A conducive legal environment for the effective functioning of civic space actors requires a strong legal framework that respects, protects and promotes the freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, expression and information in conformity with global international human rights law, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) [28]  Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the need to strengthen the protection and promotion of civil society space in Europe, 28 November 2018, Appendix I, points (b) and (c). . Importantly, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has confirmed that CSOs ‘must be able to pursue [their] activities and operate without unjustified interference by the State’ [29]  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-78/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:476, paragraph 106. , while the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that Member States also have a duty to guarantee the proper functioning of associations and secure the freedom of association [30]  ECtHR, 20 October 2005, Ouranio Toxo and Others v. Greece, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2005:1020JUD007498901, § 37. . It is also important to ensure that laws and policies do not have intentional or unintentional negative collateral effects on civic space and civic space actors.

Impact assessments can help ensure that proposed laws and policies are designed and implemented in ways that respect and protect fundamental rights, as is demonstrated in a recent FRA report on the role of human rights impact assessments in lawmaking in the EU [31]  FRA (2025), Better Legislation – Human rights impact assessments in lawmaking, 8 December 2025. . However, the report also reveals that such assessments are often either not carried out or only carried out superficially. Moreover, the input of CSOs is often limited due to short deadlines or accelerated procedures in the case of complex legislative proposals.

Despite these standards, pressures relating to the legal environment persist. In response to the question of how often their organisations had encountered difficulties in conducting their work due to different aspects of the legal environment, CSOs active in the field of fundamental rights that participated in the FRA civic space consultation covering 2024 reported issues with access to information, legislation on civil dialogue, foreign funding legislation, and (often unintended) collateral effects of legislation in other areas, such as data protection, transparency and lobbying, and taxation and charitable status (See Figure 2) [32]  FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025, p. 28 .

In the recent Special Eurobarometer 568 on protecting and promoting democracy, respondents were asked for their views on the most significant difficulties faced by CSOs in their country. Across the EU, 42 % of respondents indicated excessive administrative barriers. Nearly one third (30 %) noted abusive legal actions while a further 28 % mentioned unjustified restrictions on the work of CSOs, such as barriers to freedom of association or access to information (See Figure 1).

Figure 1 – Significant difficulties faced by CSOs across the EU (%)

Horizontal bar chart showing the most significant difficulties faced by CSOs across all 27 EU Member States. 42 % of respondents identify excessive administrative barriers as the most significant difficulty, closely followed by lack of funding at 41 %. Verbal or physical threats and attacks are mentioned by 37 %, while 30 % point to abusive legal actions or SLAPPs. Unjustified restrictions in their work are reported by 28 % of respondents. A further 1 % indicate other difficulties, while 2 % state that they face none.

Note: Visual presentation adapted by the authors.
Source: European Commission: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, Special Eurobarometer 568 – Protecting and promoting democracy – Report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 25 November 2025.

Question: ‘In your view, what are the most significant difficulties faced by civil society organisations in (our country)? (Max. 3 Answers) (EU27)’

Figure 2 – FRA consultation – Challenges across key aspects of the legal environment in 2024 (%)

Horizontal stacked bar chart showing challenges to civic space related to the legal environment. CSOs report facing difficulties often or sometimes in relation to access to information (55 %), legislation on civil dialogue or consultation (43 %), and changes in laws governing the funding of CSOs (34 %). By contrast, travel restrictions or visa bans are least frequently reported, with 10 % of CSOs indicating they face such constraints often or sometimes.

Source: FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025.

Question: ‘In the past 12 months, how often has your organisation encountered difficulties in conducting its work due to the legal environment in the following areas?’ (n = 237–269)

In relation to the freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, in recent years a number of issues have been particularly visible in the public debate. One such issue has been the use of facial recognition technology and other forms of remote biometric identification for law enforcement purposes. An upcoming FRA report will demonstrate the public’s concerns about the use of such measures by law enforcement, including due to the potential chilling effects of such technology if deployed during protests. Many discussions have also related more specifically to environmental activism, pro-Palestinian demonstrations and pride marches.

Within the legal framework, as a core principle, international and European human rights standards on the right of peaceful assembly emphasise the presumption in favour of (peaceful) assemblies, which means that public authorities must generally allow assemblies unless there are convincing reasons not to. The concept of ‘peaceful’ is central to this right, and protests that have violent intentions may be held to fall outside of its protection [33]  ECtHR, 1 April 2025, Harutyunyan and Others v. Armenia, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2025:0401DEC004540115, §§ 30 to 38. . Under the ECHR, any restriction of this right must be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others [34]  Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), Rome, 4 November 1950, Article 11(2). . States also have so-called ‘positive obligations’ under the freedom of peaceful assembly, requiring them to both proactively protect those exercising this right and to facilitate its exercise in ways that make it possible for participants to safely assemble and achieve their objectives [35]  Council of Europe / European Court of Human Rights, Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on Human Rights – Mass protests, 31 August 2025, paragraphs 99 to 108. . To navigate these rights and obligations, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly have been published by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) [36]  Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly – 3rd edition, Strasbourg/Warsaw, 15 July 2020. .

Similarly, the freedom of expression is considered to be an essential foundation of a democratic society, and therefore also applies to those ideas and information that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population [37]  ECtHR, 7 December 1976, Handyside v. The United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1976:1207JUD000549372, § 49. . Article 10 of the ECHR further stipulates that ‘The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’

In the case of environmental protests, new methods of protest such as wilfully damaging monuments or works of art, or intentionally blocking public roads or causing other disruptions through ‘civil disobedience’ are testing the boundaries between permissible peaceful assembly and permissible restrictions, including those that may be required of public authorities to meet their positive obligations to protect the safety of those who assemble and the rights and freedoms of others. For example, in a recent judgment, the ECtHR held that in the absence of violent intent, blocking a motorway as part of a strike falls within the scope of freedom of assembly [38]  ECtHR, 16 April 2025, Bodson and Others v. Belgium, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2025:0116JUD003583422, § 81. . Previously, however, the ECtHR has also held that restrictions to prevent disorder and maintain the orderly circulation of traffic may serve the legitimate aim of protection of the rights of others [39]  ECtHR, 7 January 2009, Eva Molnar v. Hungary, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:1007JUD001034605, § 34. . The UN Special Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders under the Aarhus Convention has underlined that Parties to the Aarhus Convention have a binding obligation under Article 3(8) to ‘ensure that persons exercising their rights in conformity with the Convention are not penalised, persecuted or harassed in any way for their involvement’ [40]  Forst, M. (UN Special Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders under the Aarhus Convention), State Repression of Environmental Protest and Civil Disobedience: A major threat to human rights and democracy, February 2024. , and in October 2025 issued the Guidelines on the right to peaceful environmental protest and civil disobedience [41]  Forst, M. (UN Special Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders under the Aarhus Convention), Guidelines on the right to peaceful environmental protest and civil disobedience, October 2025. .

CSOs, the UN Special Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders under the Aarhus Convention and media outlets have repeatedly raised the alarm about the increasing criminalisation of environmental protests, which was considered overly harsh and disproportionate to any harm caused. They argue that this unlawfully interferes with the freedoms of association, expression and assembly, including through the imposition of disproportionate penalties, which can lead to a chilling effect that deters people from exercising their right to protest due to fear of arrest or prosecution, and generally undermines climate activism [42]  Forst, M. (UN Special Rapporteur on Environmental Defenders under the Aarhus Convention), State Repression of Environmental Protest and Civil Disobedience: A major threat to human rights and democracy, February 2024; Robson, M. and Calder, E., ‘How states use criminalisation to target land and environmental defenders’, Global Witness, 6 January 2026 (23 October 2025); Hughes, R. A., ‘European governments are using “harsh, overly broad” laws to silence climate protesters’, Euronews, 11 September 2024; Amnesty International, Under Protected and Over Restricted: The state of the right to protest in 21 European countries, 8 July 2024; Stankiewicz ,T. and Lakhdhir, L., On Thin Ice – Disproportionate responses to climate change protesters in democratic countries, Climate Rights International, September 2024; Walker, I., ‘Freedom of expression: Climate protestors singled out by legislative changes’, International Bar Association, 17 October 2024; Hughes, R. A., ‘European governments are using “harsh, overly broad” laws to silence climate protesters’, Euronews, 11 September 2024. . Reported pressures include, for example, preventive detention ahead of protests [43]  For instance, in Germany: von Billerbeck, J., ‘An update on developments regarding civic space in the EU and an overview of the possibilities for human rights defenders to enter EU territory’, FRA, 2022, p. 3; in the Netherlands: Stankiewicz ,T. and Lakhdhir, L., On Thin Ice – Disproportionate responses to climate change protesters in democratic countries, Climate Rights International, September 2024; in Poland: National Federation of Polish NGOs (Ogólnopolska Federacja Organizacji Pozarządowych), Batory Foundation and the Legal Clinics Foundation (Fundacja Uniwersyteckich Poradni Prawnych), Civic Space Report 2025 – Poland, European Civic Forum, June 2025, p. 15 , authorities issuing blanket bans on protests in certain areas, such as a ban on all climate-related protests blocking ‘key roads’ and other areas [44]  For instance, in Germany and France. See Stankiewicz ,T. and Lakhdhir, L., On Thin Ice – Disproportionate responses to climate change protesters in democratic countries, Climate Rights International, September 2024; Dejean de la Bâtie, A. and Okunrobo Perez, S, ‘Labelling activists as terrorists: The securitisation of peaceful protest in Europe’, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, Springer Nature, February 2026. , organisers being charged with forming a criminal organisation [45]  See, for instance, in Germany (court case pending as of November 2025): Stankiewicz ,T. and Lakhdhir, L., On Thin Ice – Disproportionate responses to climate change protesters in democratic countries, Climate Rights International, September 2024; Hughes, R. A., ‘European governments are using “harsh, overly broad” laws to silence climate protesters’, Euronews, 11 September 2024; Gayle, D., ‘Alarm as German climate activists charged with “forming a criminal organisation”’, The Guardian, 23 May 2024; Article 19, ‘Europe: Urgent need to protect the right to protest’, 1 July 2024; Marandi, N. A., ‘As Europe heats up, silencing climate activists is emerging as a troubling trend’, EU Observer, Human Rights Watch, 22 July 2024. and attempts at dissolving climate organisations on the grounds of ‘eco-terrorism’ or ‘eco-vandalism’ [46]  For instance, in France and in Italy: Dejean de la Bâtie, A. and Okunrobo Perez, S, ‘Labelling activists as terrorists: The securitisation of peaceful protest in Europe’, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, Springer Nature, February 2026; Walker, I., ‘Freedom of expression: Climate protestors singled out by legislative changes’, International Bar Association, 17 October 2024; Civic Space Watch, ‘Italy: Security law enacted in June 2025, but its measures were already applied before approval’, European Civic Forum, 14 July 2025; UN OHCHR, ‘Italy: UN experts concerned by administrative enactment of problematic security bill’, 14 April 2025. . Several of these incidents have been referred to the courts, which will decide whether violations have occurred in the particular case. The ECtHR has, for example, found that subject to proportionality, states can impose a limitation on holding a demonstration in a given place for public security reasons [47]  ECtHR, 30 May 2013, Malofeyeva v. Russia, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:0530JUD003667304, § 136; ECtHR, 27 November2012, Disk and Kesk v. Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:1127JUD003867608, § 29. . In a 2024 judgment, the Strasbourg Court accepted the finding of the French courts in a case related to the ‘gilets jaunes’ that an order banning demonstrations in a defined area on a specific day had been justified [48]  ECtHR, 24 October 2024, Eckert v. France, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:1024JUD005627021, §§ 67 to 72. . In relation to criminal sanctions, the ECtHR has held that peaceful demonstration should not, in principle, be subject to the threat of a criminal sanction, and examines with particular scrutiny any case involving the imposition of a prison sentence for non-violent conduct [49]  Council of Europe / European Court of Human Rights, Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on Human Rights – Mass protests, 31 August 2025, p. 17, with reference to ECtHR, 5 September 2022, Ekram Can and Others v. Turkey, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2022:0308JUD001061310, § 92, and ECtHR, 11 August 2023, Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2023:0511JUD003134920, § 60. .

Similar patterns are apparent in relation to pro-Palestinian demonstrations, with reports from CSOs ranging from blanket bans on protests to the alleged use of excessive force by authorities, including the use of pepper spray, kettling and the deployment of police dogs [50]  Civicus, ‘Solidarity protests with Palestinian people banned in at least 12 EU countries’, 4 April 2024, with the article citing Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden; European Civic Forum, Horizontal Rule of Law Submission – Repeated restrictions on Palestine solidarity, Brussels, April 2024; Guevara-Rosas, E., ‘Europe: Stop punishing Palestinian solidarity and start punishing those who commit genocide’, Amnesty International, 15 February 2025; UN OHCHR, ‘UN experts urge Germany to halt criminalisation and police violence against Palestinian solidarity activism’, 16 October 2025. . In this context, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights raised concerns about the curtailing of the use of Arab language and cultural symbols during Gaza protests, the alleged use of force against protestors, and intrusive surveillance [51]  O’Flaherty, M. (Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights), Letter of the Commissioner to Germany’s Federal Minister of the Interior on restrictions to the freedoms of expression and of peaceful assembly, Strasbourg, 6 June 2025. .

These incidents have been taking place in a volatile geopolitical environment and entail complex issues. State authorities must ensure public order and security, and protection against hate speech, including certain forms of racism and xenophobia which, under EU law, must be punishable under criminal law [52]  Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law (OJ L 328, 6.12.2008, pp. 55–58, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2008/913/oj), Article 1. . For example, at the same time, the German Federal Association of Research and Information Centres on Anti-Semitism (Bundesverband der Recherche- und Informationsstellen Antisemitismus) has documented that in Germany, between 7 October 2023 and the end of 2024, an average of five gatherings with antisemitic content took place per day, whereas prior to 7 October, the average had been just under one per day. In 89 % of these gatherings, Israel-related antisemitism was documented – often accompanied by other forms of antisemitism. These included calls for the destruction of Israel, advocacy of violence against Jews, open support for terrorism and the relativisation of the Shoah [53]  German Federal Association of Research and Information Centres on Anti-Semitism (Bundesverband der Recherche- und Informationsstellen Antisemitismus), ‘RIAS-Publikation zeigt die Dimensionen von Antisemitismus seit dem 7. Oktober auf’ [‘RIAS publication highlights the extent of antisemitism since 7 October’], 6 October 2025. .

There have also been protests in Serbia triggered by the collapse of a canopy at the Novi Sad railway station, with protesters demanding accountability for the injuries and deaths, and greater rule of law protections. In 2025, the Civicus Monitor downgraded Serbia from ‘obstructed’ to ‘repressed’ [54]  Civicus, ‘Serbia’, Civicus website, 9 December 2025. .

The freedoms of assembly and of expression of LGBTIQ+ demonstrators has also come under increased pressure in at least two EU Member States [55]  See for instance: Amnesty International, ‘Hungary: Let pride march freely’, 16 April 2025; FRA, ‘FRA statement on recent developments affecting civil society and fundamental rights’, 29 May 2025; The Associated Press, ‘Bulgaria’s law against LGBTQ+ “propaganda” in schools spark protests’, Euronews, 9 August 2024; The Sofia Globe staff, ‘Sofia pride 2025: “We are people, not propaganda”’, The Sofia Globe, 14 June 2025 . This has included the banning of pride marches in various locations. In Hungary, this was based on a law amending certain laws for the protection of children, which has been challenged in the Court of Justice of the European Union [56]  Action brought on 19 December 2022, European Commission v Hungary, C-769/22, OJ C 54, 13.2.2023, p. 16. . Another concern in Hungary was the announced use of facial recognition software to identify participants of demonstrations [57]  European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL), ‘ECNL, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, EDRI, Liberties and nearly 50 CSOs urge the European Commission to protect fundamental rights in Hungary’, 24 June 2024; Amnesty International, ‘Banning the rainbow – How Hungarian authorities banned the upcoming PécsPride and what the EU should do about it’, 1 October 2025. . There were instances when demonstrators marched peacefully despite such bans [58]  Hungary: Amnesty International, ‘Hungary: “World is watching” as tens of thousands prepare to march in defiance of attempted ban on Budapest Pride’, 24 June 2025; De Groot, D., ‘Hungary’s ban on pride’, European Parliament: Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research and Services, 3 April 2025. . Previously, the ECtHR has found that a ban on a pride march violated the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and reiterated that restrictions on pride events must be necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim, such as public order. The ECtHR further held that repeated bans on pride marches did not meet the ‘pressing social need’ test, and that the ban therefore violated Article 11 (freedom of peaceful assembly) [59]  ECtHR, 11 April 2011, Case of Alekseyev v. Russia, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:1021JUD000491607. . In another case, the Court held that a restriction on LGBTIQ+ demonstrations did not serve to advance the alleged aim of the ‘protection of morals’ but rather reinforced stigma and prejudice and encouraged homophobia [60]  ECtHR, 13 November 2017, Bayev and Others v. Russia, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0620JUD006766709, §§ 66 to 69, 83 and 84. . In fact, banning public pride events has repeatedly been found by the ECtHR not to be necessary in a democratic society and therefore contrary to Article 11 [61]  Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Freedom of expression and assembly of LGBTI people in Europe’, 27 March 2024. .

Respect for the freedom of association remains a concern in parts of the EU, particularly regarding the registration and deregistration of CSOs in at least six EU Member States, where complex, burdensome or restrictive registration procedures are making it difficult for organisations to gain or retain legal status [62]  See for instance: Civil Society Europe, Joint civil society contribution on civic space to the 2024 annual Rule of Law Report, Brussels, 2024; Civic Champions, Comparative report on the state of civil society in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and Italy, 2025. . These bureaucratic hurdles limit their ability to operate effectively but also constrain their access to funding and other forms of support, as similar restrictive procedures outside the EU have also shown.

Similarly with the freedom of assembly, any restriction of the right of association must be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

For example, certain registration requirements for organisations seeking to provide services in refugee camps have been described by CSOs as burdensome, time-consuming and administratively opaque, creating practical obstacles to delivering aid and protection [63]  Expert Council on NGO Law of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe, ‘Opinion on the compatibility with European Standards of recent and planned amendments to the Greek legislation on NGO registration’, 2 July 2020; Aegean NGO Network, ‘Monitoring closed controlled facilities on the Greek islands’, 22 October 2025; Aegean NGO Network, ‘Greece to deliver another blow to independent NGO services and monitoring’, 11 September 2025. . In response to such concerns, in Greece, the Ministry of Migration and Asylum is currently working on the revision of the legal framework governing registration in the NGO registry and on the reduction of the required documents, with the aim of simplifying the registration procedure [64] Information provided by email to FRA via its national liaison officer on 23 January 2026. . Other reports refer to deregistration of organisations based on technicalities, such as failing to submit audited accounts on time or to convene a general assembly during the COVID-19 pandemic within the required timeframe. In one such case, an organisation challenged deregistration and won its case in the Supreme Constitutional Court [65]  Amnesty International, ‘Cyprus: Halt the dissolution of leading anti-racism organization’, 3 March 2021; KISA (Movement for Equality, Support, Anti-Racism), ‘Cyprus: KISA’s deregistration is illegal according to the Supreme Constitution Court – A new blow to the government’s attacks on freedom of expression!’, 27 October 2025. . While it was ultimately vindicated, the organisation was deregistered for five years, leading to a range of challenges for its work.

Pressure also continues to be placed on CSOs through criminal prosecution. For instance, several NGO search and rescue crews were accused of ‘aiding and abetting illegal immigration’ or colluding with smugglers, effectively criminalising humanitarian rescue. After multi-year investigations and court proceedings, all of the charges were either dismissed or the crews were acquitted by the courts [66]  FRA, Search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Mediterranean and fundamental rights – June 2025 update, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 20 June 2025, Annex: Legal proceedings by EU Member States against civil society actors involved in search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Mediterranean Sea (Update June 2025); Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, Criminalisation of Migration and Solidarity in the EU – 2024 report, pp. 15–16; European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, ‘Acquittal for sea rescuers of the Iuventa’, 19 April 2024; Amnesty International, ‘Italy: “New hope” as prosecutor recognizes that charges against the Iuventa crew should be dropped’, 28 February 2024; Zampano, G., ‘Italian court drops charges against migrant rescue ship crews and ends long-running legal battle’, The Associated Press, 19 April 2024; InfoMigrants, ‘Italian court drops charges against crew members of migrant rescue ships’, 19 April 2024. . Similarly, several aid workers and volunteers working in the Aegean Sea faced serious charges such as espionage, membership of a criminal organisation and assisting illegal entry. In two prominent cases, prosecutors recommended dismissal and groups of aid workers were acquitted by the courts due to lack of evidence, procedural flaws, the vague nature of the accusations, and because the courts held that the humanitarian actions of the defendants did not amount to criminal conduct [67]  Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, Criminalisation of Migration and Solidarity in the EU – 2024 report, pp. 15–16; International Commission of Jurists, ‘Greece: Criminalization of humanitarian support to migrants and refugees must end’, 10 June 2023; Expert Council on NGO Law of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe, ‘Civil society support to refugees and other migrants in Europe: The need to end the backlash on civil society space’, 21 June 2024, p. 17; Amnesty International, Greece – Submission to the UN Human Rights Committee – 142nd session, 14 October–7 November 2024, September 2024, p. 11; The Associated Press, ‘Greek court acquits aid workers who helped rescue migrants crossing in small boats’, Euronews, 31 January 2024; Frontline Defenders, ‘Espionage charges against Seán Binder and 23 other Human Rights Defenders were annulled’, January 2023. .

International human rights law guarantees the rights to life, liberty and security of person, the right to participate in public affairs, and the right of everyone to enjoy the freedoms of expression, assembly and association. In Europe, these rights are enshrined in the ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its related CJEU case-law, to the extent the Charter is applicable [68] Such as the right of access to public documents (Article 42), the right to good administration (Article 41), the right to participate in local and European elections (Articles 39 and 40) or the right to petition the European Parliament (Article 44). . The case-law of both courts has recognised the obligation of the state to not only abstain from undue interference, but also to provide an environment where CSOs can effectively enjoy their rights and freedoms [69]  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-78/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:476, paragraph 113; ECtHR, 20 October 2005, Ouranio Toxo and Others v. Greece, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2005:1020JUD007498901, §§ 35 to 37. . As an interesting and potentially important innovation, in a recent judgment, the ECtHR expanded the interpretation of discrimination by association, and considered two applicants who were HRDs assisting migrants and refugees to be victims of ‘threats, incitement to violence and hate speech, motivated by intolerance and prejudice and directed against the applicants because of their association, through their professional activities, with the groups of people for whose rights they worked’ [70]  ECtHR, 9 December 2025, Ilareva and Others v. Bulgaria, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2025:0909JUD002472917, § 145. .

The Council of the European Union recently invited the Member States to ‘[p]rotect CSOs and human rights defenders from, inter alia, threats, attacks, persecution of critical voices and smear campaigns targeting organisations, staff and volunteers by active means, such as by taking targeted actions to address these issues, by establishing monitoring mechanisms to prevent such threats, by ensuring the prompt identification, reporting, investigation and follow-up on such incidents, and by putting in place dedicated support services for civil society actors’ [71]  Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; The role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU’, 7388/23, 14 March 2023, paragraph 14. .

One of the three pillars of the recently adopted EU strategy for civil society centres on protection. This includes both safeguarding civic space as such, and also protecting organisations and HRDs. The strategy refers to the need to monitor civic space as a basis for preventive and reactive measures [72]  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee Of The Regions – EU strategy for civil society, COM(2025) 790 final of 12 November 2025, pp. 8–9. . Several EU instruments directly contribute to the protection of CSOs in the EU, including notably the Anti-SLAPP Directive [73]  Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj). , which provides for procedural safeguards to protect persons who engage in public participation, including CSOs, from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings, and the 2023 recommendation on participation. Under its citizen, equality, rights and values programme, the Commission also supports several protection measures that are carried out by CSO-led initiatives [74]  European Commission, ‘Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme overview’, European Commission website . The strategy also refers to the need to explore further protection measures at the national level, such as urgent assistance to organisations under threat, coordination of available protection measures in Member States, and training and support on administrative, legal and logistical arrangements [75]  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee Of The Regions – EU strategy for civil society, COM(2025) 790 final of 12 November 2025, p. 11. .

Evidence gathered by FRA and others indicates that organisations working in the area of fundamental and human rights, along with individual human rights defenders and activists, continue to face threats and attacks in the EU, from both private and public actors [76]  FRA, ‘An update on developments regarding civic space in the EU and an overview of the possibilities for human rights defenders to enter EU territory 2022 – Country research’, FRA website, 5 July 2023; FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025; European Civic Forum, ‘Civic Space Watch’, European Civic Forum website; Civicus, ‘Monitor tracking civic space’, Civicus website. . The incidents most frequently reported in FRA’s consultations over the years are ‘online verbal attacks and threats’, ‘negative media reports or campaigns’, ‘politically motivated funding cuts’ and ‘excessive administrative controls or audits’. Other challenges selected by respondents from a list of issues include criminalisation of humanitarian activities, suspected unlawful surveillance by law enforcement, alleged misuse of civil and administrative litigation in the form of SLAPPs [77]  For more details on SLAPPs, see The Daphne Caruana Galizia Foundation, SLAPPs in Europe: Mapping trends and cases, The Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe, 9 December 2024. , and vandalism and physical attacks [78]  FRA, ‘Civic space’, FRA website. . The type and intensity of experiences vary over time and among Member States (Figure 3). Moreover, they vary according to the respondent’s main area(s) of activity. This may reflect differences in the nature of organisations’ work, their level of public visibility and their interaction with other stakeholders. For example, SLAPPs are experienced predominantly by the responding organisations that work on anti-corruption and transparency, digital rights, freedom of expression, environmental rights and minority rights. Suspected surveillance is reported by CSOs working on freedom of speech/expression, anti-corruption and transparency, civic space, digital rights, democracy and the rule of law, access to justice, and Roma and Travellers. The most in-person threats and attacks are reported by CSOs working on Roma and Travellers, minority rights, LGBTIQ+ rights, hate crime, integration and inclusion of migrants, anti-racism and non-discrimination, and homeless people [79]  FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025, pp. 16–17. .

Figure 3 – FRA consultation – Negative experiences by CSOs and their staff/volunteers in the EU in 2024 (%)

Horizontal stacked bar chart showing challenges to civic space related to negative experiences faced by CSOs and their staff or volunteers. Online verbal threats or attacks are the most frequently reported issue, with 18 % of CSOs reporting they face them often and 49 % sometimes, while 33 % of CSOs report sometimes facing in-person (offline) verbal threats or attacks. 60 % report often or sometimes experiencing negative media reports or campaigns. Physical attacks against employees or volunteers are least frequently reported, with no CSOs reporting they face them often and around 10 % reporting they face them sometimes.

Source: FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025.

Question: ‘In the past 12 months, how often did you or any of your employees/volunteers face the following?’ (n = 92–310)

Particularly concerning are the reported consequences of these attacks. Over one half of the responding organisations indicated that the experiences had a medium or high impact on their staff or volunteers in the form of psychological effects such as burnout, depression, anxiety and feelings of vulnerability, 38 % indicated financial problems, and 34 % reported discontinued or reduced activities. Moreover, 22 % indicated that staff or volunteers had left the organisation, and 15 % reported post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) [80]  FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025, p. 19. .

However, FRA’s consultation indicates that 61 % of CSOs that experienced incidents did not report them or make a complaint to the relevant body. While some incidents may constitute criminal offences and fall within the remit of law enforcement authorities, others – such as negative media campaigns, politically motivated funding cuts, or excessive administrative controls – may instead be addressed through judicial, political or advocacy channels. Those consultation respondents who did make a complaint or reported incidents addressed the media most frequently (46 %), followed by the police (41 %), legal services or lawyers (28 %), the European Commission or European Parliament (23 %), and other civil society or victim support organisations (19 %) [81]  FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025, p. 20. .

The most frequent reasons indicated for not reporting were that nothing would happen or change, that the incident was minor and not worth reporting, or that they dealt with the problem themselves. A small number of respondents also indicated a fear of reprisals or discontinuation of funding. More than one half of the respondents who had reported threats or attacks to the police were dissatisfied with how the report was handled [82]  FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025, p. 21. .

Due to the wide range of pressures, threats and attacks experienced, it is important to adopt a model of ‘holistic’ protection to address the situation [83]  FRA, ‘Strengthening democracy and policy implementation: EU funding for the work of civil society organisations – Contribution of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) to the consultation on the multiannual financial framework 2028–2034’, 6 May 2025, pp. 20–25; European Civic Forum, ‘Realising protection for human rights defenders and civil society organisations in Europe: Pathways towards and effective protection ecosystem’, October 2024; European Civic Forum, ‘Realising protection for human rights defenders and civil society organisations in Europe – Mapping paper’, October 2024. . When asked which protection measures they deem most important, responding organisations indicated legal advice or legal aid (to address legal challenges, criminalisation, restrictive laws or SLAPPs), coalition building (to strengthen alliances, share resources and knowledge, amplify voices and provide mutual support), digital security measures (to protect against hacking, surveillance and doxing), psychological support (to address stress, burnout and trauma), capacity-building on protection (to train defenders in risk assessment and mitigation) and communications support (including framing messages professionally and managing reputational risks stemming from public narratives) [84]  For details see FRA, ‘Strengthening democracy and policy implementation: EU funding for the work of civil society organisations – Contribution of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) to the consultation on the multiannual financial framework 2028–2034’, 6 May 2025, p. 1 . However, funding for protection measures remains very scarce [85]  FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025, p. 26 , despite the clearly increased need for protection.

In order to do their work effectively, CSOs need financial, human and material resources. CSOs typically rely on income and funding from a variety of sources, with different traditions and opportunities across the EU Member States and candidate countries. These include public funding from their own country, other countries, the EU and international organisations, foundations and philanthropic organisations, corporations, individual donors, membership fees and income-generating activities [86]  European Commission: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, Civil Society Landscape in the European Union – Research in support of the citizens, equality, rights and values (CERV) programme, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2023, p. 21. .

The CJEU has held that under Article 12 of the Charter, ‘legislation which renders significantly more difficult the action or the operation of associations […] by limiting their capacity to receive financial resources’ constitutes an interference with the freedom of association which requires justification [87]  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary, C‑78/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:476, paragraph 114. .

The OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission guidelines on freedom of association, and a report to the UN Human Rights Council both note that the ability to seek, secure and use resources is essential to the existence and operation of any association [88]  Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, Joint Guidelines on Freedom of Association, Strasbourg/Warsaw, 17 December 2014; Kiai, M. (UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai’, 24 April 2013, Part III (Ability of associations to access financial resources: a vital part of the right to freedom of association); See also UN General Assembly, ‘Resolution adopted by the General Assembly – Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, A/RES/53/144, 8 March 1999, Article 13. . The Council of the European Union highlighted in 2023 that ‘civil society actors at all levels need appropriate and sufficient human, material and financial resources to carry out their missions effectively and that the freedom to seek, receive and use such resources is an integral part of the right to freedom of association’ [89]  Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; The role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU’, 7388/23, 14 March 2023 .

There is ample evidence underscoring a growing need for work in the areas of fundamental and human rights, democracy and the rule of law. However, the funding available is often insufficient [90]  See for instance: FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025; European Commission: Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, ‘Shedding light on quality of proposals’, European Commission website, 12 May 2023 . One reason is the global economic and political climate, due to which both the public and private sectors face economic pressures, an unsure future and shifting priorities. Beyond availability, there are increasing additional pressures on funding for the work of CSOs due to the legal framework, policies and negative narratives.

Some restrictions stem from legislation that has a direct impact on funding, such as rules on foreign funding, taxation, charitable status and philanthropy [91]   Ward, B., ‘Creeping civil society curbs in Europe threaten rights in 2023’, euobserver, 4 January 2023; European Fundraising Association, ‘EU anti-money laundering & counter-terrorism financing policy & its impact on civil society’, 28 June 2023; ECNL, ‘Unpacking the EU AML/CFT Package: Key insights and implications for the non-profit sector’, ECNL website, 18 March 2025; Meester, E., ‘New EU rules threaten the future of crowdfunding – and civil society’, Alliance, Alliance Publishing, 12 August 2025. . Additionally, legislation aimed at ensuring transparency or security may also (inadvertently) result in obstacles to access to funding for CSOs, stigmatise their work or create a chilling effect on advocacy and activism [92]  See for instance, Ward, B., ‘Creeping civil society curbs in Europe threaten rights in 2023’, euobserver, 4 January 2023; ECNL, ‘Data protection & access to resources: CSOs at the intersection’, ECNL website, 25 January 2018; Savage, J., ‘Defending civic space against “Foreign Agent” laws: How should donors respond?’, European Democracy Hub, 13 November 2024 .

For example, funding for the work of CSOs can be constrained due to rules that exclude political activity or advocacy from public funding. This becomes problematic if the definitions of ‘political activity’, ‘advocacy’ or ‘political advertising’ are broad and vague, and potentially encompass tasks such as public campaigns, policy research or even routine engagement with policymakers [93]  ECNL, ‘Do CSOs have a right to funding in times of emergency?’, ECNL website, 4 June 2020; Simon, E., ‘We Need More Clarity on the Definition of Political Advertisement’, Civil Liberties Union for Europe, 26 February 2025; see, for instance, the case of Amnesty International Ireland: Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty welcomes quashing of Sipo’s decision on OSF grant’, 31 July 2018. . Such ambiguity in definitions can further discourage CSOs from speaking out on public issues, even when the topic is central to their mission. For instance, research from Ireland finds that nearly one half (48 %) of CSOs working in areas like homelessness and addiction – sectors that are heavily reliant on state funding – self-censor or limit their advocacy due to fears that criticism of government policy could jeopardise their financial support [94]  Irish Council for Civil Liberties, “That’s not your role” – State funding and advocacy in the Irish community voluntary and non-profit sector, 1 May 2024, p. 33. .

Furthermore, in some contexts, CSOs that engage in activities deemed ‘political’ risk losing their charitable status and associated tax benefits – a risk reflected in national legal frameworks where public‑benefit or charity status is conditioned on limitations to political or party‑linked activity, contributing to legal uncertainty for advocacy‑oriented organisations [95]  Evans, K. H-M., ‘Regulating political activities of non-governmental organisations’, Expert Council on NGO Law of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe, December 2013; Poppe, A. E. and Wolff, J., ‘Germany sets a poor example: The case of ATTA in light of globally closing civic spaces’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 July 2017; Attac Germany, ‘Zehn Jahre ohne Gemeinnützigkeit: Attac kämpft weiter!’ [‘Ten years without charitable status: Attac continues to fight!’], 10 April 2024; Allianz Rechtssicherheit für politische Willensbildung, ‘ZiviZ-Survey: 30.000 Vereine verstummen wegen zu engem Gemeinnützigkeitsrecht’ [‘ZiviZ-Survey: 30 000 associations fall silent due to overly restrictive charity law’], 7 March 2023; Council on Foundations, ‘Nonprofit law in Hungary – Country notes’, November 2024. .

The Venice Commission [96]  Council of Europe, ‘Venice Commission on Hungarian law on foreign-funded NGOs: Legitimate aims, but excessive obligations, disproportionate sanctions’, 2 June 2017. , along with the case-law of the CJEU [97]  See Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-78/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:476. and the ECtHR [98] Article 11 ECtHR. , recognise that there may be situations where there is a legitimate need to exercise scrutiny over the receipt and spending of funds by CSOs, including from foreign sources. At the same time, some foreign funding laws are problematic due to disproportionate fines for receiving funding from abroad. Such foreign funding restrictions are often coupled with public debates that label all CSOs that receive funding from abroad as ‘foreign agents’, even when this term is not included in the actual draft legislation, such as the Slovak amendment to Act No 213/1997 on non-profit organisations providing services of general benefit in 2025 [99]  Civic Space Watch, ‘Slovakia: NGO draft law stigmatises CSOs, mirroring Hungary’s path’, European Civic Forum, 13 June 2024; OGP, ‘Slovak Republic action plan review 2024–2026’, OGP website, 6 January 2025; Silenská, N., ‘Slovak NGOs face new rules as chaotic bill clears parliament’, Euractiv, 17 April 2025. . The Hungarian law on the transparency of organisations receiving support from abroad of 2017 was found to be in breach of EU law by the European Court of Justice and was subsequently repealed by Hungary [100]  Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-78/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:476. . Another such example was the draft act on the registration of foreign agents in Bulgaria of 2024, which, however, was ultimately not adopted [101]  OSCE/ODIHR, ‘Opinion on the draft act on the registration of foreign agents (as of 11 November 2024) in Bulgaria’, 30 May 2025; Hegedüs, D., ‘Anti-foreign NGO laws: A tool to repress civil society’, German Marshall Fund, 9 September 2025. .

Beyond the ‘foreign agents’ labelling, CSOs can face other negative narratives, including statements by policymakers and the media that NGOs are disloyal to or against the nation, or are criminals, terrorists, or threats to sovereignty, national security or the national interest [102]  Saris, L., ‘Guarding the foundations: EU civil society in a changing geopolitical landscape’, European Policy Centre, 11 March 2025; Heinrich Boell Stiftung, ‘Drowning in disinformation – How homegrown state-sponsored disinformation threatens EU democracy’; The Good Lobby, ‘EU boosts party transparency while targeting NGOs’, 24 June 2025 . These may harm the reputation of CSOs, which may lead to financial consequences, such as a decline in donations from the general public, an erosion of trust between them and public and private donors, and a need to increase spending on communications and public relations to defend themselves in the public debate [103]  Expert Council on NGO Law of the Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe and Golubović, D., ‘Stigmatisation of non-governmental organisations in Europe’, 20 March 2024; Skrivervik, C., ECA report: No scandal – but the Commission needs to invest in a more understandable database’, European Environmental Bureau, 7 April 2025; FRA, ‘Civic space’, FRA website; Hummel, S., ‘Das Anti-NGO-Narrativ: Wie versucht wird, die Zivilgesellschaft zu delegitimieren’ [‘The anti-NGO narrative: How civil society is being delegitimised’], Maecenata, 10 September 2025. . Even if the related legislative proposals are ultimately not adopted, the process and surrounding debate may already disrupt funding flows and cause negative attitudes towards CSOs [104]  Robinson, N., Foreign Influence Registration Laws and Civil Society: An analysis and responses, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, April 2024 (updated January 2025); ECNL, ‘FATF warning against restrictive legislation efforts – do not disrupt legitimate CSO activities!’, ECNL website, 29 October 2021. .

CSOs also report (often unintended) consequences of anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism financing laws. For example, banks are de-risking or refusing to serve parts of the public benefit sector because of anti-money laundering / counter-terrorist financing compliance fears, leaving organisations without basic banking services [105]  Civil Society Europe, ‘Fundamental rights must underpin the EU action plan to fight money laundering and terrorism financing’, 27 August 2020. . While some legislative or regulatory measures – such as requirements on reporting, due diligence or access to financial services – may not directly restrict funding for CSOs, they can create indirect barriers when applied disproportionately.

Finally, there are also challenges stemming from how funding is implemented. CSOs report that they consider the level of bureaucracy in applying for, implementing and reporting on grants to often be disproportionate in comparison to the scale of the funding and the capacity of many CSOs. While accountability and transparency are essential for lawful public funding, overly complex eligibility requirements and application procedures, detailed reporting obligations that are disproportionate to the funding amount and rigid compliance rules take significant time and effort, and may divert human resources away from frontline work.

Challenges and obstacles to funding have consequences. Almost one half (44 %) of the respondents to FRA’s most recent civic space consultation reported that they had experienced an unexpected reduction, cut or freezing of funding in the 12 months preceding the consultation [106]  FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025, p. 12 . Among those reporting funding cuts, the largest percentage indicated that this had been done by their national government (37 %).

At the same time, CSOs have little financial reserves (Figure 4): no more than 7 % of respondents to the consultation indicated reserves that would allow them to continue their human rights work for more than 12 months [107]  FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025, p. 12 . Coupled with the overall decline in funding, this heightens the vulnerability of CSOs. Without financial buffers, even short-term disruptions in funding may force organisations to scale back, suspend activities or lay off staff, with subsequent effects on the rights holders they support [108]  Fortuna, G. and Iraola Iribarren, M., ‘EU Commission unlocks health funds but leaves civil society reeling from cuts’, Euronews, 25 July 2025; Wall, M., ‘Aid agency goal to lay off 30 % of staff due to funding cuts’, The Irish Times, 29 March 2025. .

Figure 4 – FRA consultation – Months of usual activity covered by CSOs’ financial reserves (%)

Horizontal bar chart showing the estimated number of months that CSOs’ financial reserves could cover their usual activities. Most CSOs report limited reserves, with 17 % indicating they could cover zero to two months, 21 % three to five months, and a further 21 % six to eight months of activity. A larger share, 33 %, report reserves sufficient to cover nine to twelve months. Only a small proportion of CSOs report longer-term financial reserves, with 7 % indicating reserves sufficient to cover more than twelve months of activity.

Source: FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025.

Question: ‘Please estimate the number of months of your usual activity, that your financial reserves could cover?’ (n = 229)

FRA’s consultation also asked CSOs whether funding concerns had been a threat to their work in the previous 12 months. Figure 5 shows that 39 % of the EU-based consultation participants indicated that concerns around funding threaten some of their current work, 32 % percent responded that these concerns threaten much of their work, while 14 % reported that all of their current work was threatened by funding concerns. Only 14 % indicated no current threat to their work stemming from funding issues.

Figure 5 – FRA consultation – How much of a concern funding has been over the last 12 months (%)

Horizontal bar chart displaying the extent to which funding concerns threatened the work of CSOs. Most CSOs report that funding concerns affected their work to some degree, with 39 % indicating that some of their current work was threatened and 32 % reporting that much of their work was threatened. A further 14 % report that funding concerns threatened all of their current work. By contrast, 14 % of CSOs indicate that funding concerns did not threaten their work.

Source: FRA, ‘Summary of key findings from FRA’s civic space consultation covering 2024’, 25 September 2025.

Question: ‘In the past 12 months, how much of a concern was funding for your organisation?’ (n = 347)

Taken together, these various pressures – legal, financial, bureaucratic, narrative and reputational – create a complex and often hostile environment for CSOs, undermining their ability to operate independently, advocate effectively and fulfil their role in a democratic society.