Article 3 - Right to integrity of the person
Article 4 - Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
Article 35 - Health care
Key facts of the case:
The Court of Appeals of Milan had to decide on the execution of a European arrest warrant issued by the Court of Zadar against an Italian citizen to be tried in Croatia for the offence of possession and sale of drugs. A medical examination ordered by the Court of Appeal had shown that the defendant was suffering from a chronic mental illness of indefinite duration, incompatible with detention in prison. Since the Italian law on the European arrest warrant – Articles 18 and 18-bis of the Law No. 69/2015, implementing the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA – does not provide that the Italian judicial authority may refuse surrender in such a case, the Court of Appeals asked the Constitutional Court to declare the Italian rules unconstitutional, arguing that they were contrary to the right to health, protected by Articles 2 and 32 of the Italian Constitution.
Key legal question raised by the Court:
The Constitutional Court stressed that it has not the competence to decide the question raised by the Court of Appeals of Milan. The Constitutional Court noted first of all that not even the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant provides for the possibility of refusing to surrender a person in such a case. Consequently, the doubts as to the compatibility of the national law with the fundamental rights of the person concerned could not fail to affect the very provisions of the Framework Decision. However, the Court has observed that, in matters subject to full harmonisation of legislation, such as the arrest warrant, it is primarily a matter of European Union law to lay down the standards of protection of fundamental rights, compliance with which is a prerequisite for the lawfulness of the rules governing the European arrest warrant and its practical implementation at national level. Any other solution would, as the Court of Justice has repeatedly held, undermine the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law.
Outcome of the case:
The Constitutional Court considered it necessary to refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In particular, the CJEU will have to clarify whether and to what extent the principles and procedures already established in relation to other possible grounds for refusing surrender, not expressly provided for in the Framework Decision (such as in the case of systemic prison overcrowding or serious problems relating to the lack of independence of the judiciary in the requesting State), can also be extended to the hypothesis that surrender could expose the person concerned to the risk of suffering serious damage to his health. Pending the CJEU’s decision, the main proceeding was suspended.
“5. […] Indeed, Articles 3, 4 and 4-bis of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant, which govern the mandatory and optional grounds for refusing surrender, do not expressly include among them the situation of serious danger to the health of the person concerned arising from the surrender itself, connected with a chronic pathology of potentially indefinite duration. Accordingly, the doubts - raised by the referring court - as to the compatibility of Articles 18 and 18-bis of Law No 69 of 2005 with the Italian Constitution cannot fail to concern also the rules governing Articles 3, 4 and 4-bis of the Framework Decision, in relation to the corresponding fundamental rights recognised by the Charter and Article 6 TEU.”
“7.3 The general principle that the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, and consequently its implementation at the level of each Member State, must respect the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 6 TEU is explicitly stated, both in Recital 12 and in Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision. Moreover, that principle underlies the entire legal order of the European Union, in which - as is clear, inter alia, from Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) - fundamental rights are binding both on the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, first and foremost in their legislative output, and on the Member States when they implement European Union law.”
“7.4 It follows that it is primarily a matter of EU law to establish the standards of protection of fundamental rights to which the legitimacy of the rules of the European Arrest Warrant, and its concrete execution at national level, are subject, since this is a matter subject to full harmonisation. The precise prevision, in Articles 3, 4 and 4 bis of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, of the possible grounds for refusal of surrender, compulsory or optional, aims, precisely, to ensure that the concrete implementation of the discipline of the European Arrest Warrant respects the fundamental rights of the individual – in the extension recognized by the Charter, in the light of the ECHR and of the common constitutional traditions – in conformity with the principle enunciated in Recital 12 and Article 1, para 3, of the Framework Decision.”
“8. Moreover, European Union law itself could not tolerate the execution of the European arrest warrant leading to a breach of the fundamental rights of the person concerned recognised by the Charter and Article 6(3) TEU.”
“10. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the present proceedings should be suspended and the question whether Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant, read in the light of Articles 3, 4 and 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), should be interpreted as meaning that, where the executing judicial authority considers that the surrender of a person suffering from a serious, chronic and potentially irreversible illness could place them at risk of serious damage to their health, it must request from the issuing judicial authority information enabling it to rule out the existence of that risk and must refuse to surrender the person if it does not obtain such assurances within a reasonable period of time.”
“The Constitutional Court hereby requests the Court of Justice of the European Union, pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to give a preliminary ruling on the following question: Must Article 1(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant, read in the light of Articles 3, 4 and 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), be interpreted as meaning that, where the executing judicial authority considers that the surrender of a person suffering from a serious, chronic and potentially irreversible illness would expose him to the risk of serious damage to their health, it must ask the issuing judicial authority for information enabling it to rule out the existence of that risk and must refuse to surrender the person if it does not obtain such assurances within a reasonable period of time.”
“5. […]Infatti, gli artt. 3, 4 e 4-bis della decisione quadro 2002/584/GAI sul mandato di arresto europeo, che disciplinano i motivi di rifiuto obbligatori e facoltativi della consegna, non includono espressamente tra i medesimi la situazione di grave pericolo per la salute dell’interessato derivante dalla consegna stessa, connesso a una patologia cronica e di durata potenzialmente indeterminabile. Pertanto, i dubbi – sollevati dal giudice rimettente – di compatibilità degli artt. 18 e 18-bis della legge n. 69 del 2005 con la Costituzione italiana non possono non investire anche la disciplina degli artt. 3, 4 e 4-bis della decisione quadro, in relazione ai corrispondenti diritti fondamentali riconosciuti dalla Carta e dall’art. 6 TUE.”
“7.3 – Il principio generale secondo cui la decisione quadro sul mandato d’arresto europeo, e conseguentemente la sua attuazione a livello di ciascuno Stato membro, debbono rispettare i diritti fondamentali sanciti dall’art. 6 TUE è affermato esplicitamente, sia dal considerando n. 12, sia dall’art. 1, paragrafo 3, della decisione quadro. Inoltre, tale principio è sotteso all’intero ordinamento giuridico dell’Unione, nel quale – come risulta, tra l’altro, dall’art. 51, paragrafo 1, della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea (CDFUE) – i diritti fondamentali vincolano tanto le istituzioni, organi e organismi dell’Unione, in primis nella loro produzione normativa, quanto gli Stati membri allorché attuino il diritto dell’Unione.”
“7.4 Da ciò consegue che spetta in primo luogo al diritto dell’Unione stabilire gli standard di tutela dei diritti fondamentali al cui rispetto sono subordinate la legittimità della disciplina del mandato di arresto europeo, e la sua concreta esecuzione a livello nazionale, trattandosi di materia oggetto di integrale armonizzazione. La puntuale previsione, agli artt. 3, 4 e 4-bis della decisione quadro 2002/584/GAI, dei possibili motivi di rifiuto della consegna, obbligatori o facoltativi, mira per l’appunto a far sì che l’attuazione concreta della disciplina sul mandato di arresto europeo rispetti i diritti fondamentali della persona – nell’estensione loro riconosciuta dalla Carta, alla luce della CEDU e delle tradizioni costituzionali comuni –, in conformità al principio enunciato dal considerando n. 12 e dall’art. 1, paragrafo 3, della decisione quadro.”
“8. Peraltro, lo stesso diritto dell’Unione non potrebbe tollerare che l’esecuzione del mandato di arresto europeo determini una violazione dei diritti fondamentali dell’interessato riconosciuti dalla Carta e dall’art. 6, paragrafo 3, TUE.”
“10. Tutto ciò premesso, questa Corte ritiene di sospendere il giudizio in corso e di sottoporre alla Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea, ai sensi dell’art. 267 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea (TFUE), il quesito se l’art. 1, paragrafo 3, della decisione Quadro 2002/584/GAI sul mandato di arresto europeo, letto alla luce degli artt. 3, 4 e 35 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’unione europea (CDFUE), debba essere interpretato nel senso che l’autorità giudiziaria di esecuzione, ove ritenga che la consegna di una persona afflitta da gravi patologie di carattere cronico e potenzialmente irreversibili possa esporla al pericolo di subire un grave pregiudizio alla sua salute, debba richiedere all’autorità giudiziaria emittente le informazioni che consentano di escludere la sussistenza di questo rischio, e sia tenuta a rifiutare la consegna allorché non ottenga assicurazioni in tal senso entro un termine ragionevole.”
“La Corte costituzionale dispone di sottoporre alla Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea, in via pregiudiziale ai sensi dell’art. 267 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea (TFUE): se l’art. 1, paragrafo 3, della decisione quadro 2002/584/GAI sul mandato di arresto europeo, letto alla luce degli artt. 3, 4 e 35 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’unione europea (CDFUE), debba essere interpretato nel senso che l’autorità giudiziaria di esecuzione, ove ritenga che la consegna di una persona afflitta da gravi patologie di carattere cronico e potenzialmente irreversibili possa esporla al pericolo di subire un grave pregiudizio alla sua salute, debba richiedere all’autorità giudiziaria emittente le informazioni che consentano di escludere la sussistenza di questo rischio, e sia tenuta a rifiutare la consegna allorché non ottenga assicurazioni in tal senso entro un termine ragionevole.”
