Italy / Constitutional Court / Decision No. 68/2025

Case referred by the Ordinary Court of Lucca concerning a case involving the public prosecutor and two private parties
Deciding body type
National Court/Tribunal
Deciding body
Constitutional Court
Type
Decision
Decision date
22/05/2025

Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne

  • Italy / Constitutional Court / Decision No. 68/2025

    Key facts of the case:

    The public prosecutor asked the Lucca Ordinary Court to revise the birth certificate of a child of two women, who was born through medically assisted procreation. This practice – governed by Law No. 40/2004 – is forbidden in Italy for same-sex couples and was practiced abroad. According to the public prosecutor the birth certificate should report only the biological parent, and not the intentional one. The Lucca Ordinary Court referred the case to the Constitutional Court asking whether Article 8 and 9 of the Law No. 40/2004 and Article 250 of the Italian Civil Code on child parental recognition are compliant with Article 24( 3) of the Charter, Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 18 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 

    Key legal question raised by the court:

    The private parties challenge the national provisions insofar as they prevent a child born as a result of medically assisted procreation carried out by a female couple from being granted the status of recognised child by the so-called intentional mother who, together with the biological mother (meaning the woman who gave birth), has given her consent to the fertilisation procedure and, in any case, where they require the removal from the birth certificate of the recognition made by the intentional mother.

    Outcome of the case:

    The Court, after clarifying that the issue does not concern the conditions that legitimise access to medically assisted procreation in Italy, held that the current impediment to children born in Italy to obtaining, from birth, the status of recognised child of the woman who consented to the medical procedure abroad together with the biological mother does not guarantee the best interests of the child and constitutes a violation of Article 2 of the Constitution, for the damage to the personal identity of the child and their right to be recognised from birth as having a certain and stable legal status from birth; Article 3 of the Constitution (principle of equality), due to the unreasonableness of the current regulation, which is not justified in the absence of a countervailing interest of constitutional rank; Article 30 of the Constitution, as it infringes the rights of the child to be recognised, from birth and in relation to both parents, the rights connected with parental responsibility and the consequent obligations towards children. 

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    1. By order of 26 June 2024, registered under no. 148 in the 2024 order register, the Lucca Ordinary Court , civil section, sitting as a panel, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy regarding Articles 8 and 9 of Law no. 40 of 19 February 2004 (provisions on medically assisted reproduction) and Article 250 of the Civil Code, with reference to Articles 2, 3, 30, 31 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to: Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights; Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU); Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 18 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 November 1989, ratified and implemented by Law No. 176 of 27 May 1991, and Articles 1 and 6 of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights, signed in Strasbourg on 25 January 1996, ratified and implemented by Law No. 77 of 20 March 2003.

    1.2 … Finally, the best interests of the child are also at the basis of the alleged violation of Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution on grounds of the aforementioned supranational parameters. Specifically, the following human rights would be violated. First, Article 8 of the ECHR, as interpreted by the case law of the Strasbourg Court in the aforementioned grounds, given that the absence of recognition of a bond between the child and the intended mother prejudices the child themself, leaving them in a situation of legal uncertainty as to their identity in society. Second, Article 14 of the ECHR, due to the unjustified difference in treatment between children, depending on whether they were conceived through heterologous fertilisation by a heterosexual couple or a homosexual couple, with only the first case being destined for single-parent status. Third, Article 24(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which provides that “Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests” Fourth, Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 18 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, in that they would violate the commitments undertaken by the Italian State upon ratification. These commitments are: 1) to respect and guarantee to every child the rights set forth in the Convention without distinction of any kind and to take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is effectively protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment (Article 2); 2) to take into account “the best interests of the child” in all decisions concerning children (Articles 3 and 4); 3) to respect the responsibility, right and duty of parents or members of the extended family to provide guidance and advice appropriate to the exercise of the rights recognised in the Convention (Article 5); 4) to safeguard the right of the child to be “registered immediately after birth and thereafter” to have a name “and, as far as possible, to know his or her parents and be brought up by them” (Art. 7); 5) to guarantee the right of the child “to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations” (Art. 8); 6) to ensure that separation from parents is a measure taken in the best interests of the child (Art. 9) and, finally, 7) to guarantee recognition of the common principle that both parents have joint responsibility for the upbringing of the child and for ensuring his or her development (Article 18). Fifth, Articles 1 and 6 of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights, which require judicial decisions to be taken in the best interests of the child.

    8.1 …Where a couple has embarked on the path of parenthood, recognition of the relationship with the biological mother alone is not sufficient, as there is the “right of the child to maintain a relationship with both parents” (Decision no. 102 of 2020 of the Italian constitutional Court), a right recognised in ordinary legislation (Article 315-bis, first and second paragraphs, and Article 337-ter, first paragraph, of the Civil Code) and also affirmed by a number of international and European Union instruments (Article 8, paragraph 1, of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 24, paragraph 3, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). In other words, as noted in Decision No. 33 of 2021 of the Italian Constitutional Court, what is at issue here is solely the interest of the child in ensuring that these individuals are legally responsible for the duties that serve the child's interests and that the legal system considers inextricably linked to the exercise of parental responsibility. It is unthinkable that they could evade these duties at will.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)

    1. Con ordinanza del 26 giugno 2024, iscritta al n. 148 del registro ordinanze 2024, il Tribunale ordinario di Lucca, sezione civile, in composizione collegiale, ha sollevato questioni di legittimità costituzionale degli artt. 8 e 9 della legge 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40 (Norme in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita) e dell’art. 250 del codice civile, in riferimento agli artt. 2, 3, 30, 31 e 117, primo comma, della Costituzione, quest’ultimo in relazione: agli artt. 8 e 14 della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, come interpretati dalla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo; all’art. 24 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea (CDFUE); agli artt. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 e 18 della Convenzione ONU sui diritti del fanciullo approvata dall’Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite il 20 novembre 1989, ratificata e resa esecutiva con legge 27 maggio 1991, n. 176 e agli artt. 1 e 6 della Convenzione europea sull’esercizio dei diritti dei fanciulli, firmata a Strasburgo il 25 gennaio1996, ratificata e resa esecutiva con legge 20 marzo 2003, n. 77.

    ...

    1.2 […] Il primario interesse del minore è, infine, anche alla base della dedotta violazione dell’art. 117, primo comma, Cost. per il tramite degli evocati parametri sovranazionali interposti. Nello specifico sarebbero lesi: a) l’art. 8 CEDU, come interpretato dalla giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo nelle premesse richiamate, atteso che l’assenza di riconoscimento di un legame tra il bambino e la madre intenzionale pregiudica il primo, lasciandolo in una situazione di incertezza giuridica quanto alla sua identità nella società; b) l’art. 14 CEDU, per l’ingiustificata disparità di trattamento tra i nati, a seconda che siano stati concepiti con fecondazione eterologa praticata da coppia eterosessuale o da coppia omosessuale, essendo solo questi ultimi destinati ad uno status di figli unigenitoriali; c) l’art. 24, paragrafo 3, CDFUE, che prevede che «[i]l minore ha diritto di intrattenere regolarmente relazioni personali e contatti diretti con i due genitori, salvo qualora ciò sia contrario al suo interesse»; d) gli artt. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 e 18 della Convenzione ONU sui diritti del fanciullo, in quanto sarebbero violati gli impegni, assunti dallo Stato italiano in sede di ratifica, 1) a rispettare e garantire ad ogni fanciullo i diritti enunciati dalla Convenzione senza distinzione di sorta e ad adottare tutti i provvedimenti appropriati affinché il fanciullo sia effettivamente tutelato contro ogni forma di discriminazione o di sanzione (art. 2); 2) a tenere in considerazione «l’interesse superiore del fanciullo» in tutte le decisioni relative ai bambini (artt. 3 e 4); 3) a rispettare la responsabilità, il diritto ed il dovere dei genitori o dei membri della famiglia allargata di dargli l’orientamento ed i consigli adeguati all’esercizio dei diritti che gli sono convenzionalmente riconosciuti (art. 5); 4) a salvaguardare il diritto del fanciullo a essere «registrato immediatamente al momento della sua nascita e da allora» ad avere un nome «e, nella misura del possibile, a conoscere i suoi genitori ed a essere allevato da essi» (art. 7); 5) a garantire il diritto del fanciullo «a preservare la propria identità, ivi compresa la sua nazionalità, il suo nome e le sue relazioni famigliari» (art. 8); 6) a far sì che la separazione dai genitori sia misura di salvaguardia dell’interesse preminente del minore (art. 9) e, infine, 7) a garantire il riconoscimento del principio comune secondo il quale entrambi i genitori hanno una responsabilità comune per quanto riguarda l’educazione del fanciullo ed il provvedere al suo sviluppo (art. 18); e) gli artt. 1 e 6 della Convenzione europea sull’esercizio dei diritti dei fanciulli che impongono l’assunzione di decisioni giurisdizionali nel superiore interesse dei minori.

    ...

    8.1 […] Qualora vi sia una coppia di persone che ha intrapreso il percorso genitoriale, non è sufficiente il solo riconoscimento del rapporto con la madre biologica, sussistendo il «diritto del minore di mantenere un rapporto con entrambi i genitori» (sentenza n. 102 del 2020), diritto riconosciuto a livello di legislazione ordinaria (art. 315-bis, primo e secondo comma, e 337-ter, primo comma, cod. civ.) e affermato altresì da una pluralità di strumenti internazionali e dell’Unione europea (art. 8, comma 1, della Convenzione ONU sui diritti del fanciullo nonché art. 24, paragrafo 3, CDFUE). In altri termini – come osservato nella sentenza n. 33 del 2021 – ciò che è qui in discussione è unicamente l’interesse del minore a che sia affermata in capo a costoro la titolarità giuridica di quel fascio di doveri funzionali ai suoi interessi che l’ordinamento considera inscindibilmente legati all’esercizio di responsabilità genitoriali. Doveri ai quali non è pensabile che costoro possano ad libitum sottrarsi.