Preamble
(15) This Regulation does not affect the freedom of expression and information guaranteed to individuals under the Charter. The European Court of Human Rights has observed that in such a sensitive sector as the audiovisual media sector, in addition to its negative duty of non-interference, the public powers have a positive obligation to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework to guarantee effective media pluralism
(20) In order to avoid circumvention of the protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications and guarantee adequate respect for one’s private and family life, home and communications in accordance with the Charter, safeguards should also apply to persons who, because of their regular private or professional relationship with media service providers or members of their editorial staff, are likely to have information that could identify journalistic sources or confidential communications. That should include persons living in a close relationship in a joint household and on a stable and continuous basis and persons who are or have been professionally involved in the preparation, production or dissemination of programmes or press publications and who are only targeted due to their close links with media service providers, journalists or other members of the editorial staff. The protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications should also benefit the staff of media service providers, such as the technical staff, including cybersecurity experts, who could be targeted given the important support role they provide to journalists in their daily work, which requires solutions to ensure the confidentiality of journalists’ work, and the resulting likelihood that they have access to information concerning journalistic sources or confidential communications.
(21) Protecting journalistic sources and confidential communications is consistent with and contributes to the protection of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter. It is also crucial for safeguarding the ‘public watchdog’ role of media service providers and, in particular investigative journalists in democratic societies and for upholding the rule of law. In light thereof, ensuring an adequate level of protection for journalistic sources and confidential communications requires that measures for obtaining such information be authorised by an authority that can independently and impartially assess whether it is justified by an overriding reason of public interest, such as a court, a judge, a prosecutor acting in a judicial capacity, or another such authority with competence to authorise those measures in accordance with national law. It also requires that surveillance measures be subject to regular review by such an authority to ascertain whether the conditions justifying the use of the measure in question continue to be fulfilled. That requirement is also met where the purpose of the regular review is to verify whether the conditions justifying an extension of the authorisation for the use of the measure have been fulfilled.
(26) Intrusive surveillance software should only be deployed where it is justified by an overriding reason of public interest, it is provided for in Union or national law, it is in compliance with Article 52(1) of the Charter as interpreted by the Court of Justice and with other Union law, it has been authorised ex ante or, in exceptional and urgent cases, subsequently confirmed by a judicial authority or an independent and impartial decision-making authority, it occurs in investigations of offences listed in Article 2(2) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA (9) punishable in the Member State concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order of a maximum period of at least three years or in investigations of other serious offences punishable in the Member State concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order of a maximum period of at least five years, as determined by the national law of that Member State, and provided that no other less restrictive measure would be adequate and sufficient to obtain the information sought. According to the principle of proportionality, limitations can be made to an individual’s rights and freedoms only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union. Thus, as regards specifically the deployment of intrusive surveillance software, it is necessary to ascertain whether the offence in question attains a threshold of seriousness as laid down in this Regulation, whether, following an individual assessment of all the relevant circumstances in a given case, the investigation and prosecution of that offence merit the particularly intrusive interference with fundamental rights and economic freedoms consisting in the deployment of intrusive surveillance software, whether there is sufficient evidence that the offence in question has been committed, and whether the deployment of intrusive surveillance software is relevant for the purpose of establishing the facts related to the investigation and prosecution of that offence.
(77) This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by the Charter, in particular Articles 7, 8, 11, 16, 47, 50 and 52 thereof. Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied with due respect for those rights and principles. In particular, nothing in this Regulation should be interpreted as interfering with the freedom of information, editorial freedom or the freedom of the press as enshrined in national constitutional law that is consistent with the Charter or as incentivising Member States to introduce requirements for the editorial content of press publications.
Article 4: Rights of media service providers
4. By way of derogation from paragraph 3, points (a) and (b), of this Article, Member States may take a measure referred to therein, provided that it:
(a) is provided for by Union or national law;
(b) is in compliance with Article 52(1) of the Charter and other Union law;
(c) is justified on a case-by-case basis by an overriding reason of public interest and is proportionate; and
(d) is subject to prior authorisation by a judicial authority or an independent and impartial decision-making authority or, in duly justified exceptional and urgent cases, is subsequently authorised by such an authority without undue delay.
8. Member States shall ensure that media service providers, their editorial staff or any persons who, because of their regular or professional relationship with a media service provider or its editorial staff, might have information related to or capable of identifying journalistic sources or confidential communications have a right to effective judicial protection, in line with Article 47 of the Charter, in cases regarding breaches of paragraphs 3 to 7 of this Article.
Article 6: Duties of media services providers
3. Without prejudice to national constitutional law consistent with the Charter, media service providers providing news and current affairs content shall take measures that they deem appropriate with a view to guaranteeing the independence of editorial decisions. In particular, such measures shall aim to:
(a) guarantee that editorial decisions can be taken freely within the established editorial line of the media service provider concerned; and
(b) ensure that any actual or potential conflicts of interest that might affect the provision of news and current affairs content are disclosed.