent to the right of defence provided in the ECHR rule; and if the lower court had also violated, among other things, B.’s right to effective judicial protection.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The two relevant questions were if 370 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to which no appeal may be lodged with the Supreme Court of Justice against decisions handed down in precautionary proceedings, including those ordering the reversal of proceedings, could be applied or not to cases of double conformity - where there is a second confirmation of a judicial decision that should not be subject to a third judicial review-, and whether or not a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU should be admitted.
Outcome of the case:
With regard to the supposed admissibility of the appeal, the Court explained that under the law, as a rule, there is no appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice in the context of precautionary proceedings, unless one of the situations provided for in Article 629(2)(a) to (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure arises, in which case the appeal is always admissible. However, none of these hypotheses apply to this case. No violation of any rules of jurisdiction or res judicata was invoked, the value of the case was not disputed, no uniform jurisprudence was invoked, and no contradiction with another court decision by the Court of Appeal on the same question was raised. Therefore, no fundamental right was violated. The Court also clarified that this limitation to the admissibility of appeals was not unconstitutional, since the Constitutional Court has successively and peacefully affirmed that, in matters of private law, it is up to the ordinary legislator to regulate the breadth of the appeals system. In addition, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice has also explained (and the Constitutional Court has agreed) that the guarantee of access to the law does not mean an unrestricted right to appeal, since the Constitution leaves to the legislator a wide margin of freedom to shape the requirements for admissibility of appeals; and much less does it impose a triple degree of jurisdiction. Therefore, in this case, since the right to appeal was guaranteed through an appeal to the Court of Appeal, there was no basis for considering the restriction of access to the Supreme Court of Justice, in a decision that was provisional in nature, as violating any fundamental right. Nor could it be said that the ECHR or the jurisprudence of the ECHR expand the content of the fundamental rights in question, beyond what was already enshrined in the national constitution. With regard to the reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court understood that in order for a reference for a preliminary ruling to be justified, two conditions must be met: firstly, that the national court has doubts about the interpretation or validity of rules of EU law; and secondly, that a decision on such doubts is indispensable for a proper resolution of the case pending before the national court. However, in this case, the Court found that the admissibility of a review appeal, was not a question for a preliminary ruling since, as a general rule, civil procedural law is not "communitarised or Europeanised", i.e. it is not the subject of the Treaties or legislative acts of the European Union, and is therefore not covered by the Union's primary or secondary laws. And even if it were understood that a fundamental right enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was at stake, namely the right of action established in Article 47, as a guarantee of the right to a remedy, the truth is that this would not apply to the case at hand, since under the terms of Article 51(1), the Charter is addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, as well as the Member States, only when they apply Union law in accordance with their respective competences and within the limits of the competences conferred on the Union by the Treaties. In its decision, the Court decided to reject the appeal.
“There is therefore no violation of the fundamental rights of the Respondent/Appellant/Complainant, especially with regard to the guarantee of access to the law and to the courts, since there is no basis for the view that the rights to a fair trial and to effective judicial protection, expressly enshrined in the CRP (Art. 20), in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Art. 47) and in the ECHR (Arts. 6, no. 16, and 13), are not guaranteed in this case or are offended by the rejection of the appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice, id est, by the inadmissibility of access to a third degree of jurisdiction.” “It is therefore concluded that there is no unconstitutionality and no violation of the ECHR or the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the rejection of the review appeal, under the respective admissibility regime, of the decisions handed down in the precautionary procedure.”
“As regards the appropriateness of making a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, the Respondent/Appellant/Complainant takes the view that the proceedings should be suspended and that this issue should be raised before that Court. It argues that, since the ECHR has been incorporated into the EU legal order and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has been approved, the interpretation made by the courts is contrary to the interpretation of the Treaties made by the CJEU, and that there is a risk of a fait accompli occurring which could render the eventual outcome of the main action, in whole or in part, useless.”
“Even if it were understood that a fundamental right enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was at stake, namely the right of action established in Article 47, as a guarantee of the right to a remedy, the truth is that this would not apply to the case at hand. Indeed, as is well known, under the terms of Article 51(1), the Charter is addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, as well as the Member States, only when they apply Union law in accordance with their respective competences and observing the limits of the competences conferred on the Union by the Treaties. Accordingly, “with regard to references for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it must be noted that, under Article 51(1) of the Charter, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. While the circumstances of such implementation can vary, it must nevertheless be clearly and unequivocally apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that a rule of EU law other than the Charter is applicable to the case in the main proceedings. Since the Court has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling where a legal situation does not come within the scope of EU law, any provisions of the Charter that may be relied upon by the referring court or tribunal cannot, of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction. Faced with the proliferation of requests for preliminary rulings wrongly made on the basis of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the CJEU has repeatedly stated that when a legal situation is not covered by EU law, it does not have jurisdiction to deal with it and that the provisions of the Charter that may be invoked cannot in themselves serve as a basis for such jurisdiction. For this reason, the CJEU has rejected proceedings in such cases on the grounds that there is no indication of a national regulation applying EU law that might be offending the Charter. (...) Any request for a reference for a preliminary ruling under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is therefore unfounded when it concerns the application of rules of the CPC which govern the system of appeals to the Supreme Court of Justice and which have no connection with European Union law."
“Inexiste, pois, qualquer violação dos direitos fundamentais do Requerido/Recorrente/Reclamante, mormente no que se refere à garantia de acesso ao Direito e aos Tribunais, pois não tem fundamento o entendimento de que os direitos a um processo equitativo e à tutela jurisdicional efetiva, expressamente consagrados na CRP (art. 20.º), na Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia (art. 47.º) e na CEDH (arts. 6.º, n.º 1, e 13.º) não se mostram assegurados no processo ou são ofendidos por efeito da rejeição do recurso de revista para o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, id est, pela inadmissibilidade do acesso a um terceiro grau de jurisdição.”
“Conclui-se, deste modo, pela inexistência de qualquer inconstitucionalidade e de qualquer violação da CEDH ou da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da UE na rejeição do recurso de revista, ao abrigo do respetivo regime de admissibilidade, das decisões proferidas em sede de procedimento cautelar.”
“Já quanto à pertinência de proceder a um reenvio prejudicial dirigido ao TJUE, o Requerido/Recorrente/Reclamante entende que deve ser suspenso o processo e que esta questão deve ser suscitada perante esse Tribunal. Sustenta que, tendo sido acolhida no ordenamento da União a CEDH e aprovada a Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da UE, a interpretação feita pelas instâncias é contrária àquela dos Tratados efetuada pelo TJUE, havendo o risco de ocorrer um facto consumado suscetível de tornar inútil, total ou parcialmente, a eventual procedência da ação principal.”
«Mesmo que se entendesse que estava em causa um direito fundamental consagrado na Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da UE, nomeadamente, o direito de ação estabelecido no art. 47.º, enquanto garantia do direito ao recurso, a verdade é que tal não teria aplicação ao caso em apreço. Com efeito, como é sabido, nos termos do art. 51.º, n.º 1, os destinatários da Carta são as instituições, órgãos e organismos da União, assim como os Estados-Membros, apenas quando apliquem o Direito da União, de acordo com as respetivas competências e observando os limites das competências conferidas à União pelos Tratados. Nestes moldes, “No que diz respeito aos reenvios prejudiciais que têm por objeto a interpretação da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia, importa recordar que, segundo o seu artigo 51.º, n.º 1, as disposições da Carta têm por destinatários os Estados-Membros apenas quando apliquem o direito da União. Embora as hipóteses em que essa aplicação está em causa possam ser diversas, é, no entanto, necessário que resulte de forma clara e inequívoca do pedido de decisão prejudicial que, no processo principal, é aplicável uma regra de direito da União diferente da Carta. Na medida em que o Tribunal de Justiça não é competente para conhecer de um pedido de decisão prejudicial quando uma situação não for abrangida pelo âmbito de aplicação do direito da União, as disposições da Carta eventualmente invocadas pelo órgão jurisdicional de reenvio não podem, por si só, fundar essa competência”. Perante a proliferação de pedidos de reenvio prejudicial indevidamente formulados com base na Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da UE, o TJUE tem repetidamente afirmado que, quando uma situação jurídica não está abrangida pelo Direito da União, não tem competência para dela conhecer e que as disposições da Carta eventualmente invocadas não podem, por si sós, servir de base a essa competência. Por isso, o TJUE tem rejeitado, nesses casos, o processo por não se indicar uma regulamentação nacional que aplique o direito da União que possa estar a ofender a Carta. (…) Carece, assim, de fundamento qualquer pedido de reenvio prejudicial ao abrigo da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da UE quando está em causa a aplicação de normas do CPC que disciplinam o regime dos recursos para o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça e que não têm qualquer relação com o Direito da União Europeia.»
