Belgium / Belgian Constitutional Court / ECLI:BE:GHCC:2024:ARR.083

« Orde van Vlaamse balies » and Peter Callens v Conseil des ministres
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Type
Decision
Decision date
10/07/2024
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:BE:GHCC:2024:ARR.083
  • Belgium / Belgian Constitutional Court / ECLI:BE:GHCC:2024:ARR.083

    Key facts of the case:

    The case is an action for annulment of two provisions of the Economic Law Code (Articles 4 and 5 of Law of 4 May 2023) which expose lawyers who collect debts on behalf of their clients to criminal penalties, and empowers certain officials to carry out checks on these lawyers. The applicants attacked these provisions in so far as they violate the independence of lawyers and therefore have detrimental consequences also for litigants. The applicants argue that the independence of lawyers is protected under several provisions, notably Article 49 § 1 of the Charter, together with provisions of the national Constitution and the ECHR. The Council of Ministers (Conseil des Ministres) defends that this law is aimed at protecting consumers and does not harm essential activities of lawyers.  

    Key legal question raised by the Court:

    One of the grounds concerns the question whether the national law at stake is contrary to Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the Belgian Constitution, read in light of Article 7(1) of the ECHR and Article 49(1) of the Charter, together with the principle of “independence of lawyers” and legal certainty. When it comes to the assessment of Article 49(1) of the Charter, the Court has to demonstrate first that this provision is applicable because the situation at stake falls within the scope of EU law (point B.12.1 of the judgement). 

    Outcome of the case: 

    The Court rules that the parties have not demonstrated a link between the situation at stake and Union law and therefore the Charter cannot be applied (point B.12.1 of the judgement). In particular the Constitutional Court stresses the inexistence under EU (and national) law of the principle of the independence of a lawyer advanced by the parties. Their argument is thus rejected.  

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    B.12.1. The Court may examine the compatibility of the contested provisions with Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Articles 10, 11 and 12(2) of the Constitution, only in so far as the contested provisions fall within the scope of Union law, in accordance with Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CJEU, Grand Chamber, 26 February 2013, C-617/10, Åklagaren, ECLI: EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 17 et seq, specul. paragraph 21). Since the applicants have not shown that there is a link with the scope of Union law, the first plea in law is inadmissible in so far as it relates to Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

    B.12.2 Moreover, there is no general principle of law ‘of the independence of lawyers’ against which the Court could review the contested provisions, read in conjunction with Articles 10, 11 and 12(2) of the Constitution. Moreover, it is not possible to deduce from the account given in the application how the provisions challenged in the first plea restrict the independence of lawyers, still less in the light of which reference standards the Court should assess such a restriction. Consequently, the first plea in law is inadmissible to that extent too. 

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    B.12.1. La Cour ne peut examiner la compatibilité des dispositions attaquées avec l’article 49 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, lus en combinaison avec les articles 10, 11 et 12, alinéa 2, de la Constitution, qu’en ce que les dispositions attaquées relèvent du champ d’application du droit de l’Union, conformément à l’article 51, paragraphe 1, de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (CJUE, grande chambre, 26 février 2013, C-617/10, Åklagaren, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, points 17 et suivants, spéc. point 21). Dès lors que les parties requérantes ne démontrent pas l’existence d’un lien de rattachement avec le champ d’application du droit de l’Union, les branches du premier moyen sont irrecevables en ce qu’elles portent sur l’article 49 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne.

    B.12.2. Il n’existe par ailleurs aucun principe général de droit « de l’indépendance de l’avocat » au regard duquel la Cour pourrait contrôler les dispositions attaquées, lues en combinaison avec les articles 10, 11 et 12, alinéa 2, de la Constitution. En outre, l’exposé développé dans la requête ne permet pas de déduire en quoi les dispositions attaquées dans le premier moyen limiteraient l’indépendance de l’avocat, et encore moins au regard de quelles normes de référence la Cour devrait apprécier une telle limitation. Par conséquent, le premier moyen est irrecevable également dans cette mesure.