Luxembourg / Higher Administrative Court / Case No. 49262C / ECLI:LU:CADM:2024:49262

A v Ministry of Defence (Ministère de la Défense) and the General Chief of Defence (Général Chef d’Etat-major de l’Armée)
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Type
Decision
Decision date
14/03/2024
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:LU:CADM:2024:49262

Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

  • Luxembourg / Higher Administrative Court / Case No. 49262C / ECLI:LU:CADM:2024:49262

    Key facts of the case: 

    A joined the Luxembourgish Army in 2010 as a volunteer soldier. Although he started an officer training in 2011, he decided to pursue a different career within the Army in 2013 without completing the training. In October 2020, he applied for an external examination to start a career as an officer. In accordance with Article 10(2) of the Act of 23 July 1952 on military organisation (Loi modifiée du 23 juillet 1952 concernant l’organisation militaire), which was in force at the time, applicants needed to be under 29 years of age at the time of admission to the probationary period. As such, A submitted a request for a waiver of this age requirement to the Minister of Defence in November 2020. A was admitted to the examination subject to a positive response from the Minister of Defence. He came first in the examination. However, in March 2021, the Minister of Defence refused A’s request as the law did not provide for the possibility of waiving the age requirement. Later that month, the General Chief of Defence informed A that his application could not be accepted due to this refusal. A lodged an administrative appeal against both decisions in April 2021, which was dismissed by the Minister of Defence in June 2021. In July 2021, he brought an action before the Administrative Court (tribunal administratif) against the decisions from March and June 2021. By judgment of July 2023, the Administrative Court declared the action for annulment unfounded.  

    Key legal question raised by the Court: 

    The key legal question addressed by the Court is the legality of an exception to the principle of equal treatment based on age. 

    Outcome of the case: 

    The Higher Administrative Court firstly holds that, in cases such as those of the proceedings where the applicant raises the incompatibility of a provision of national law with the EU Charter and EU secondary law, as well as the Luxembourgish Constitution, the Court must first analyse the compatibility of such provision with international standards before carrying out the constitutional review.

    The Court further clarifies that the decisions under review implement EU law. This is because they are governed by national acts that transpose Council Directive 2000/78/EC, notably regarding standards applicable to relevant age requirements and non-discrimination requirements. As such, Article 21 of the EU Charter is directly applicable to the decisions in question.

    The Court recalls that, in line with the provisions of Directive 2000/78/EC which it transposes, the Act of 29 November 2006 amending 1. the amended Act of 16 April 1979 laying down the general status of State civil servants, 2. the amended Act of 24 December 1985 laying down the general status of municipal civil servants (Loi du 29 novembre 2006 modifiant 1. la loi modifiée du 16 avril 1979 fixant le statut général des fonctionnaires de l’Etat 2. la loi modifiée du 24 décembre 1985 fixant le statut général des fonctionnaires communaux) provides for i) a prohibition of any discrimination based on age and ii) an exception to this general principle of equal treatment. As such, access to public employment may be limited by an age requirement such as that of the proceedings in the present case as an exception to the principle of equal treatment. However, such exception must comply with the principle of proportionality. In this regard, the Court refers to relevant caselaw of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

    In applying these standards to the specific circumstances of the applicant, the Court recalls that the rationale of the age requirement in question is, on the one hand, to verify the physical condition of the candidate and, on the other, to enable the candidate to pursue a sufficiently long career before admission to retirement, which in the armed forces has traditionally been 55 years of age. Given that the applicant had been in the Army for over seven years, came first in the external examination and passed the eliminatory test designed to measure his physical condition, the Court concludes that the age limit does not appear to be justified as a means to verify the physical condition of the applicant. As for the need to achieve a reasonable period of employment before retirement, the Court recalls that the applicant joined the Army in 2010. As such, the age limit does not appear to be necessary for that purpose. The lack of necessity of the age requirement in question is further confirmed by its repealing in August 2023, with the aim of increasing the attractiveness of the Army. The Court therefore concludes that, by refusing the waiver to the applicant, the Minister of Defence disregarded the principle of non-discrimination derived among others from Article 21 of the EU Charter. Consequently, it amends the judgment under appeal by annulling the three decisions under review and referring the case to the responsible Minister. 

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    The applicant's twofold argument consisted in alleging, on the one hand, the incompatibility of Article 10 of the Act of 23 July 1952, which was applicable at the time of the contested decisions, firstly with Article 21 of the Charter and then with the relevant provisions of Directive 2000/78/EC and, on the other hand, that such Article 10 was unconstitutional in relation to the principle of equality contained at the material time in Article 10a (1) of the Constitution.

    The [Administrative] Court [...] did not lose sight of the application of Article 21 of the Charter either, given that according to the established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, hereinafter ‘the CJEU’, EU law is being implemented, since the transposition of the directive in question underpins the validity of the existing age requirement, which is currently at issue, and, further, the related non-discrimination requirements directly arising from the European framework.

    Contrary to the [Administrative] Court's assessment, the issue is not that of imperfect transposition of the Directive into national law, which determines the applicability of European law, but rather that of the immediate application of EU law, including Article 21 of the Charter, given that the question of the age requirement and the related non-discrimination requirements fall directly within the scope of EU law, which actually has to be implemented in the case in point.

    This Act, which stems from Directive 2000/78/EC, is based on the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter. Article 21 (1) of the Charter states that ‘any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited’.

    It follows from these provisions that, as an exception to the principle of non-discrimination, access to employment may be limited to a condition of age, which must, however, in substance comply with the principle of proportionality.

    It is common ground that the ministerial decisions refusing the waiver take up the point of view of the Minister for the Civil Service and are all based on the fact that the legislation applicable at the time did not expressly provide for the possibility of derogating from the disputed age requirement contained in Article 10 of the Act of 23 July 1952. However, the 10 requirements of non-discrimination, based among others on age, as derived from the aforementioned Article 21 of the Charter and the relevant provisions of Directive 2008/78/EC, transposed into Luxembourg law by the Act of 29 November 2006 amending the general status, are binding on the Minister and the General in making their respective decisions.

    The fact that the applicant had been in the Army for more than 7 years at the time the decisions at issue were taken, corroborated, moreover, by the result of the competition, should alone have been sufficient to infer that, in the specific case in point, the maintenance of the age requirement was no longer justified in the case of the applicant, even in the absence of a statute expressly providing for such a waiver, taking into account the applicable general principles, together with the higher-ranking provisions of EU law, including Article 21 of the Charter and the aforementioned relevant provisions of the Act of 29 November 2006 transposing Directive 2000/78/EC into national law.

    Consequently, by refusing the waiver requested by the applicant in the circumstances of the proceedings, the Minister, through his two negative decisions, disregarded the principle of non-discrimination derived from higher-ranking norms, and the General, by refusing the application, saw his negative decision affected by the same defect. 

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    Le double argumentaire de l’appelant consiste à invoquer, d’un côté, l’inconventionnalité de l’article 10 de la loi du 23 juillet 1952 applicable au moment des décisions critiquées d’abord par rapport à l’article 21 de la Charte, puis par rapport aux dispositions pertinentes de la directive 2000/78/CE et, de l’autre côté, l’inconstitutionnalité dudit article 10 par rapport au principe d’égalité contenu à l’époque des faits à l’article 10bis, paragraphe 1er de la Constitution.

    Le tribunal [...]n’a pas perdu de vue non plus l’application de l’article de 21 de la Charte, vu que d’après une jurisprudence constante de la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne, ci-après « la CJUE », il y a mise en œuvre du droit de l’Union européenne, la transposition de la directive en question sous-tendant la validité de la condition d’âge posée, actuellement litigieuse et plus loin les exigences d’exclusion de discrimination y relatives découlant directement du cadre européen.

    Contrairement à l’appréciation du tribunal, la question n’est pas celle d’une transposition imparfaite de la directive en droit national conditionnant l’applicabilité du droit européen, mais bien celle de l’application immédiate du droit de l’Union, y compris l’article 21 de la Charte, étant constant précisément que la question de la condition d’âge et des exigences de non-discrimination y relatives relèvent directement du droit de l’Union européenne qui se trouve effectivement à mettre en œuvre dans le cas de figure de l’espèce. Cette loi, issue de la directive 2000/78/CE, se fonde sur le principe de non-discrimination consacré par l’article 21 de la Charte. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article 21 de la Charte dispose qu’« est interdite toute discrimination fondée notamment sur le sexe, la race, la couleur, les origines ethnico-sociales, les caractéristiques génétiques, la langue, la religion ou les convictions, les opinions politiques ou toute autre opinion, l’appartenance à une minorité nationale, la fortune, la naissance, un handicap, l’âge ou l’orientation sexuelle ».

    Il se dégage de ces dispositions que par exception au principe de non-discrimination, l’accès à l’emploi peut être limité à une condition d’âge, qui doit toutefois en substance respecter le principe de proportionnalité.

    Il est constant que les décisions ministérielles de refus de dérogation reprennent le point de vue du ministre de la Fonction publique et s’appuient toutes sur le fait que la législation applicable à l’époque n’a pas prévu de manière expresse une possibilité de dérogation par rapport à la condition d’âge litigieuse contenue à l’article 10 de la loi du 23 juillet 1952. Toutefois, les 10 exigences de non-discrimination, fondées notamment sur l’âge, telles qu’issues de l’article 21 précité de la Charte et des dispositions pertinentes de la directive 2008/78/CE, transposées en droit luxembourgeois par la loi du 29 novembre 2006, modifiant le statut général, s’imposent au ministre et au Général dans la prise de décision respective.

    La présence de l’appelant au corps de l’armée durant plus de 7 ans au moment de la prise des décisions litigieuses, corroborée d’ailleurs par le résultat au concours, aurait dû suffire à elle seule pour induire que dans le cas précis de l’espèce le maintien de la condition d’âge ne se justifie plus dans le chef de l’appelant, même en l’absence de texte de loi prévoyant expressément pareille dérogation, et ce compte tenu des principes généraux applicables, ensemble les dispositions supérieures du droit de l’Union européenne, dont l’article 21 de la Charte et les dispositions pertinentes précitées de la loi du 29 novembre 2006 transposant en droit interne la directive 2000/78/CE.

    Par voie de conséquence, en refusant dans les conditions données la dérogation sollicitée à l’appelant, le ministre, à travers ses deux décisions négatives, a méconnu le principe de non-discrimination issu de normes supérieures et le Général, en refusant la candidature, a vu de sa décision négative affectée du même vice.