CJEU Case C-544/23 / Judgment

T.T. and BAJI Trans, s.r. o. v Národný inšpektorát práce
Deciding body type
Court of Justice of the European Union
Type
Decision
Decision date
01/08/2025
ECLI (European case law identifier)
ECLI:EU:C:2025:614
  • CJEU Case C-544/23 / Judgment

    Key facts of the case:

    Reference for a preliminary ruling – Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EU) No 165/2014 – Obligation periodically to inspect tachographs – Exemption – Last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 51(1) thereof – Principle lex posterior mitius – Administrative penalties of a criminal nature – Appeal in cassation – New law having entered into force after the ruling which is the subject of that appeal – Concept of ‘final conviction’.

    Outcome of the case:

    On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules:

    1. Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is implementing Union law for the purposes of that provision when (i) in accordance with Article 19(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 of 20 December 1985 on recording equipment in road transport, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006, and Article 41(1) of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on tachographs in road transport, repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport, it imposes an administrative penalty on the driver of a vehicle because of a failure, by that driver, to fulfil obligations laid down by those regulations and (ii) it subsequently avails itself of the possibility which it is recognised as having under Article 3(2) of Regulation No 165/2014 of exempting certain road transport vehicles from having to comply with such obligations.
    2. The last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be interpreted as meaning that it is capable of being applied to an administrative penalty of a criminal nature which has been imposed on the basis of a rule which, after the imposition of the penalty, has been amended in a way which is more favourable to the person concerned by that penalty, provided that that amendment reflects a change of position regarding the criminal classification of the acts committed by that person or regarding the penalty to be applied.
    3. The last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be interpreted as meaning that a court hearing an appeal in cassation against a judicial decision dismissing the action brought against an administrative fine of a criminal nature and falling within the scope of EU law is, in principle, required to apply a piece of national legislation which is more favourable to the convicted person and which entered into force after the delivery of that judicial decision, irrespective of whether that decision is regarded as final under national law.
  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter

    46. By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 51(1) of the Charter is to be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is implementing Union law for the purposes of that provision when, in accordance with Article 19(1) of Regulation No 3821/85 and Article 41(1) of Regulation No 165/2014, it imposes an administrative penalty on the driver of a vehicle because of a failure, by that driver, to fulfil obligations laid down by those regulations.

    ...

    48. Having clarified that aspect, it follows from Article 51(1) of the Charter that the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.

    ...

    50. Furthermore, it can be seen from the settled case-law of the Court that a Member State is implementing Union law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter where it is discharging the obligation, set out in an act of EU law, to provide for penalties with regard to the offences referred to by that act (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 27, and of 19 October 2023, G. ST. T. (Proportionality of the penalty for trade mark infringement), C‑655/21, EU:C:2023:791, paragraph 43).

    ...

    52. It follows that, by adopting Paragraph 38(1)(a)(1) of Law No 462/2007 and by imposing an administrative fine on T.T. for having, on 4 November 2015, driven a vehicle transporting ready-mixed concrete without complying with the obligations periodically to inspect the tachograph with which that vehicle had to be equipped, the Slovak authorities were implementing Union law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter.

    ...

    54. Therefore, in order to provide the referring court with a full answer, it is also necessary to note that, by making such an amendment to the relevant national legislation, the Slovak legislature was also implementing Union law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter.

    ...

    56. According to the settled case-law of the Court, where a Member State adopts measures in connection with a margin of discretion which is an integral part of the regime established by an act of EU law, it must be regarded as implementing that law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter (see, in that regard, judgments of 13 June 2017, Florescu and Others, C‑258/14, EU:C:2017:448, paragraph 48, and of 29 July 2024, protectus, C‑185/23, EU:C:2024:657, paragraph 59).

    57. The dispute at issue in the main proceedings thus concerns national legislation which is implementing Union law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter, with the result that the requirements stemming from the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter must be complied with in the context of that dispute (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Real Madrid Club de Fútbol, C‑633/22, EU:C:2024:843, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).

    58. It follows from all the foregoing considerations that Article 51(1) of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is implementing Union law for the purposes of that provision when (i) in accordance with Article 19(1) of Regulation No 3821/85 and Article 41(1) of Regulation No 165/2014, it imposes an administrative penalty on the driver of a vehicle because of a failure, by that driver, to fulfil obligations laid down by those regulations and (ii) it subsequently avails itself of the possibility which it is recognised as having under Article 3(2) of Regulation No 165/2014 of exempting certain road transport vehicles from having to comply with such obligations.

    59. By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter is to be interpreted as meaning that it is capable of being applied to an administrative penalty which has been imposed on the basis of a rule which, after the imposition of the penalty, has been amended in a way which is more favourable to the person concerned by that penalty.

    60. As a preliminary point, it should be emphasised that the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter provides that, if, subsequent to the date on which the offence was committed, the law provides for a lighter penalty, that lighter penalty must be applied.

    ...

    62. It is apparent from the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17) relating to Article 49 of the Charter that that provision applies to the field of criminal law.

    63. As the Advocate General noted in point 52 of his Opinion, it can be seen from the settled case-law of the Court that three criteria are relevant for assessing the criminal nature of a penalty for the purposes of, inter alia, applying Article 49 of the Charter. The first is the legal classification of the offence under national law, the second is the intrinsic nature of the offence, and the third is the degree of severity of the penalty which the person concerned is liable to incur (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 June 2012, Bonda, C‑489/10, EU:C:2012:319, paragraph 37, and of 4 May 2023, Agenția Națională de Integritate, C‑40/21, EU:C:2023:367, paragraph 34).

    64. Although it is for the referring court to assess, in the light of those criteria, whether the fine imposed on T.T. is of a criminal nature for the purposes of Article 49(1) of the Charter, the Court, when giving a preliminary ruling, may nevertheless provide clarification designed to give the national court guidance in its assessment (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 May 2023, Agenția Națională de Integritate, C‑40/21, EU:C:2023:367, paragraph 36).

    ...

    66. However, the application of Article 49 of the Charter extends, even in the case of offences which are not classified as ‘criminal’ under domestic law, to proceedings and to penalties which must be considered to have a criminal nature on the basis of the other two criteria referred to in paragraph 63 of the present judgment (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 June 2021, Latvijas Republikas Saeima (Penalty points), C‑439/19, EU:C:2021:504, paragraph 88, and of 14 September 2023, Vinal, C‑820/21, EU:C:2023:667, paragraph 49).

    67. Regarding, next, the second criterion based on the intrinsic nature of the offence, that criterion involves ascertaining whether the measure at issue has, inter alia, a punitive purpose, which is the distinctive feature of a penalty of a criminal nature for the purposes of Article 49 of the Charter, and the mere fact that it also pursues a deterrent purpose does not mean that it cannot be characterised as a criminal penalty. It is of the very nature of criminal penalties that they seek both to punish and to deter unlawful conduct. By contrast, a measure which merely repairs the damage caused by the offence at issue is not criminal in nature (judgments of 22 June 2021, Latvijas Republikas Saeima (Penalty points), C‑439/19, EU:C:2021:504, paragraph 89, and of 14 September 2023, Vinal, C‑820/21, EU:C:2023:667, paragraph 50).

    ...

    73. If, however, following an examination of all the relevant circumstances, that court were to find that that fine is not of a criminal nature and that, accordingly, the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter does not apply to the dispute in the main proceedings, no rule of EU law would require, in this instance, observance of the principle lex mitior.

    ...

    75. It is true that the Court has established the existence of such a principle, even before the entry into force of the Charter, relying on the constitutional traditions common to the Member States (judgment of 3 May 2005, Berlusconi and Others, C‑387/02, C‑391/02 and C‑403/02, EU:C:2005:270, paragraphs 68 and 69). However, as was noted by the Advocate General, in essence, in point 67 of his Opinion, there is no common constitutional tradition which is capable of supporting extending the principle lex mitior to penalties which are not of a criminal nature.

    76. That finding is borne out by the choice, on the part of the authors of the Charter, to limit the scope of the principle of the more lenient criminal law, as guaranteed in the last sentence of Article 49(1) thereof, only to measures falling within the field of criminal law, as well as by the fact that the scope of Article 7 ECHR is also limited to those measures alone.

    ...

    80. The obligation to apply, pursuant to the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter, a law post-dating the commission of the offence is subject to the condition that that law ‘provides for a lighter penalty’.

    ...

    92. Lastly, it should be borne in mind that Article 49 of the Charter contains, at the very least, the same guarantees as those provided for in Article 7 ECHR, which must be taken into account by virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter as a minimum threshold of protection (judgment of 29 July 2024, Alchaster, C‑202/24, EU:C:2024:649, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited). The Court must, accordingly, ensure that its interpretation in the present case ensures a level of protection which does not disregard that guaranteed in Article 7 ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (judgment of 10 November 2022, DELTA STROY 2003, C‑203/21, EU:C:2022:865, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

    93. In that regard, it should be noted that the requirements, set out in paragraph 81 of the present judgment, to which a possible application of the principle lex posterior mitius is subject under Article 49(1) of the Charter ensure, in view of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights referred to in paragraph 82 of the present judgment, a level of protection of that principle which does not disregard the level of protection guaranteed in Article 7 ECHR, as interpreted by that court.

    94. It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that it is capable of being applied to an administrative penalty of a criminal nature which has been imposed on the basis of a rule which, after the imposition of the penalty, has been amended in a way which is more favourable to the person concerned by that penalty, provided that that amendment reflects a change of position regarding the criminal classification of the acts committed by that person or regarding the penalty to be applied.

    95. By its third and fourth questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter is to be interpreted as meaning that a court hearing an appeal in cassation against a judicial decision dismissing the action brought against an administrative fine of a criminal nature and falling within the scope of EU law is required to apply a piece of legislation which is more favourable to the convicted person and which entered into force after the delivery of that judicial decision, irrespective of whether that decision is regarded as final under national law.

    96. In the first place, it should be borne in mind that the Court has already held that the rule lex posterior mitius, contained in the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter, applies so long as no final conviction has been handed down (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 56).

    ...

    98. It should be noted that that interpretation of the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter does not disregard the threshold of protection provided by Article 7 ECHR. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the principle lex posterior mitius, as guaranteed in Article 7(1) ECHR, means that, where there are differences between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and subsequent criminal laws enacted before a final ruling is delivered, the courts must apply the law whose provisions are most favourable to the defendant (see, to that effect, ECtHR, 17 September 2009, Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2), CE:ECHR:2009:0917JUD001024903, § 109).

    99. In the second place, although the rules of criminal procedure fall within the competence of the Member States in so far as the European Union has not legislated in that field, the Member States are nonetheless required, in exercising that competence, to comply with their obligations under EU law, including the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 April 2024, Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Bolzano, C‑178/22, EU:C:2024:371, paragraph 44).

    100. Accordingly, while the assessment of the ‘final’ nature of the conviction must be carried out on the basis of the law of the Member State in which that conviction was handed down (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 June 2014, M, C‑398/12, EU:C:2014:1057, paragraph 36), the fact remains that, for the purpose of applying the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter, that concept must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, in so far as it determines the extent of the right guaranteed by that provision and, consequently, the extent of the obligations derived therefrom for the Member States.

    101. It follows, as was emphasised by the Advocate General, in essence, in point 99 of his Opinion, that the fact that a conviction is regarded as final under national law is not decisive for the purposes of the application, by the court hearing an appeal against the decision handing down that conviction, of the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter.

    102. It follows, as was emphasised by the Advocate General, in essence, in point 99 of his Opinion, that the fact that a conviction is regarded as final under national law is not decisive for the purposes of the application, by the court hearing an appeal against the decision handing down that conviction, of the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter.

    103. That is the case where the convicted person or the public prosecuting authority may bring, within a time limit determined by law and without having to rely on exceptional circumstances (such as the need to ensure, in the interests of the law, the consistency of case-law), proceedings before a court in order to obtain annulment or variation of the conviction or the penalty imposed, notwithstanding the fact that such proceedings are regarded, under national law, as an extraordinary remedy which, according to the information provided by the referring court as referred to in paragraph 43 of the present judgment, would, in this instance, be the case under Slovak law. As long as the time limit for bringing such proceedings has not expired or a ruling has not been given thereon, the decision relating to that conviction and that penalty cannot be regarded as having definitively barred further prosecution for the purpose of applying the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter.

    ...

    105. It follows that, where an appeal in cassation is launched, under the conditions referred to in paragraph 103 of the present judgment, against a judicial decision, that decision cannot become final for the purposes of the application of the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter until the parties have exhausted that legal remedy or have allowed the time limit for bringing such an appeal to have elapsed without having lodged such an appeal.

    106. Accordingly, the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter means that a court hearing an appeal in cassation is, in principle, obliged to ensure that the perpetrator of an offence the penalising of which constitutes the implementation of Union law benefits from a piece of criminal legislation that is favourable to that perpetrator, even if that piece of legislation entered into force after the delivery of the judicial decision that is the subject of that appeal in cassation.

    ...

    109. Subject to verification by the referring court, the decision of the Krajský súd v Bratislave (Regional Court, Bratislava) of 27 March 2019 therefore cannot be regarded as a ‘final conviction’ for the purpose of applying the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter.

    110. It follows that, if the referring court were to consider that the administrative fine which has been imposed on T.T. is of a criminal nature, that court would be required to apply the piece of legislation which is more favourable to him for the purposes of the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter, which is Paragraph 2(2) of Law No 461/2007, read in conjunction with Regulation 2020/1054, irrespective of the fact that that piece of legislation entered into force after the decision, classified as final under national law, of the Krajský súd v Bratislave (Regional Court, Bratislava). That obligation is not affected by the fact that the referring court is required, under that law, to give a ruling in light of the situation existing on the date that decision was handed down.

    ...

    112. The last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter is worded in a way that is clear and precise and is not subject to any conditions, meaning that it has direct effect.

    113. Accordingly, if the referring court were to find that its domestic law does not permit it to apply the guarantees derived from the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter to the dispute pending before it and if it is not possible to envisage interpreting that law in conformity with EU law, that court would be required to ensure, within the framework of its competences, the protection derived, for litigants, from the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter and to guarantee the full effect of that provision by disapplying, if necessary, any provision of national legislation that is contrary thereto.

    114. It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the last sentence of Article 49(1) of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that a court hearing an appeal in cassation against a judicial decision dismissing the action brought against an administrative fine of a criminal nature and falling within the scope of EU law is, in principle, required to apply a piece of national legislation which is more favourable to the convicted person and which entered into force after the delivery of that judicial decision, irrespective of whether that decision is regarded as final under national law.

  • Paragraphs referring to EU Charter (original language)