Article 4 - Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
Key facts of the case:
The plaintiff is an applicant for international protection. The first-instance court has dismissed the plaintiff’s action against the d decision of the Administrative Court (hereinafter: the defendant) to detain the applicant for the purpose of establishing certain facts on which his application for international protection was based, which could not be obtained without the measure imposed, at the premises of the Foreigners Centre for maximum three months, with the possibility of an extension of one month.
The first-instance court upheld the position of the defendant that there was a ground for restriction of movement in the present case under the International Protection Act. Since the applicant had left Slovenia arbitrarily on two occasions, it upheld the defendant’s assessment that in the present case there was a well-founded risk that the applicant would (again) abscond. As regards the deprivation of liberty (restriction of movement to the Foreigners Centre), the first-instance court explained that the Slovenian legislator had not yet transposed the provision of Article 8(4) of the Reception Directive (alternatives to detention) into national law. But in the first-instance court's view, in the specific circumstances of the applicant's case (where there is manifest risk of absconding), any other measure would be regarded as ineffective and that the measure imposed was also necessary.
The plaintiff appealed against the judgement of the first-instance court and argued that that the latter wrongfully concluded that the defendant correctly assessed and proved the existence of the risk of absconding. The plaintiff had already duly explained in the previous proceedings that he had left Slovenia for the first time to go to a friend to look for his personal documents and that he had been advised to leave the second time, and that in the proceedings in Germany he had expressly requested to return to Slovenia.
The plaintiff argued that the contested judgment does not address his allegations that, due to severe mental problems, he is not capable of forming an intent to abscond. In that connection, he requested the hearing of a psychiatric expert, which the court did not hold. The truth of the allegations concerning his psychiatric problems is also demonstrated by the fact that, after the main hearing, the appellant was admitted to a psychiatric hospital.
The plaintiff further submits that the judgment is incorrect in that it is not clear from the defendant's decision which fact the defendant intends to establish in order to decide on his application for international protection, which means that legal condition for restriction of movement is not fulfilled. The plaintiff submits that the defendant has failed to provide sufficient reasons as to why the measure of compulsory detention in the asylum home (instead of foreigners centre) would not be appropriate in the present case. The applicant notes that the defendant's reference to its own experience (that 80 % of applicants leave the asylum home without permission) is not sufficient. The ineffectiveness of less coercive means than detention in the Foreigners Centre must relate to the individual circumstances of the plaintiff and not to the general circumstances of ensuring order and security in the asylum home.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The purpose of the appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court in an administrative dispute is not to assess the facts, but to ensure that the judicial remedy before the first-instance court was correctly and lawfully exercised.
A detention measure is disproportionate to the interference with the health of the applicant for international protection if its enforcement would constitute a violation of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment laid down in Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, that is to say, where the measure would lead to (a serious deterioration of the applicant’s health.
Outcome of the case:
The appeal was upheld.
The decision of the first-instance court to reject as manifestly unnecessary the plaintiff's request for a hearing of a psychiatric expert and not to further address the plaintiff's allegations concerning the risk of deterioration of his health condition in the event of his continued detention in the Foreigners Centre leads to an infringement of the procedural rules, which require that the judgment under appeal be annulled and that the case be referred back to the first-instance court for a new procedure. In the new proceedings, the first instance court will have to address the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the risk of deterioration of his medical condition in accordance with the views expressed in this decision and, if necessary, to take all the evidence necessary to establish the relevant facts in order to decide the case correctly and lawfully, without prejudice to the plaintiff's rights under Article 4 of the Charter and Article 3 of the ECHR.
The core of the judgement: “A detention measure is disproportionate to the interference with the health of a plaintiff - the applicant for international protection if its enforcement would constitute a violation of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment laid down in Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, that is to say, where the measure would lead to (a deterioration in) a particularly serious state of health of the applicant for international protection.”
15. From the point of view of the proportionality of the measure, the state of health of the applicant for international protection (the plaintiff) is one of the circumstances which undoubtedly forms part of the assessment required under Article 8 of the Reception Directive II, in accordance with the interpretation of the Directive and of national law guaranteeing fundamental rights and the general principles of European Union law. As stated above, it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union ('the CJEU') that detention may only be used as a measure of last resort where it is established that its use is necessary, reasonable and proportionate in the light of the legitimate aim pursued. The CJEU emphasised that, although the proper functioning of the Common European Asylum System essentially requires that the competent national authorities have reliable information relating to the identity or nationality of the applicant for international protection and to the elements on which his or her application is based, this Article should not justify deciding on detention measures without those national authorities first having verified in each case whether they are proportionate to the purpose. Thus, a detention measure is disproportionate to the interference with the health of an applicant for international protection if its enforcement would violate the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment laid down in Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter the Charter), i.e. where the measure would lead to (a deterioration of) a particularly serious state of health of the applicant for international protection. It is clear from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which must be taken into account when interpreting Article 4 of the Charter, that suffering as a result of a naturally occurring physical or mental illness may be covered by Article 3(3) of the ECHR. Article 3 of the ECHR if, as a result of treatment resulting from a situation of detention, deportation or other measures for which responsibility may be attributed to the authorities, it is being, or is likely to be, aggravated, provided that the resulting suffering reaches the minimum severity required by that Article. Given the general and absolute nature of Article 4 of the Charter, these principled considerations are also relevant in the context of detention decisions under Reception Directive II. When assessing the lawfulness of a detention order, the courts must therefore assess the risk of such consequences being realised, since the execution of that order could lead to inhuman or degrading treatment of the person concerned.
16. In the judgment under appeal, the first-instance court did not address the plaintiff's allegations that (continued) detention would lead to a serious deterioration in his state of health, not even when rejecting the proposed evidence of a psychiatric expert. In this respect, the first-instance court therefore failed to assess the alleged consequences as not reaching the level of seriousness, in the above-mentioned sense and in accordance with the case-law of the ECtHR and the CJEU, to be considered irrelevant for the purposes of the decision in the particular case. The Administrative Court also failed to investigate the facts at the main hearing in a manner which could have further clarified the merits of the above-mentioned request for evidence, since, in the context of the answers given by the plaintiff to the questions put by his attorney concerning the existence of his health problems, it did not itself ask any questions which it could have asked pursuant to the power conferred on it by Article 285 of the ZPP [Civil Procedure Act], which governs the substantive conduct of proceedings. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff himself did not testify further at the hearing, in the light of the allegations previously made in the application and the offer of evidence for an expert witness, does not lead to the conclusion that the circumstances relevant for the decision were not put forward, or to the conclusion that the court fulfilled its duty to assess the facts alleged, which could have resulted in a violation of the plaintiff's rights under Article 4 of the Charter and Article 3 of the ECHR.
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18. Against this background, the fact that the Slovenian legislator has not yet fully transposed into national law the provision of Article 8(4) of the Reception Directive II (according to which Member States shall ensure that rules on alternatives to detention are laid down in national law) is particularly serious. Precisely in those cases where the above-mentioned assessment of the proportionality of the detention measure would dictate an alternative measure, in particular in order to protect human rights guaranteed under the Charter and the ECHR, the failure to comply with the requirements of the Directive also results in the fact that the court in an administrative dispute under the ZMZ-1 [International Protection Act] cannot decide on the choice of an alternative, proportionate measure (such as regular reporting, a financial guarantee, or detention in a specific area, etc.).
19. In the light of the foregoing, the decision of the first-instance court to reject as manifestly unnecessary the plaintiff’s request for a hearing of a psychiatric expert and not to further address the plaintiff's allegations concerning the risk of deterioration of his state of health in the event of his continued detention in the Foreigners Centre leads to an infringement of the procedural rules (Article 75(2) of the Administrative Dispute Act), which requires that the judgment under appeal be annulled and that the case be referred back to the first-instance court for a new procedure (Article 77 of the Administrative Dispute Act). In the new proceedings, the first-instance court will have to address the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the risk of deterioration of his health in accordance with the views expressed in this decision of the Supreme Court and, if necessary, take all the evidence necessary to establish the relevant facts in order to give a correct and lawful decision in the case, without prejudice to the plaintiff’s rights under Article 4 of the Charter and Article 3 of the ECHR.
Jedro: “Ukrep pridržanja je v nesorazmerju s posegom v zdravje prosilca za mednarodno zaščito, če bi njegova izvršitev pomenila kršitev prepovedi nečloveškega in ponižujočega ravnanja in kaznovanja, določeno v 4. členu Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah, torej kadar bi ukrep vodil do (poslabšanja) posebej resnega zdravstvenega stanja prosilca za mednarodno zaščito.”
15. Z vidika sorazmernosti ukrepa je namreč zdravstveno stanje prosilca za mednarodno zaščito (pritožnika) ena od okoliščin, ki je nedvomno del presoje, ki se zahteva po 8. členu Recepcijske direktive II, skladno z razlago direktive in nacionalnega prava, ki zagotavlja temeljne pravice in splošna načela prava Evropske unije. Kot že navedeno zgoraj, izhaja iz prakse Sodišča Evropske unije (v nadaljevanju SEU), da se lahko pridržanje uporabi le kot skrajno sredstvo, kadar se ugotovi, da je njegova uporaba nujna, razumna in sorazmerna glede na legitimen cilj. SEU je poudarilo, da čeprav pravilno delovanje skupnega evropskega azilnega sistema v bistvu zahteva, da pristojni nacionalni organi razpolagajo z zanesljivimi informacijami, ki se nanašajo na identiteto ali državljanstvo prosilca za mednarodno zaščito in na elemente, na katerih temelji njegova prošnja, ta člen ne bi smel upravičiti tega, da se o ukrepih pridržanja odloči, ne da bi ti nacionalni organi prej v vsakem primeru posebej preverili, ali so ti sorazmerni z namenom. Tako je ukrep pridržanja v nesorazmerju s posegom v zdravje prosilca za mednarodno zaščito, če bi njegova izvršitev pomenila kršitev prepovedi nečloveškega in ponižujočega ravnanja in kaznovanja, določeno v 4. členu Listine Evropske unije o temeljnih pravicah (v nadaljevanju Listina), torej kadar bi ukrep vodil do (poslabšanja) posebej resnega zdravstvenega stanja prosilca za mednarodno zaščito. Iz sodne prakse Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice (v nadaljevanju ESČP) v zvezi s 3. členom Evropske konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin (v nadaljevanju EKČP), ki jo je treba upoštevati pri razlagi 4. člena Listine, je razvidno, da je lahko trpljenje zaradi telesne ali duševne bolezni, ki je nastopila naravno, zajeto s 3. členom EKČP, če se zaradi ravnanja, ki je posledica pripornih razmer, izgona ali drugih ukrepov, za katere je mogoče odgovornost pripisati oblastem, stopnjuje ali obstaja tveganje, da se bo stopnjevalo, in to pod pogojem, da trpljenje, ki iz tega izvira, dosega minimalno resnost, ki se zahteva s tem členom. Ob upoštevanju splošne in absolutne narave 4. člena Listine so ti načelni preudarki upoštevni tudi v okviru odločanja o pridržanju na podlagi Recepcijske direktive II. Sodišča morajo ob presoji zakonitosti sklepa o pridržanju torej presoditi nevarnost za uresničitev teh posledic, ker bi lahko izvršitev tega sklepa pripeljala do nečloveškega ali ponižujočega ravnanja s to osebo.
16. Sodišče prve stopnje se v izpodbijani sodbi niti ob zavrnitvi predlaganega dokaza z izvedencem psihiatrične stroke niti sicer ni opredelilo do navedb pritožnika, da bo (nadaljnje) pridržanje povzročilo resno poslabšanje njegovega zdravstvenega stanja.13 S tega vidika torej ni ovrednotilo zatrjevanih posledic kot takih, ki ne dosegajo stopnje resnosti v zgoraj navedenem smislu in skladno s prakso ESČP in SEU, da bi jih lahko štelo kot neupoštevne za odločitev v konkretni zadevi. Upravno sodišče tudi na glavni obravnavi ni razčiščevalo navedenih dejstev na način, ki bi lahko nadalje razjasnil (ne)utemeljenost navedenega dokaznega predloga, saj ob odgovorih pritožnika na vprašanja njegove pooblaščenke v zvezi z obstojem njegovih zdravstvenih težav samo ni zastavilo nobenih vprašanj, ki bi jih lahko zastavilo na podlagi pooblastila iz 285. člena ZPP, ki ureja materialno procesno vodstvo.14 Zgolj iz dejstva, da pritožnik ob predhodno podanih navedbah v tožbi ter podanem dokaznem predlogu postavitve izvedenca o tem na obravnavi sam ni več izpovedoval, pa ni mogoče sklepati na to, da za odločitev pomembne okoliščine niso (bile) podane oziroma šteti, da je sodišče izpolnilo svojo dolžnost presoje navedenih dejstev, ki bi lahko povzročila kršitev pravic pritožnika po 4. členu Listine in 3. členu EKČP.
18. Ob navedenem se kaže kot posebej resno dejstvo, da slovenski zakonodajalec v nacionalno zakonodajo še ni v celoti prenesel določbe četrtega odstavka 8. člena Recepcijske direktive II (po kateri države članice zagotovijo, da so pravila o alternativah pridržanja določena v nacionalnem pravu). Prav v primerih, kjer bi navedena presoja sorazmernosti ukrepa pridržanja, še posebej zaradi varstva človekovih pravic, zagotovljenih po Listini in EKČP, narekovala alternativni ukrep, ima neuresničitev zahtev direktive tudi za posledico, da sodišče v upravnem sporu po ZMZ-1 ne more odločiti o izbiri drugega, sorazmernega ukrepa (kot so redno javljanje, finančno jamstvo ali zadrževanje na določenem območju itd.).
19. Glede na navedeno odločitev sodišča prve stopnje, ki je kot očitno nepotreben zavrnilo pritožnikov predlog za zaslišanje izvedenca psihiatrične stroke in se ni nadalje opredeljevalo do pritožnikovih navedb glede nevarnosti poslabšanja njegovega zdravstvenega stanja ob nadaljnjem pridržanju v Centru za tujce, vodi do kršitve pravil postopka (drugi odstavek 75. člena ZUS-1), ki narekuje razveljavitev izpodbijane sodbe in vrnitev zadeve sodišču prve stopnje, da opravi nov postopek (77. člen ZUS-1). V novem postopku se bo moralo sodišče prve stopnje opredeliti do navedb pritožnika glede nevarnosti poslabšanja njegovega zdravstvenega stanja skladno s stališči iz tega sklepa Vrhovnega sodišča in po potrebi izvesti vse dokaze za ugotovitev upoštevnega dejanskega stanja za pravilno in zakonito odločitev v zadevi, ki ne bo posegala v pravice pritožnika iz 4. člena Listine in 3. člena EKČP.
