Article 4 - Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
Key facts of the case:
FM, a Russian citizen, lodged an application for asylum for herself and her minor daughters, one of which had the status of a person with a disability. By decision of 2 June 2022 the Migration Office of the Ministry of Interior declared the FM’s application for international protection inadmissible, as under applicable law, Poland was the state responsible for the proceedings. FM sought the annullement of the Migration Office' decision before the Košice Regional court. FM argued that the transfer of her daughter with a disability to Poland would have had the same effect as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment and that the Migration Ofifce had failed to apply the discretionary clause by which it had acquired competence to act in this case.The Košice Regional court by its judgment No 2SaZ/1/2022-33 annulled the defendant’s decision holding that the Migration Office did not sufficiently consider the health condition of the FM’s daughter with a disability which might lead to the possible infringement of the The Convention on the Right of the Child. The Migration Office subsequently complained before the Supreme Administrative Court requesting the annulment of the Regional court’s judgement.
Applicable law:
- Section 11(1)(c), Section 53b(1) of the Act No 280/2002 Coll. on Asylum and on amendment to certain acts (Asylum Act),
- Article 3(2), Article 17, Article 18(1)(c) and Article 29 (1) of the Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (Dublin III Regulation), replacing Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003(Dublin II Regulation), lays down the criteria and mechanisms for determining which EU country is responsible for examining an asylum application.
- Article 4 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 of 2 September 2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The Supreme Administrative Court was asked to consider: Whether there existed a reason for derogation from the responsibility of the first Member State, in which the application for international protection was lodged. Whether the Migration Office was obliged to reason why it did not apply the discretionary clause. Wether the transfer of a child with a disability in this case could have been considered to be an infringement of Article 4 of the EU Charter and what criteria should have be taken into account.
Outcome of the case:
The Supreme Administrative Court disagreed with the legal opinion of the court of first-instance and considered that it was not possible to conclude from FM’s submissions and the evidence adduced by her that the transfer to Poland would lead to a significant and irreversible deterioration in the health of the her minor daughter and, therefore, that FM and her daughters would be exposed to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, as they had already travelled from Russia to Poland, then from Poland to Ukraine, and then to Slovakia. As the Migration Office did not decide to use the discretionary clause pursuant to Art. 17 of the Dublin III regulations, it was not specifically obliged to reason its decision not to acquire the competence to act instead of authorities of other Member State, as such reasoning is compulsory only in the case of the application of discretionary clauseand not in case of its non-aplication.
28. The EU secondary law, including the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, must be interpreted and applied in compliance with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights (see judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 21 December 2011, N.S. and Others, C-411/10 and C-493/10, paragraphs 77 and 99). The Member States are thus bound by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as by Article 4 of the Charter, when applying Regulation (EU) No 604/2013.
36. The Supreme Administrative Court in no way disputes the medical diagnosis of the applicant's minor daughter and the fact that the transfer of a person with such a medical diagnosis is more complicated and difficult to prepare for and to carry out itself. However, it considers that the mere fact that the transfer is of a person with a medical diagnosis does not give rise to the conclusion that, by being expelled or transferred to another Member State, she will be subjected to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
38. The applicability of Article 17(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 in relation to an applicant with a medical diagnosis has been addressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in C. K. and Others v. Slovenia (C 578/16 PPU of 16 February 2017), leaving the application of Article 17 of the Dublin Regulation to the discretion of the Member States. In so far as the applicant's state of health is so serious that his transfer would constitute a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, which cannot be excluded even by measures taken pursuant to Articles 29 to 32 of the Dublin Regulation and Chapter III of Commission Implementing Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003, it would be incumbent on the authorities of the Member State to postpone the execution of the transfer decision until such time as the applicant's state of health improves. Alternatively, should it be established that the applicant's state of health may not improve during the six-month period referred to in Article 29(1) of the Dublin Regulation, or that a prolonged delay would entail a risk of deterioration of the applicant's condition, the requesting Member State may decide to assess the applicant's application itself, applying Article 17(1) of the Dublin Regulation (see also judgment of 30 May 2013, Halaf, C-528/11, EU:C:2013:342, paragraph 38). At the same time, however, that provision of Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter, cannot be interpreted as meaning that it implies an obligation on that Member State to make use of the discretionary clause.
28. Pravidlá sekundárneho práva Únie, vrátane ustanovení nariadenia (EÚ) č. 604/2013, je potrebné vykladať a uplatňovať pri rešpektovaní základných práv zaručených Chartou základných práv (pozri rozsudok Súdneho dvora EÚ z 21. decembra 2011, N. S. a i., C-411/10 a C-493/10, body 77 a 99). Členské štáty sú tak pri aplikovaní nariadenia (EÚ) č. 604/2013 viazaní judikatúrou Európskeho súdu pre ľudské práva, ako aj čl. 4 Charty.
36. Najvyšší správny súd žiadnym spôsobom nespochybňuje zdravotnú diagnózu maloletej dcéry žalobkyne a skutočnosť, že transfer osoby s takou zdravotnou diagnózou je komplikovanejším a zložitejším na prípravu a samotnú realizáciu. Má však za to, že len samotná skutočnosť, že sa jedná o odovzdanie osoby so zdravotnou diagnózou nezakladá záver o tom, že vyhostením, resp. odovzdaním do iného členského štátu bude vystavená reálnej hrozbe neľudského alebo ponižujúceho zaobchádzania, v rozpore s čl. 3 Dohovoru a čl. 4 Charty základných práv EÚ.
38. Možnosťou uplatnenia čl. 17 ods. 1 nariadenia (EÚ) č. 604/2013 vo vzťahu k žiadateľovi so zdravotnou diagnózou sa zaoberal Súdny dvor Európskej únie v rozsudku C. K. a ďalší proti Slovinsku (C 578/16 PPU zo 16.2.2017), pričom uplatnenie čl. 17 Dublinského nariadenia ponechal na rozhodnutí členských štátov. Pokiaľ by zdravotný stav žiadateľa bol natoľko závažný, že by jeho odovzdanie predstavovalo skutočné riziko neľudského alebo ponižujúceho zaobchádzania, ktoré nie je možné vylúčiť ani opatreniami, prijatými podľa čl. 29 až 32 Dublinského nariadenia a kapitoly III vykonávacieho nariadenia Komisie (ES) č. 1560/2003, bolo by povinnosťou orgánov členského štátu odložiť výkon rozhodnutia o odovzdaní dovtedy, keď sa zdravotný stav žiadateľa zlepší. Ak by sa prípadne zistilo, že zdravotný stav žiadateľa sa nemusí počas šesťmesačnej lehoty podľa čl. 29 ods. 1 Dublinského nariadenia zlepšiť, alebo že dlhodobý odklad by znamenal riziko zhoršenia stavu žiadateľa, môže sa žiadajúci členský štát rozhodnúť, že sám posúdi jeho žiadosť, aplikujúc čl. 17 ods. 1 Dublinského nariadenia (pozri aj rozsudok z 30. mája 2013, Halaf, C-528/11, EU:C:2013:342, bod 38). Zároveň však platí, že toto ustanovenie čl. 17 ods. 1 nariadenia Dublin III, chápané s prihliadnutím na článok 4 Charty, nemožno vykladať v tom zmysle, že znamená povinnosť tohto členského štátu využiť diskrečnú doložku.
