CJEU Case C-365/23 / Judgment

Arce
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Type
Decision
Decision date
20/03/2025
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2025:192
  • CJEU Case C-365/23 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case: 

    Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Directive 93/13/EEC – Scope – Article 2(b) – Article 3(1) – Article 4(2) – Article 5 – Article 6(1) – Article 8a – Pre-formulated standard contract – Contract between a supplier providing services for development and career support for sportspersons and a ‘rising star’ sportsman of minor age represented by his parents – Term establishing the obligation to pay to that supplier remuneration equal to 10% of the income received by that sportsman over the following 15 years – Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Articles 17 and 24 – Right to property – Rights of the child

    Outcome of the case: 

    On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules:

    1. Article 1(1) and Article 2(b) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that a contract for services for development and career support for a sportsperson, concluded between, on the one hand, a supplier carrying on an activity in the field of sports development and, on the other hand, a ‘rising star’ of minor age, represented by his or her parents, who, when that contract was concluded, was not yet employed in the field of sport and, therefore, had the status of consumer, falls within the scope of that directive.
    2. Article 4(2) and Article 8 of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that a contractual term stipulating that, for the provision of services for development and career support in a particular sport, specified in the contract, the young sportsperson undertakes to pay remuneration equal to 10% of the income received over the 15 years following the conclusion of that contract falls within the scope of that provision. Consequently, a national court may, in principle, assess, in the light of Article 3 of that directive, the unfairness of that term only if it reaches the conclusion that it is not drafted in plain, intelligible language. However, those provisions do not preclude national legislation which authorises a judicial review of the unfairness of that term even where it is drafted in plain, intelligible language.
    3. Article 5 of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that a contractual term which merely stipulates that, in exchange for the provision of services for development and career support for a sportsperson, that sportsperson undertakes to pay the service provider remuneration equal to 10% of the income received over the 15 years following the conclusion of that contract, without all the information necessary to enable him or her to assess the financial consequences of the commitment undertaken by him or her being communicated to the consumer before the conclusion of the contract, is not drafted in plain, intelligible language within the meaning of that provision.
    4. Article 3(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that a contractual term which stipulates that, in exchange for the provision of services for development and career support for a sportsperson, a young sportsperson undertakes to pay remuneration equal to 10% of the income received over the 15 years following the conclusion of that contract does not create a significant imbalance, to the detriment of the consumer, between the parties’ rights and obligations, within the meaning of that provision, merely because that term does not establish a link between the value of the service provided and its cost to the consumer. The existence of such an imbalance must be assessed in the light, in particular, of the rules applicable in national law in the absence of an agreement between the parties, fair and equitable market practices on the date of conclusion of the contract in the matter of remuneration in the field of sport concerned and all the circumstances attending the conclusion of that contract, as well as all the other terms of that contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.
    5. Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding a national court which has found that a term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is unfair, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of that directive, from reducing the amount payable by the consumer to the extent of the costs actually incurred by the seller or supplier in the performance of that contract.
    6. Directive 93/13, read in the light of Article 17(1) and Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,vmust be interpreted as meaning that, where a contractual term stipulates that, in exchange for the provision of services for development and career support for a sportsperson, a consumer undertakes to pay remuneration equal to 10% of the income received over the 15 years following the conclusion of that contract, the fact that the consumer was a minor at the time that contract was concluded and that that contract was concluded by the minor’s parents on behalf of the minor is relevant for the purposes of assessing whether that term is unfair.
  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    97. By its ninth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Directive 93/13, read in the light of Article 17(1) and Article 24(2) of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, where a contractual term stipulates that, in exchange for the provision of services for development and career support for a sportsperson, a consumer undertakes to pay remuneration equal to 10% of the income received over the 15 years following the conclusion of that contract, the fact that the consumer was a minor at the time that contract was concluded and that that contract was concluded by the minor’s parents on behalf of the minor is relevant for the purposes of assessing whether that term is unfair.

    98. It should be recalled that, so far as actions of the Member States are concerned, the scope of the Charter is defined in Article 51(1) thereof, under which the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law.

    99. In the present case, in response to the first question, the Court found that Directive 93/13 was applicable to a contract such as that at issue in the main proceedings, with the result that the national regulatory framework of which the dispute in the main proceedings forms part constitutes an implementation of that directive and, therefore, of EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter.

    100. Consequently, the referring court is required, when applying Directive 93/13, to respect the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, which include those laid down in Articles 17 and 24 thereof, which concern, the right to property and the rights of the child, respectively.

    101. As regards, in particular, the rights of the child guaranteed in Article 24 of the Charter, those rights entail, inter alia, the obligation to take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in all actions relating to children.

    102. Consequently, although Directive 93/13 does not refer to consumers who are minors, it nevertheless follows from Article 24(2) of the Charter and Article 3(1) of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1989, to which the explanations relating to Article 24 of the Charter expressly refer, that the best interests of the child must not only be taken into account in the substantive assessment of applications concerning children, but must also influence the decision-making process leading to that assessment, subject to specific procedural safeguards. As the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child has observed, the expression ‘best interests of the child’, within the meaning of Article 3(1), refers to a substantive right, an interpretative legal principle and a rule of procedure (judgment of 11 June 2024, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Women identifying with the value of gender equality), C‑646/21, EU:C:2024:487, paragraph 73).

    103. That said, the obligation to take into account the best interests of the child, incumbent in particular on the referring court, does not preclude that court, in the present case, from taking into consideration the fact that C’s parents, who represented him when the contract of 14 January 2009 was concluded, themselves had knowledge of the world of professional sport or the fact that C was 17 years old on the date on which that contract was concluded.

    104. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the ninth question is that Directive 93/13, read in the light of Article 17(1) and Article 24(2) of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that, where a contractual term stipulates that, in exchange for the provision of services for development and career support for a sportsperson, a consumer undertakes to pay remuneration equal to 10% of the income received over the 15 years following the conclusion of that contract, the fact that the consumer was a minor at the time that contract was concluded and that that contract was concluded by the minor’s parents on behalf of the minor is relevant for the purposes of assessing whether that term is unfair.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)